MARGARET M. SIDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS MARINO, III, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed modification of visitation arrangement, holding that informal parental agreement to increase father's time-sharing does not constitute substantial change in circumstances required by statute.
Modification of a consent decree's visitation arrangement requires competent, substantial evidence of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances, not merely informal parental agreement or exercise of existing rights.
[1] Modification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule under Florida Statutes sections 61.13(2)(e) and (3) requires proof of a substantial, material, and unanticipate…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“allowing an agreement between the parents to provide a basis for modification would discourage parents from making informal, joint decisions for the benefit of their children”
Court's reasoning for why informal parental agreements cannot serve as basis for modification of custody/visitation arrangements
Margaret Sidman and Louis Marino, III entered into a consent decree in 2000 establishing a visitation arrangement. The father began exercising his ful…
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Margaret Sidman appeals an order modifying the visitation arrangement contained in the consent decree she entered into with Louis Marino, III, in 2000. We find that the lower court abused its discretion by modifying visitation without competent, substantial evidence of a substantial change in circumstances. See, e.g., Jannotta v. Hess, 959 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Sections 61.13(2)(e) and (3), Florida Statutes, each require, proof that modification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule is in the best interests of the child and is based upon a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances. See Kelly v. Colston, 977 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Krohn v. Foster, 856 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although the evidence may have shown that increasing the father’s time with the child is in the child’s best interest, there was no evidence of an unanticipated and substantial change in circumstances. The father had merely begun exercising the full visitation rights allowed in the consent decree, and an additional weekly overnight that the mother had agreed to informally. As we have said regarding modification of custody arrangements, allowing an agreement between the parents to provide a basis for modification would discourage parents from making informal, joint decisions for the benefit of their children. See, e.g., Smoak v. Smoak, 658 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BENTON, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
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Telissa A. Brown v. Schane D. Brown, 124 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
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Idelson v. Jayson Carmer (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
Authorities Cited
- Smoak v. Smoak, 658 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Hancock v. State, 977 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- Austin v. State, 492 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Mathis v. State, 959 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- U.S. Foundry & Mfg., Inc. v. Vaughn Carner, 959 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Walker v. Copertino, 856 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Krohn v. Foster, 856 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)