MICHAEL A. ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Anderson appealed the denial of his postconviction motion seeking relief from the revocation of prison time credits by the Department of Corrections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the motion as untimely, holding that the two-year limitation period for filing a Rule 3.850 motion began when the DOC revoked the credits in November 1999, not when his original sentence became final.
The motion was untimely. Although the trial court's reasoning was incorrect, the result was correct. The two-year limitation period for filing a Rule 3.850 motion based on the revocation of prison credits began when the DOC revoked the credits in November 1999, not when the original judgment became final in 1995. Accordingly, any motion had to be filed by November 2001, and Anderson's January 2003 filing was untimely.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief is untimely if filed more than two years after the date the judgments and sentences became final, unless an exception applies.
[2] A defendant has two years from the date of the Department of Corrections' revocation of previously awarded prison credit to file a motion for postconviction relief based…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“At the time his 1995 judgments and sentences became final, Anderson had no way of knowing that later the DOC would revoke the prison credit previously recognized.”
Establishes that the limitation period cannot begin before the defendant becomes aware of the revocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson pleaded guilty in seven criminal cases in 1993 and was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to a split sentence of ten years (five suspend…
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COVINGTON, Judge.
Michael A. Anderson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We agree with the trial court that his motion is untimely, but for different reasons, and we affirm.
In 1993, after pleading guilty in seven criminal cases, Anderson was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to a true split sentence of ten years in prison suspended after five years with the remaining five years to be served on probation. In 1995, after violating probation, Anderson was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to the suspended five years in prison with the sentencing court awarding credit for all time previously served in the Department of Corrections (DOC) prior to resentencing. Pursuant to that award of prior prison time served, the DOC applied against his sentence of five years a credit of 644 days of time previously served in prison. However, in November 1999, the DOC revoked the credit on the authority of Roberts v. State, 702 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
On January 27, 2003, Anderson filed this motion seeking relief from the revocation of the prison credit and alleging timeliness due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court found that after September 1997 Anderson’s motion would be untimely since it was not filed within two years of the date when the time period for taking an appeal of his 1995 judgments and sentences had expired and the judgments and sentences became final. See McGee v. State, 684 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, at the time his 1995 judgments and sentences became final, Anderson had no way of knowing that later the DOC would revoke the prison credit previously recognized. Once that occurred in November 1999, Anderson had two years from that date to file a rule 3.850 motion containing a claim based on the revocation of prison credit. See Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Any motion filed after November 2001 would be untimely. Anderson did not file his motion until 2003. Consequently, his motion is untimely.
Affirmed.
CANADY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ad been forfeited until he filed administrative grievances with the DOC. Once the DOC responded and informed him of the forfeiture, Spradley had two years to file a rule 3.850 motion based on this newly discovered information. See Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, Spradley’s motion for rehearing, which alleged these additional facts, was not under oath, and therefore the trial court was not required to consider the motion…
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Hall v. State, 891 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…led administrative grievances with the DOC. Once the DOC responded and informed him of the forfeiture, Spradley had two years to file a rule 3.850 motion based on this newly discovered information. See Spradley, 868 So. 2d at 633; Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Based on this court’s reasoning in Spradley, Hall’s motion for postconviction relief was timely filed. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand with…
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Watts v. State, 139 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…2d 1052 (Fla.1998); Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Waiter v. State, 965 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Bizzell v. State, 912 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Campbell v. State, 884 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Nedd v. State, 855 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Dwyer v. State, 981 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). CRENSHAW, BLACK, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McGEE v. State, 684 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Alton L. Roberts v. State, 702 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)