FRANK GRADDY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Frank Graddy appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the denial, finding the motion time-barred under the two-year limitation period, which began when Graddy discovered through his February 1993 resentencing that his sentences would run consecutively rather than concurrently as promised.
The motion was time-barred. Although the trial court erred in identifying when the judgment became final, the two-year limitation period under Rule 3.850(b)(1) commenced on February 16, 1993, when Graddy's resentencing revealed that his sentences would run consecutively, not concurrently as represented. The motion filed November 7, 1995, exceeded this deadline.
[1] A motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is time-barred if not filed within two years of the date the judgment and sentence under review became…
[2] The time for filing a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 begins to run when newly discovered facts are discovered or could have been reasonably discove…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“At the time the judgment and sentence resulting from the plea became final, appellant would have had no way of knowing that subsequently the sentence would not be running concurrently to that later imposed after his retrial. This amounts to newly discovered facts under the rule, and the time frame of the rule begins to run at the time such facts are discovered or could have been reasonably discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
Establishes the newly discovered facts doctrine and when the two-year limitation period commences under Rule 3.850(b)(1).
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGraddy was sentenced to concurrent forty-four year sentences after a jury trial. In a separate case, he entered a guilty plea conditioned on receiving…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion Pursuant To Florida Rule Of Criminal Procedure 3.850 cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Frank Graddy challenges the denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court found it to be time-barred. Although the court’s characterization of the date that the judgment and sentence under review became final is erroneous, for reasons we explain below we affirm and find the claim is time-barred.
Appellant was sentenced to two concurrent forty-four year sentences after a jury trial in an unrelated case. Thereafter in the case he now attacks he entered a plea conditioned upon the representation that the twelve years which were to be imposed would run concurrently with the forty-four year sentences.
He successfully appealed the judgment which followed his trial and, after retrial, was sentenced to a total of thirty-four years, to run, however, consecutively to the twelve-year sentence which earlier had resulted from the plea. The thrust of his argument in the motion denied in the trial court is that counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead to the twelve years with the promise that the time would run concurrently with his trial sentence when, several years later, the trial sentence was imposed to run consecutively to the sentence on the plea.
The trial court found that no appeal had been taken from the plea and that judgment became final December 5, 1991. The motion below was filed in November 7, 1995, well past the two-year time limitation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
At the time the judgment and sentence resulting from the plea became final, appellant would have had no way of knowing that subsequently the sentence would not be running concurrently to that later imposed after his retrial. This amounts to newly discovered facts under the rule, and the time frame of the rule begins to run at the time such facts are discovered or could have been reasonably discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(1). See Adams v. State, 543 So. 2d 1244 (Fla.1989).
The resentencing which alerted appellant to the legal issue raised below occurred on February 16, 1993. An unsuccessful appeal from that case was decided on December 1, 1993. The proper resolution of which of these dates triggers the time frame of two years addressed in the rule will determine if the claim is time-barred. We find no legal cause which excused appellant from initiating the claim below as soon as the sentencing of February 16, 1993, had occurred. The appeal of that sentence was no jurisdictional impediment to the institution of the claim advanced below, as it involved a separate case number and was not under review.
Accordingly, we find that appellant’s two-year time limitation commenced on February 16, 1993, and that the filing of the motion below on November 7, 1995, was untimely.
Affirmed.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PARKER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…vances with the DOC. Once the DOC responded and informed him of the forfeiture, Spradley had two years to file a rule 3.850 motion based on this newly discovered information. See Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, Spradley’s motion for rehearing, which alleged these additional facts, was not under oath, and therefore the trial court was not required to consider the motion for rehearing. See Melton v. State, 720 So. 2d 577 (F…
-
Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…er the DOC would revoke the prison credit previously recognized. Once that occurred in November 1999, Anderson had two years from that date to file a rule 3.850 motion containing a claim based on the revocation of prison credit. See Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Any motion filed after November 2001 would be untimely. Anderson did not file his motion until 2003. Consequently, his motion is untimely. Affirmed. CANADY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.…
-
Hall v. State, 891 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…DOC responded and informed him of the forfeiture, Spradley had two years to file a rule 3.850 motion based on this newly discovered information. See Spradley, 868 So. 2d at 633; Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Based on this court’s reasoning in Spradley, Hall’s motion for postconviction relief was timely filed. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand with instructions that the trial court address the merits…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Amendment TO Fla. Rules OF Jud. Administration-Rule 2.125(b)(1), 543 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1989)