MARTY J. HALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marty Hall seeks postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging his counsel misadvised him about gain time credits available upon his guilty plea to second-degree murder. The court reverses the trial court's summary denial, holding that Hall's motion, though filed seven years after sentencing, was timely because he could not have discovered the gain time forfeiture until receiving a DOC report in 2002.
Hall's motion was timely because he could not have discovered the gain time forfeiture through the exercise of due diligence before receiving the DOC's response to his administrative grievances. Once informed of the forfeiture, Hall had two years to file his rule 3.850 motion, making the October 2002 filing timely.
[1] A defendant may seek postconviction relief when counsel misadvises the defendant regarding the length of a sentence or eligibility for gain time.
[2] A motion for postconviction relief is the proper procedural vehicle to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea based on counsel's misrepresentation about gain time credits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because counsel's misrepresentation about the length of a sentence of eligibility for gain time can form the basis for a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 is the correct vehicle to seek such relief.”
Establishes that misrepresentation about gain time eligibility is cognizable ground for postconviction relief under rule 3.850
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHall pleaded guilty to second-degree murder on August 29, 1995, and was sentenced to thirty years in prison plus five years probation on October 9, 19…
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PER CURIAM.
Marty J. Hall seeks review of the order summarily denying his motion for postcon-viction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse.
On August 29, 1995, Hall pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder. He was sentenced on October 9, 1995, to thirty years in prison followed by five years of probation. Therefore, his judgment and sentence became final on November 8, 1995. Under rule 3.850, Hall had until November 8, 1997, to file a mo tion for postconviction relief. He filed this motion on October 14, 2002.
In his motion, Hall alleged that it was not until he received an incentive gain time credit report on October 8, 2002, that he discovered that he had not received any basic gain time credits. He maintains that counsel assured him that he would receive these credits if he accepted the State’s plea offer. Hall now contends that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that he would hot receive any basic gain time credits. Nonetheless, the trial court denied relief because “the defendant fail[ed] to allege that the facts on which his claim is predicated were previously unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
In Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), this court confronted a strikingly similar situation. Spradley alleged that his counsel misadvised him that he would receive credit for previously earned gain time upon sentencing for a violation of probation. Spradley sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that had he known that he would not receive the previously earned gain time, he would not have pleaded guilty to violating his probation. Because counsel’s misrepresentation about the length of a sentence of eligibility for gain time can form the basis for a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 is the correct vehicle to seek such relief. See Jones v. State, 834 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The trial court, though, denied Spradley’s motion as untimely because it was filed outside of the two-year period for filing a motion for postconviction relief.
. This court concluded that Spradley could not have known about the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) forfeiture of gain time at the sentencing if he had not been advised of the possibility of forfeiture by counsel or the trial court. Like Hall, Spradley did not discover that his gain time had been forfeited until he filed administrative grievances with the DOC. Once the DOC responded and informed him of the forfeiture, Spradley had two years to file a rule 3.850 motion based on this newly discovered information. See Spradley, 868 So. 2d at 633; Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Based on this court’s reasoning in Spradley, Hall’s motion for postconviction relief was timely filed. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand with instructions that the trial court address the merits of Hall’s motion.
Reversed and remanded.
FULMER, STRINGER, and VILLANTI, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Heriberto Galindez v. State, 909 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…n which the prisoner pleaded, but the date on which the DOC informed the prisoner of the gain time forfeiture and that the DOC determination of gain time constituted newly discovered information within the meaning of rule 3.850(b)(1). Hall v. State, 891 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Galindez’s motion was filed on April 5, 2004, within two years of April 23, 2002, the undisputed date that DOC informed him of his gain time forfeiture. The motion is timely.…
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Singleton v. State, 981 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…rs after the finality of judgment and sentence. See Boykins v. State, 976 So. 2d 700, 700-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Beasley v. State, 958 So. 2d 1086, 1087-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Galindez v. State, 909 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Hall v. State, 891 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Douglas v. State, 977 So. 2d 776, 777-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We have concluded that such gain time misadvice claims present circumstances that fall within…
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Stephon Boykins v. State, 976 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…time forfeiture and that the DOC determination of gain time constituted newly discovered information within the meaning of rule 3.850(b)(1). Id. at 1087-88 (quoting Galindez v. State, 909 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Hall v. State, 891 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Because Boykins claimed that he did not learn that the DOC had forfeited his gain time until he was returned to prison in 2005, his 2006 rule 3.850 motion was timely filed. A…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Graddy v. State, 685 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Anderson v. State, 862 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Jones v. State, 834 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)