JONATHAN FETTLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jonathan Fettler appeals his probation revocation sentence, arguing he was entitled to jail credit for all time previously served in prison, not just time served in boot camp. The court reversed and remanded, holding that under Florida's youthful offender statutes, defendants are always entitled to credit for prison time previously served upon probation revocation.
A youthful offender is always entitled to prison credit for all time previously served upon revocation of probation following successful completion of boot camp. The 364-day limitation on sentences for probation violations does not negate the requirement to credit previously served time.
[1] A youthful offender who successfully completes boot camp may not be sentenced to more than 364 days of incarceration upon a violation of the subsequent period of probatio…
[2] A defendant is entitled to prison credit for all time previously served upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an appellant is "always entitled to prison credit previously served upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence."”
Establishes the fundamental principle that all previously served time must be credited regardless of sentencing scheme.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFettler was placed on probation with a suspended sentence for attempted robbery without a firearm. After violating probation and going through drug co…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Jonathan Fettler, appeals from the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation, arguing that the trial court should have credited him for the time he served prior to his entrance into the boot camp program pursuant to the statutes governing youthful offenders and the youthful offenders basic training program, sections 958.04 and 958.045, Florida Statutes. Because the plain language of the statutes supports appellant’s arguments, we reverse and remand.
Upon being charged with several criminal counts, appellant initially entered a plea and was placed on probation with a thirty-six month suspended sentence for one count of attempted robbery without a firearm. After violating probation, going through drug court, and violating another term of probation, appellant’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The trial court then mitigated appellant’s sentence and designated him as a youthful offender eligible for boot camp. Appellant successfully completed boot camp and was placed on probation for the remainder of his sentence. Appellant then violated the terms of his probation and entered a plea of nolo contendere. The trial court sentenced appellant to 364 days’ imprisonment with credit for 185 days of time served. Appellant argued before the trial court that he was entitled to jail credit for all the time he had previously spent in prison, not merely the time he served in boot camp and while incarcerated awaiting sentencing in the instant case. This appeal followed.
It is well-established in the courts of Florida that when a youthful offender successfully completes boot camp, he may not be sentenced to more than 364 days of incarceration upon a violation of the subsequent period of probation. See, e.g., Mims v. State, 871 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citing §§ 958.04(2)(b), 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2003)); Blaxton v. State, 868 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
It is similarly well-established that an appellant is “always entitled to prison credit previously served upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence.” Atkinson v. State, 860 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Layman v. State, 787 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). Furthermore,
when probation is revoked after a defendant has been sentenced to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation, the trial court may impose any sentence it could originally have imposed, less jail time previously served as part of the sentence .... the same is true as to youthful offenders subject to the terms of [the youthful offenders statute].
Pendergrass v. State, 487 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (citing State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla.1978)). Interestingly, the State made an argument in Pender-grass similar to the one it makes here, arguing that the appellant’s one-year sentence upon revocation of probation was “intended as a net sentence after allowing for the time already served on the youthful offender conviction.” 487 So. 2d at 36.
Likewise, in the instant case, the State argues that the Legislature’s 364- day limitation on the sentence a youthful offender may receive upon violation of probation after successful completion of probation “was already factored into the sentence at issue imposed by the trial court.” However, while the result urged by the State may seem reasonable, it is without support by the plain meaning of the statutes or by the case law’s interpretation of such. The State has acknowledged that appellant has already served 543 days in prison, and appellant is entitled to have that period of imprisonment credited against his current sentence of 364 days’ imprisonment. See, e.g., Mims, 871 So. 2d at 1004; Pendergrass, 487 So. 2d at 36. Accordingly, appellant’s sentence is reversed and remanded for the trial court to credit him for all time previously served.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAVIS, LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Adderly v. State, 958 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…uld have originally been imposed on the charge. See Ch. 06-270, § 1, Laws of Fla. Prior to this statutory change, a defendant who violated probation after completing boot camp could only be sentenced to 364 days in jail. See, e.g., Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“It is well established in the courts of Florida that when a youthful offender successfully completes boot camp, he may not be sentenced to more than 364 days of incarceration upon a violation of the subsequent period of pr…
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Reginald v. Davis, Jr., 16 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…ly sentenced under earlier version of statute upon revocation of probation following successful completion of boot camp, violated ex post facto clause of Constitution); see also Adderly v. State, 958 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). On rehearing, the State now asserts that Appellant never completed the [*997] boot camp program and filed an affidavit from a Department of Corrections official in support.2 If Appellant, in fact, successfully completed th…
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Williams v. State, 889 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…the original probation was not a youthful offender sentence. A trial court, in imposing sentence following a revocation of probation, may impose any sentence which it could have originally imposed. See § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat.; Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Trent v. State, 770 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). See also State v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)(Torpy, J., concurring). We can discern no basis for distin…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1978)
- Baron Ellis Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Shamus D. Layman v. State, 787 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Blaxton v. State, 868 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Mims v. State, 871 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Lenden Alvin Pendergrass v. State, 487 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Atkinson v. State, 860 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)