STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
S.C., A CHILD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of a delinquency petition against a juvenile for possession of a weapon on school property. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court erred by not granting the State a ten-day window period to bring the case to trial after the ninety-day speedy trial period expired.
The State was entitled to the ten-day window period provided in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090. When a juvenile is taken into custody, the State has ninety days to bring the case to trial; if that does not occur, the juvenile may file a motion for discharge, and if none of the factors in subsection (d) apply, the State is given a ten-day window period within which to try the case.
[1] A juvenile is entitled to a ten-day recapture period to bring a case to trial after the initial ninety-day speedy trial period expires, unless specific factors enumerated…
[2] The availability of a recapture period for speedy trial in juvenile cases is determined by the plain language of the rule, not by attributing delay to the child or the st…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a juvenile is taken into custody, the State is given ninety days to bring the case to trial. When that does not occur, the juvenile may file a motion for discharge. The court must then set a hearing within five days to review the factors in subsection (d). If none of them apply, the State is given a ten-day window period within which to try the case.”
This quote establishes the mandatory procedural framework for the speedy trial rule and the automatic ten-day window period when subsection (d) factors do not apply.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.C., a juvenile, was arrested on October 4, 2001, and a delinquency petition was filed a week later. The petition was not served upon S.C. within the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Recapture Period cases and more on FLexlaw
HAZOURI, J.
The state appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for delinquency filed against appellee for possession of a weapon on school property. The state asserts that the trial court erred in granting the dismissal because it was entitled to the ten-day window provided for in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090. Citing State v. D.L., 841 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), appellee argues that the state is not entitled to the benefit of the recapture period because “the availability of the recapture period turns on whether the child’s inability to move for speedy trial discharge within a short time after the expiration of the ninety-day period is attributable to the child or to the State.” Id. at 666.
In the instant case, appellee was arrested on October 4, 2001, and the petition for delinquency was filed a week later. It was not served upon appellee within the ninety-day speedy trial time period. Appellee was arraigned on May 29, 2002, and on August 2, 2002, appellee filed his motion to dismiss. At the hearing held on August 7, 2002, counsel presented their arguments. Appellee argued that he was not arraigned until 105 days after the speedy trial period had expired, relying on D.D. v. State, 817 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). After hearing testimony concerning the failure to serve appellee, the trial court concluded that the state’s attempts at service were insufficient and dismissal of the petition was required.
This court has recently receded from D.D. and D.L. in C.D. v. State, 865 So. 2d 605, 2004 WL 86327 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.21, 2004) (en banc). Following the plain language of Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090, this court held:
When a juvenile is taken into custody, the State is given ninety days to bring the case to trial. When that does not occur, the juvenile may file a motion for discharge. The court must then set a hearing within five days to review the factors in subsection (d). If none of them apply, the State is given a ten-day window period within which to try the case. If the State fails to bring the case to trial within those ten days, the juvenile is discharged. If one of the factors in subsection (d) is found to exist, then the State is given ninety days within which to try the case.
Id. at 607. As none of the factors in subsection (d) apply in this case, the state should have been given the ten-day window period within which to try appellee. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
STONE and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
C.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 974 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…language of section 39.621(10). Instead of documenting de [*501] tailed factual findings with regard to each of the six factors, the trial court made the conclusory finding that reunification was not in the children’s best interests. In In re H.H., 865 So. 2d 684, 685-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), the Second District rejected similarly conclusory findings. There, the trial court’s findings were not sufficient to show that reunification would endanger the children’s safety, well-being, and health, where the order st…
-
State v. P.M., 872 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…, the juvenile is discharged. If one of the factors in subsection (d) is found to exist, then the State is given ninety days within which to try the case. 865 So. 2d at 610; see also State v. C.E., 866 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); State v. S.C., 865 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Because none of the factors in subsection (d) were found to exist, the state was entitled to the ten-day recapture period within which to try this case. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.…
-
State v. D.M., 888 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…, the juvenile is discharged. If one of the factors in subsection (d) is found to exist, then the State is given ninety days within which to try the case. 865 So. 2d at 610. See also State v. C.E., 866 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); State v. S.C., 865 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Because none of the elements in subsection (d) exist in this instance, the State was entitled to the ten-day recapture period within which to try this case. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings…
Authorities Cited
- C.D. v. State, 865 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- D.D. v. State, 817 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Leafy WAY Enters., Inc. v. Lamb, 841 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)