ADRIAN EARL MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Adrian Moore appealed his conviction for possessing an altered driver's license, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court reversed, holding that the officer's warrantless search of Moore's wallet during a vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the search and no lawful basis to remove items from Moore's pockets.
The court held that the search was illegal because: (1) the officer articulated no reasonable suspicion that Moore was armed to justify a frisk; and (2) even if a frisk were justified, nothing justified removing items from Moore's pockets without consent after the initial patdown ensured officer safety.
[1] A police officer's authority to order passengers out of a lawfully stopped vehicle does not automatically confer authority to frisk them.
[2] The authority to frisk an individual during a temporary detention stems from the officer's reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed with a weapon.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the authority to remove [a defendant] from [a] car [does] not automatically confer upon the officer the authority to frisk him”
Establishes that removal from vehicle does not justify automatic frisk authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped a vehicle for an inoperative taillight. The vehicle fled, leading to a low-speed chase before being stopped. Police ordered all occupan…
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VILLANTI, Judge.
Moore entered a no contest plea to possession of an altered or counterfeit driver’s license imposed after the trial court denied his dispositive motion to suppress. Because the counterfeit driver’s license was seized as the result of an illegal search, we reverse the judgment and sentence.
Moore was a passenger in an automobile that police stopped for having an inoperative taillight. When the officer approached the car, it took off and a low-speed chase ensued. Police ultimately stopped the car, ordering the driver and passengers, including Moore, out of the car at gunpoint. The car’s occupants were ordered to he face down on the pavement, where they were handcuffed. An officer then searched their pockets.1 Although Moore was not placed under arrest following the search of his pockets, the officer pulled Moore’s wallet out of his pocket, opened it, and found the altered driver’s license that was the subject of the motion to suppress. Moore was then arrested for possession of the altered driver’s license.
Moore concedes that the initial stop of the car was proper and that it was proper for the police to order the passengers out of the car pending the completion of the stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “Nevertheless, the authority to remove [a defendant] from [a] car [does] not automatically confer upon the officer the authority to frisk him.” Smith, 735 So. 2d at 572. Instead, the authority to frisk an individual who has been temporarily detained stems from the police officer’s reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed with a weapon. § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2003); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981) (interpreting the “probable cause” standard enunciated in section 901.151(5) to mean reasonable suspicion). Thus, a police officer must articulate some reasonable basis for believing a person is armed with a weapon before frisking him during a valid vehicle stop. Sutton v. State, 698 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Here, the officer articulated no basis that would justify the need to frisk Moore. Although he stated he believed that all of the passengers in the car were armed, he was not able to provide any factual basis for that belief despite defense counsel’s persistent efforts to get the officer to explain his reasoning. Moore had no bulge in his pockets and made no furtive movements. The officer’s mere belief, not grounded in any factual support, did not justify a frisk of Moore. However, even if the frisk were justified, nothing justified the officer’s removing items from Moore’s pockets without his consent after the initial patdown assured the officer’s safety.
To his credit, the officer stated he would have had no probable cause to arrest Moore but for the search that revealed the altered driver’s license. The State agreed that the ruling on the motion to suppress was dispositive. Because the evidence was seized as the result of an illegal search, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
CANADY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. . Inside Moore's pockets, the officer found a pocketknife, a checkbook, a wallet, and the driver’s license that is the subject of this appeal. The State has advanced no argument on the relevance of the pocketknife’s discovery to the propriety of the subsequent search of Moore’s wallet.
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Dewberry v. State, 905 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…commission of a traffic infraction. See Hatcher v. State, 834 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In this circumstance, the officer may be justified in asking the driver or passenger to exit the vehicle for officer safety. Id.; see also Moore v. State, 874 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).…
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State v. Olave, 948 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), that police may ask drivers to exit their vehicles as a matter of routine procedure for police safety during traffic stops. See, e.g., Breed, 917 So. 2d at 208; Moore v. State, 874 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In Hewitt v. State, 920 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), Orlando Police legally stopped Hewitt’s car for a traffic violation. The officer conducting the stop asked for Hewitt’s driver’s license, and Hewitt admitted she w…
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Coleman v. State, 990 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…n was not justified. This is not a case where suspicious surrounding circumstances, combined with the officer’s observation of a bulge on appellant’s person justified a pat down. See L.D. v. State, 770 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Moore v. State, 874 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Ray v. State, 849 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). This case is distinguishable from Graham v. State, whereby a pat down was reasonably justified where police observed a bulge in defendant’s pocket and feared that he was armed, 4…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981)
- Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1997)
- Gilmore v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Kewanee Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- King v. State, 698 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Sutton v. State, 698 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)