EDWARD M. HOLLINS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a restitution order while the defendant's direct appeal was pending, rendering the order void and making a belated appeal unnecessary.
A trial court is divested of jurisdiction to impose restitution while a defendant's direct appeal is pending, even if the court properly reserved jurisdiction to determine restitution amount at sentencing.
[1] A trial court is divested of jurisdiction to enter or modify a restitution order while a defendant's direct appeal is pending, notwithstanding prior reservation of jurisd…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to do so while Hollins's direct appeal was pending”
Court explaining why the restitution order was void despite proper reservation of jurisdiction at sentencing
Edward M. Hollins was sentenced and the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine restitution. While Hollins's direct appeal was pending, the tri…
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ORFINGER, J.
Edward M. Hollins petitions for a belated appeal of a restitution order entered against him while his judgment and sentence was on direct appeal. In its response, the State properly concedes that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the restitution order because of the pending appeal. See Queen v. State, 832 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Kern v. State, 726 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)).
Restitution is a mandated part of sentencing and must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter. State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla.1993). If the court orders restitution at sentencing, or within sixty days thereafter, the court has the authority to reserve jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period. State v. Hiscox, 677 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In the instant case, while the court properly reserved jurisdiction at sentencing to impose restitution, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to do so while Hollins’s direct appeal was pending. As a result, the restitution order entered against Hollins on July 8, 2003, is a nullity. Consequently, Hollins has no need for a belated appeal.
PETITION FOR BELATED APPEAL DENIED.
SHARP, W., J., concurs.
PETERSON, J., concurs with result only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ward v. State, 273 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…court did not order restitution. It is also apparent the trial court did not impose restitution at the sentencing hearing. The trial court correctly granted the motion and ordered the clerk to strike the restitution order. Cf. Hollins v. State, 881 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ("Restitution is a mandated part of sentencing and must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter."); cf. also Socorro v. State, 901 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("Prior to ordering restit…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Gaines, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993)
- Kern v. State, 726 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- State v. Hiscox, 677 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Queen v. State, 832 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)