BRIAN LEONARD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Williams appeals his sentence for probation violation and sexual offenses, arguing the trial court erroneously believed it lacked authority to impose a youthful offender sentence. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reverses and remands for resentencing, holding that a court imposing sentence after probation revocation may impose any sentence it could have originally imposed, including youthful offender designation.
A trial court imposing sentence following probation revocation may impose any sentence it could have originally imposed, including a youthful offender sentence, regardless of whether the original probation was a youthful offender sentence. The trial court's mistaken belief that it lacked this authority warrants reversal and remand for resentencing.
[1] A sentence must be reversed where the sentencing court was under the incorrect impression that it was barred from imposing a particular sentencing option.
[2] A trial court, in imposing sentence following a revocation of probation, may impose any sentence which it could have originally imposed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court, in imposing sentence following a revocation of probation, may impose any sentence which it could have originally imposed.”
Establishes the core legal principle that sentencing authority following probation revocation is not limited by the nature of the original sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams entered no contest pleas to violating probation on fleeing and eluding and driving without a valid license charges, and to lewd and lasciviou…
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STONE, J.
Williams entered no contest pleas to violating probation and to the substantive offenses of lewd and lascivious exposure and sexual battery on a person under sixteen. His probation was on charges of fleeing and eluding and driving without a valid license. Williams was sentenced to 110.70 months in prison on the primary charge and five years in prison, concurrent, on the violation of probation. We reverse Williams’ sentence and remand for re-sentencing. The record reflects that at sentencing, the trial court expressed the erroneous belief that it was barred from sentencing Williams as a youthful offender. Williams’ attorney requested a sentence as a youthful offender. The court, however, indicated that Williams could not be sentenced as a youthful offender because the original probation was not imposed as a youthful offender sentence.
The record reflects the following exchange:
MR. BUTLER (prosecutor): ... Legally I don’t know if he can be sentenced as a youthful offender on the probation violation because he wasn’t sentenced originally—
THE COURT: He can’t.
The discussion then deviated to an ancillary argument, that a youthful offender sanction could not be imposed for the primary offense if it could not also be imposed for the violation of probation offense. Although the state argues on appeal that the record does not “clearly” reflect that the court was under this mistaken belief, we conclude that the clear statement, “he can’t,” is sufficient to overcome some ambiguity in the record.
In Ellis v. State, 816 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), this court recognized that a sentence must be reversed where the sentencing court was under the incorrect impression that it was compelled to sentence the defendant as a habitual offender. Here, the trial court was under the mistaken belief that it could not impose a youthful offender sentence because the original probation was not a youthful offender sentence.
A trial court, in imposing sentence following a revocation of probation, may impose any sentence which it could have originally imposed. See § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat.; Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Trent v. State, 770 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). See also State v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)(Torpy, J., concurring). We can discern no basis for distinguishing these circumstances from any other sentence that the court could have imposed.
We reverse and remand so that the trial court may consider whether to impose a youthful offender sentence. The court, of course, remains free to re-impose the existing sentence.
GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Langdon, 978 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…aragraph (6)(a), may be required by the court to successfully complete a term of probation pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in s. 948.034(2), in lieu of serving a term of imprisonment, [emphasis added] . See, e.g., Williams v. State, 889 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (a trial court, in imposing sentence following a revocation of probation, may impose any sentence which it could have originally imposed).…
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Washington v. State, 82 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…nder an abuse of discretion standard. Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla.2008). However, where a trial court erroneously believes it does not have the discretion to impose a certain sentence, resentencing is warranted. See Williams v. State, 889 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (reversing sentence where “the trial court expressed the erroneous belief that it was barred from sentencing [the defendant] as a youthful offender”); Ellis v. State, 816 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing habitu…
Authorities Cited
- Ellis v. State, 816 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Trent v. State, 770 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- State v. Dewann L. Brown, 855 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)