VALERIA GRANDINI, APPELLANT,
v.
CARLOS E. CARIZO, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2005-02-02
No. 3D04-2361
Before GERSTEN, SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
891 So. 2d 1216 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

This appeal challenges a trial court's non-final order appointing a receiver for two limited liability companies. The District Court of Appeal reversed the appointment, finding that the parties lacked adequate notice that receivership would be addressed at the hearing and that the trial court improperly expanded the scope of the proceeding.


Holding

The trial court's appointment of a receiver was reversed because: (1) the parties received inadequate notice under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure § 1.620(a) that receivership would be addressed; (2) the scope of the hearing was improperly expanded to cover issues not noticed; and (3) the trial court erroneously determined that dissolution of the limited liability companies was necessary, which in turn necessitated a receiver.


Headnotes

[1] A non-final order appointing a receiver may be reversed if the parties were not adequately noticed that the issue of receivership would be addressed at an evidentiary hea…

[2] The scope of an evidentiary hearing cannot be improperly expanded to address issues that were not noticed.

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Key Quotes

“the parties were not noticed that the issue of receivership was going to be addressed at the evidentiary hearing; therefore, inadequate notice was given under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure § 1.620(a)”

Establishes the primary basis for reversal—lack of proper notice to parties regarding the receivership issue

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Facts & Procedural History

Joe Nicenboim, claiming to be the duly authorized Liquidating Agent for two limited liability companies, filed a three-count complaint seeking judicia…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a non-final order appointing a receiver. Joe Nicenboim, claiming to be the duly authorized and elected Liquidating Agent for two limited liability companies, filed á three-count complaint requesting in Count I Judicial Supervision of Dissolution and Liquidation of the Two Limited Liability Companies, requesting in Count II an Emergency Injunction to Require the Defendant from Intervening in the Action of the Liquidating Agent, and requesting in Count III Damages. Only Count II was noticed for evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order appointing a receiver for dissolution of the two limited liability companies. An appeal from the non-final order followed.

The trial court’s non-final order appointing a receiver of the two limited liability companies is reversed upon the following findings: (1) the parties were not noticed that the issue of receivership was going to be addressed at the evidentiary hearing; therefore, inadequate notice was given under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure § 1.620(a); (2) the scope of the hearing was improperly expanded to address the receivership issue which was not noticed, Carroll & Assocs. v. Galindo, 864 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Epic Metals Corp. v. Samari Lake East Condo. Ass’n, 547 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Landa v. Landa, 539 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); and (3) the erroneous determination that the dissolution of the limited liability companies was necessary and, therefore, necessitated the appointment of a receiver. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1953); McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, 40 So. 2d 201 (Fla.1949); News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941); Bochterle v. Florida Milk Co., 132 Fla. 827, 182 So. 215 (1938); Recarey v. Rader, 320 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

For the above reasons, the order appointing a receiver is hereby reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Connell v. Cap. City P'rs, LLC, 932 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    …of relief, which is not sought by the notice of hearing or which expands the scope of a hearing and decides matters not noticed for hearing, violates due process. Khan v. Dep’t of Revenue, 901 So. 2d 992, 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Grandini v. Carizo, 891 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Fouts v. Bowling, 596 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Devaney v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 564 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Epic Metals Corp. v. Samari Lake E. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 547 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Margulies v. M…

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