HORACE E. IVORY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Horace Ivory appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop based on a cracked windshield. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop Ivory's vehicle for the cracked windshield under Florida law, making the stop constitutional regardless of Ivory's subjective belief that the crack was harmless.
The trial court properly found the stop constitutional because the deputy had objective reasonable suspicion to stop Ivory and inspect the windshield under Florida Statutes sections 316.295 and 316.610. The officer's motivations are irrelevant; what matters is whether the basis asserted for the stop is valid, and the cracked windshield provided a valid basis for the stop.
[1] A law enforcement officer may require a driver to stop and submit a vehicle for inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the vehicle is unsafe or not equ…
[2] The reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined by the objective validity of the basis asserted by the officer, not the officer's subjective motivations.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The issue for the trial court was whether there was a constitutional basis, reasonable suspicion, for the deputy to stop Ivory. The motivations of the deputy are irrelevant.”
Establishes that the officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant to the validity of a traffic stop; only the objective basis matters.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIvory was stopped by a deputy for driving with a cracked windshield. Ivory admitted to driving with the cracked windshield but contended it did not im…
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THOMPSON, J.
Horace E. Ivory appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Ivory was charged with driving while license revoked as a habitual offender1 after he was stopped for driving with a cracked windshield. He filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the traffic stop was improper because there was no warrant and that the reason for the stop, a cracked windshield, was not a statutory offense. In his motion, he admitted that he was driving an automobile with a cracked windshield when the deputy stopped him; however, Ivory stated that the crack did not impair his vision and endangered neither him nor members of the public.
Section 316.2952, Florida Statutes, provides that a vehicle must have a windshield, and section 316..610 states that it is a civil infraction to drive a vehicle that is in an unsafe condition because of faulty or defective equipment that endangers the driver or other members of the public. Courts have held that it is a violation of this section to drive when the cracked windshield impedes a driver’s vision. K.G.M. v. State, 816 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Thomas v. State, 644 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th. DCA 1994). More important, under section 316.610(1), if a law .enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, the officer may require the driver to stop the vehicle and submit it to an inspection.
Ivory contends that the cracked windshield did not impair his vision and was not a safety hazard. He argues that the deputy had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. Further, he implies that the stop was a ruse or subterfuge to detain him. He contends that because the stop violated his rights, all evidence flowing from the stop should have been suppressed. What Ivory ignores is that the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and reviewed photographs of the windshield. After-doing so, the trial court made a factual finding and determined that the cracked windshield provided a constitutional basis for the deputy to stop Ivory. It is irrelevant for our consideration what Ivory’s opinion is. Our concern is whether the record evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact. If there is record support, those findings of fact come to this court presumed to be true, State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and are accorded great deference by an appellate court, Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla.1983).
The issue for the trial court was whether there was a constitutional basis, reasonable suspicion, for the deputy to stop Ivory. The motivations of the deputy are irrelevant. Dobrin v. Dep’t of High way Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla.2004). The deputy testified that he observed the cracked winsh-ield while driving behind Ivory’s car. Once he stopped Ivory and examined the windshield, he determined that it was unsafe. The deputy testified that it was a substantial crack and not a hairline crack or chip. After Ivory stated he did not have a license, the deputy wrote a traffic citation for driving with a suspended license,2 which he later amended to driving while license suspended or revoked when he learned that Ivory was a habitual traffic offender. The court found that the deputy had objective reasonable suspicion, to stop Ivory and inspect the windshield. There is no error. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (the reasonableness of a traffic stop is based upon the validity of the basis asserted by the officer involved in the stop); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur. . § 322.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2003).
. § 322.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).
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Citator
Cited By
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Tristan Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2007)…etween seven and ten inches long, and extended above the bottom of one of the resting windshield wipers” and “a trooper ... could readily and reasonably think that the crack met the administrative criteria for excessive cracking”); 7 Ivory v. State, 898 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (upholding stop where officer testified that windshield crack was “substantial ... and not a hairline crack or chip”); State v. Pease, 531 N.E. 2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (stop valid where “the damage was sufficiently e…1 / 2
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State v. Tomesha Marie Howard, 909 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…ith the reasoning in Hilton II, we conclude that Deputy Hood had an objective reasonable suspicion to stop Appellee’s car and inspect the windshield, so that the evidence discovered after the stop should not have been suppressed. See Ivory v. State, 898 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (affirming denial of motion to suppress, where deputy had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop and inspect cracked windshield observed while driving behind defendant’s vehicle); State v. Breed, 80 Fla. L. Weekly D1457, —…
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Daniels v. State, 917 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Schuck, 913 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Ivory v. State, 898 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). THOMPSON, PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983)
- State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Dobrin v. Fla. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004)
- Thomas v. State, 644 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Gilmore v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Kewanee Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- K.G.M. v. State, 816 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)