SHANNON MURPHY, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHERINE REYNOLDS, APPELLEE
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Shannon Murphy appeals a final injunction for protection against repeat violence entered by the trial court. The appellate court reverses because the trial court's finding that Murphy committed repeat violence lacks competent, substantial evidence to support it.
The trial court's finding that Murphy committed repeat violence lacks competent, substantial evidence in support because Reynolds failed to introduce evidence linking Murphy to the alleged cyberstalking incidents, and therefore the injunction is reversed.
[1] An appeal of an expired injunction for protection against repeat violence is not moot if collateral legal consequences flow from the injunction.
[2] A cause of action for an injunction for protection in cases of repeat violence requires competent, substantial evidence to support findings of two incidents of repeat vio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“competent, substantial evidence must support the trial court's findings of two incidents of repeat violence”
Establishes the legal standard for proving a repeat violence injunction cause of action
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKatherine Reynolds sought an injunction for protection against repeat violence against Shannon Murphy, alleging cyberstalking incidents including an o…
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Shannon Murphy appeals a final injunction for protection against repeat violence, entered against her at the behest of Katherine Reynolds. Because the trial court’s finding that Ms. Murphy committed “repeat violence” against Ms. Reynolds lacks competent, substantial evidence in support, we reverse.
The trial court decreed that the injunction remain in place until October 27, 2010, when it expired. This case is not moot, however, because collateral legal consequences flowing from such an injunction outlast the injunction itself. See Rodman v. Rodman, 48 So.3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[I]njunctions for protection against domestic violence are an exception to the usual rules of mootness because of the collateral legal consequences that flow from such an injunction.”); accord Boyles v. Tiefenthaler, 810 So.2d 1041, 1041 (Fla. *7172d DCA 2002) (finding an appeal of an injunction for protection against repeat violence was not moot, as “issuance of the injunction prevented] [appellant] from carrying a gun under federal law and thus affect[ed] her career in law enforcement”). But see Bevan v. Wolfson, 638 So.2d 527, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (citing Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla.1992)) (dismissing an appeal of an expired repeat violence injunction on grounds none of the three exceptions to mootness applied, including collateral legal consequences).
Section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes (2009), creates a cause of action for “an injunction for protection in cases of repeat violence.” To prove the cause of action, “[competent, substantial evidence must support the trial court’s findings of two incidents of repeat violence.” Terrell v. Thompson, 935 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). “Repeat violence” is defined as “two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent.” § 784.046(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Violence” means “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment.” § 784.046(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Harassment” is “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress ... and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Cyberstalking” entails harassment by means of electronic communications. See § 784.048(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Ms. Reynolds set out to prove “cyber-stalking” as grounds for the injunction, alleging Ms. Murphy sent her an offensive email, hacked into her email accounts, deleted all of her emails, and changed her email signature block to include disparaging remarks. But Ms. Reynolds did not introduce evidence that linked Ms. Murphy to the cyberstalking incidents. No competent substantial evidence identified Ms. Murphy as the perpetrator of these acts.
Reversed.
DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…mmunicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language ... directed at a specific per [*1092] son, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(d); see also Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“ ‘Harassment’ is a ‘course of conduct directed to a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress ... and serves no legitimate purpose.’ ‘Cyberstalking’ entails harassment by means of electronic communications…
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Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162 (Fla.2d DCA 2001). Ms. Young used her husband’s email in an inappropriate manner but did not threaten or stalk him. Although the trial court cited this court’s opinion in Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), as implicitly approving the finding that “offensive email, hacking into another person’s email account, deleting email or changing an email signature,” could be grounds for a repeat-violence injunction under section 784.046(2),…
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Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…rectly points out that several district courts have interpreted the stalking statute with guidance from the repeat violence statute—section 784.046—which defines 1 Although the injunction has now expired, the appeal is not moot. Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (finding appeal of an expired injunction against repeat violence was not moot “because collateral legal consequences flowing from such an injunction outlast the injunction itself”). “repeat violence” as “two incidents of vi…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sallas v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992)
- Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992)
- Bevan v. Wolfson, 638 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Rodman v. Niah Rodman, 48 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Terrell v. Thompson, 935 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Boyles v. Tiefenthaler, 810 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Traniello v. State, 810 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)