CHERYL B. YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL D. YOUNG, APPELLEE
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Cheryl Young appeals a domestic violence injunction issued against her for accessing her husband's email account during divorce proceedings. The appellate court reverses, holding that her conduct—while improper—does not constitute cyberstalking or domestic violence under Florida law because it lacked the required threatening communications directed at the victim.
The court reversed, holding that Young's conduct, while inappropriate, does not constitute domestic violence or cyberstalking because cyberstalking requires electronic communications of words, images, or language directed at a specific person causing substantial emotional distress and serving no legitimate purpose. Young's acts of changing the password and appropriating emails do not meet this definition.
[1] A domestic violence injunction requires a showing of actual or imminent danger of domestic violence as defined by statute.
[2] Domestic violence, as defined by statute, includes stalking, which requires a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress a…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance.”
Establishes the legal standard for what conduct qualifies as domestic violence sufficient to support an injunction, requiring a threat of imminent violence, not merely inappropriate behavior.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring their dissolution proceeding, Michael Young shared his computer password with Cheryl Young to install anti-virus software. Without his consent,…
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Cheryl B. Young appeals the trial court’s issuance of a domestic violence injunction against her pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2011). We review the trial court’s conclusion of law de novo. See Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So.3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The evidence showed that Ms. Young engaged in improper behavior, but it did not constitute domestic violence, and we reverse.
During their dissolution proceeding, Michael Young gave Cheryl Young his computer password so that she could install some anti-virus software that he had purchased, which allowed multiple users. Later, without his consent, she used the password to read his email and then changed the password so that he could no longer gain access to his account. She filed a paper in the divorce proceeding that contained extensive personal information taken from the emails. The trial court rejected Ms. Young’s explanation for her conduct and issued the injunction. In denying her motion for rehearing, the trial court suggested that her conduct amounted to cyberstalking.
Section 741.30(6) authorizes the court to issue an injunction when a person shows that he or she has been or is in imminent danger of being a victim of domestic violence as defined in section 741.28. “Do*479mestic violence” under section 741.28(2), Florida Statutes (2011), includes the offense of “stalking” as one of the enumerated forms of domestic violence, which is the only offense that could possibly apply to the facts at bar. That term, as used in section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2011), includes willful, malicious, and repeated harassment, and defines “harass” in sub-paragraph (l)(a) as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Stalking also includes cyber-stalking, defined in section 784.048(l)(d) as the communication of “words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”
An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance. See Power v. Boyle, 60 So.3d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Randolph v. Rich, 58 So.3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Young v. Smith, 901 So.2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162 (Fla.2d DCA 2001). Ms. Young used her husband’s email in an inappropriate manner but did not threaten or stalk him.
Although the trial court cited this court’s opinion in Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So.3d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), as implicitly approving the finding that “offensive email, hacking into another person’s email account, deleting email or changing an email signature,” could be grounds for a repeat-violence injunction under section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes (2009), this court held in that case that the petitioner had failed to show that the respondent was the perpetrator of the incidents alleged. This court did not decide whether any of the petitioner’s allegations constituted cy-berstalking.
Ms. Young’s acts in the case at bar, which consisted of changing her husband’s password, appropriating his emails, and including them in a filing in their divorce proceeding, do not amount to cyberstalk-ing, because they were not electronic communications by her of “words, images, or language ... directed at” Mr. Young.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Mitchell v. Mitchell, 198 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Oettmeier, 960 So. 2d at 903. Put generally, “uncivil behavior” and actions that “paint[] ... a typical, albeit unfortunate, picture of a domestic relationship gone awry” cannot ground this sort of injunction. Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Oettmeier, 960 So. 2d at 904. In granting Appellee’s request for an injunction, the trial court explained that “[i]n Florida[,] the only question is, is there behavior, sir on your part that scares her?” Finding Appellee’s…
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Wills v. Rashida Wills Jones, 213 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…ainst domestic violence is impermissible absent proof of malicious harassment that includes a threat of imminent violence and cannot be based on “mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance.” Them point is well-taken. See Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists [*985] at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance”). A…
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Sammie Horowitz v. Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…g website. [*532] Although Mrs. Horowitz’s assertions that Mr. Horowitz somehow “hacked” into her Facebook account are disconcerting, that behavior alone does not amount to cyber-stalking as it is not an electronic communication. See Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“Ms. Young’s acts in the case at bar, which consisted of changing her husband’s password, appropriating his emails, and including them in a filing in their divorce proceeding, do not amount to cyberstalking, because they we…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Boyd v. State, 787 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Power v. Boyle, 60 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
- Young v. Shelitha Kay Smith, 901 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
- Randolph v. Philicia Corine Rich, 58 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
- Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)