OCELYN ST. CYR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ocelyn St. Cyr appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming the trial court erred by not evaluating his mental health before sentencing and by revoking his youthful offender status. The court affirmed as to the mental health claim but remanded as to the youthful offender status claim because the trial court failed to provide records clarifying whether appellant was sentenced as a youthful offender following community control revocation.
The court affirmed that mental health evaluation claims are not proper for a rule 3.800(a) motion. The court held that a youthful offender's status must be maintained upon revocation of community control, but the sentencing limitation of six years applies only to technical violations, not substantive violations. Upon substantive violation, a court may sentence a youthful offender up to the statutory maximum. The fifteen-year sentence was not illegal on its face.
[1] A claim that a trial court failed to evaluate a defendant's mental health status before sentencing is not cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
[2] A trial court's failure to attach records to refute a claim in a motion to correct illegal sentence requires remand.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a circuit court has imposed a youthful offender sentence, it must continue that status upon resentencing after a violation of probation or community control.”
Establishes the mandatory requirement to maintain youthful offender status upon revocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant St. Cyr was a youthful offender placed on community control. He violated community control by committing new offenses (substantive violation…
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Ocelyn St. Cyr appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. We affirm as to appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in not evaluating his mental health status before sentencing. This claim is not proper for a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Potter v. State, 769 So.2d 519, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Appellant also claimed that the trial court could not revoke his “youthful offender status” following revocation of community control. We remand as to this claim because, as the state concedes, the trial court failed to attach records to refute the claim.1
*489The trial court revoked appellant’s youthful offender community control status following substantive violations, including appellant’s commission of new offenses while on community control. Because this was a substantive and not a technical violation, the court could sentence appellant as a youthful offender up to the statutory maximum for the offenses and was not limited by the six-year cap that applies to technical violations only. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2007).
Appellant’s argument that he could not be sentenced to more than six years in prison is incorrect. Appellant appears confused by language in Rogers v. State, 972 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Boynton v. State, 896 So.2d 898, 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). The confusion was clarified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Christian v. State, 84 So.3d 437, 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). See also Flores v. State, 46 So.3d 102, 104-05 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), rev. dismissed, 93 So.3d 324 (Fla.2012).
A defendant need not have been charged or convicted of the new offense constituting the substantive violation in order for a court to sentence a youthful offender in excess of the six-year cap. See Lee v. State, 67 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“[W]hile the court must maintain the defendant’s youthful offender status upon revocation of probation, the court is not limited to imposing the usual youthful offender sentence of six years or less in prison if the revocation is based on a substantive violation of probation.”).
The court in this case could sentence appellant as a youthful offender up to the statutory maximum for his offenses. The fifteen-year sentence he received is not illegal on the ground that it exceeds the six-year cap that applies to technical violations.
Nevertheless, as the state concedes, without the sentencing records, it is not clear whether the trial court sentenced appellant as a youthful offender following revocation. “Once a circuit court has imposed a youthful offender sentence, it must continue that status upon resentencing after a violation of probation or community control.” Blacker v. State, 49 So.3d 785, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citations omitted). The erroneous revocation of this status, that is the failure to sentence the defendant as a youthful offender following revocation of supervision, can be raised in a rule 3.800(a) motion. Id. at 787.
Appellant’s designation as a youthful offender could affect his classification within the prison system, the availability of programs, and the possibility of early release. See Christian, 84 So.3d at 443-44; Blacker, 49 So.3d at 787.
Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court with directions to sentence appellant as a youthful offender or to attach records refuting appellant’s claim.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
WARNER, POLEN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
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Smith v. State, 143 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…the State counters that Smith’s youthful offender status could be revoked once Smith was charged with and convicted of three new substantive offenses. We reject the State’s reading of Rogers and point to our subsequent decision in St. Cyr v. State, 106 So. 3d 487, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). When a defendant violates his youthful offender probation by committing a substantive violation,2 the court is not bound to “‘the usual youthful offender sentence of six years or less’ ” and “can impose up to the statutory…
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Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097 (Fla. 2018)…ven for committing a substantive probation violation); Cooper v. State , 235 So. 3d 1034, 1035-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (same); Peterson v. State , 176 So. 3d 1015, 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (same); Gadson , 160 So. 3d at 496 (same); St. Cyr v. State , 106 So. 3d 487, 488-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same); Josey v. State , 128 So. 3d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (same); Lachenauer v. State , 117 So. 3d 880, 880-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same); Mistretta v. State , 99 So. 3d 561, 561-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (same); Christ…
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Johnie Earl Larkins v. State, 159 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm on all but one point and accept the State’s concession that Larkins’ sentence must be corrected to reflect his youthful offender status. Smith v. State, 143 So. 3d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); St. Cyr v. State, 106 So. 3d 487, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Knite v. State, 102 So. 3d 691, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), rev. denied, 108 So. 3d 656 (Fla. 2012). As the cases point out, because of the substantive violation of pro…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- LEE v. State, 67 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
- Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
- Christian v. State, 84 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)
- Boynton v. State, 896 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- MacIer v. In re Est. OF Bessie Giamportone, 972 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Rogers v. State, 972 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Flores v. State, 46 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- Potter v. State, 769 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Azar Osmanovic v. State, 46 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Flores v. State, 93 So. 3d 324 (Fla. 2012)