RAYMOND NEELEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Neeley appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance without a prescription after pleading guilty. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the officer illegally detained Neeley before searching him and discovering oxycodone pills, rendering any consent to the search invalid and tainted.
The court held that Officer Hilton illegally detained Neeley by instructing him to 'stand by' and later to step out of the vehicle, and that any consent to the search was presumptively tainted and involuntary as a result of the illegal detention. Therefore, the evidence must be suppressed and the conviction reversed.
[1] A search conducted after an illegal detention is presumptively tainted and rendered involuntary, invalidating any subsequent consent.
[2] An officer's instruction to an individual to 'stand by' constitutes a detention when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or disregard the instruction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Officer Hilton's instruction to Mr. Neeley to 'stand by' was a detention because a reasonable person under the circumstances would not feel free to leave or to disregard the instruction.”
Establishes that the initial instruction to stand by constituted an unlawful detention under the Mendenhall reasonable person standard
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Hilton responded to a call about a man slumped in a van in a driveway belonging to the defendant's ex-wife, Ms. Clancy. The officer found Neel…
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Raymond Neeley appeals his judgment and sentence after pleading to possession of a controlled substance without a prescription. See § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). We have jurisdiction. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). The trial court erred in denying Mr. Neeley’s motion to suppress the pills found in his pocket after an illegal. detention and search. Consequently, we reverse.
The undisputed facts appear as follows. Officer Hilton was alerted to a man slumped over in a van in the driveway of a residence. He responded to the site and saw Mr. Neeley slumped behind the wheel with two doors wide open. He determined that Mr. Neeley was' all right and not intoxicated. Officer Hilton directed Mr. Neeley to “stand by” and knocked on the front door of the residence, which belonged to Ms. Clancy, Mr. Neeley’s ex-wife. The van was hers. After speaking with Ms. Clancy, Officer Hilton returned to the driveway. He searched Mr. Neeley and discovered eight oxycodone pills. Ms. Clancy found the van keys in her purse before Officer Hilton removed Mr. Neeley from the scene.
The.testimony of Officer Hilton and that of Ms. Clancy conflict as we delve further. Officer Hilton claimed that Ms. Clancy told him that Mr. Neeley did not have her permission to be in her van and that she was concerned about where her keys were. He said that when he searched Mr. Nee-ley, he believed he had probable cause to arrest him for trespass to a conveyance and that he was searching for the car keys. He claimed that he asked if he could search Mr. Neeley. Mr. Neeley only lifted his arms several inches, which Officer Hilton interpreted as consent.
Ms. Clancy testified that when she answered Officer Hilton’s knock on her door, she told him that the last time she saw Mr. Neeley he was on the couch, that it was fine with her that Mr. Neeley was sleeping in her van, and that she left the van unlocked. She testified that when she opened the door to Officer Hilton, she saw Mr. Neeley standing outside, handcuffed. She said that Officer Hilton told her he had found medication in Mr. Neeley’s *766pocket and asked her if she took medication and what type.
After a hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Neeley’s motion to suppress. The court found that at no time did Officer Hilton have probable cause to arrest him for trespass, but that the search was legal because there was no unlawful detention and Mr. Neeley consented to the search. The trial court concluded that Officer Hilton’s “asking” Mr. Neeley to “stand by” did not “put[ ] him in custody in any way” and that “he could have walked away if he wanted.” The court noted but discounted Ms. Clancy’s testimony that Mr. Neeley was handcuffed when she answered the door.
Even if Mr. Neeley consented to the search, such consent was invalid because Officer Hilton illegally detained him before consent. Consent given after illegal police activity is presumptively tainted and rendered involuntary. Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 646-47 (Fla.1980); Butler v. State, 697 So.2d 907, 908-09 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Officer Hilton’s instruction to Mr. Neeley to “stand by” was a detention because a reasonable person under the circumstances would not feel free to leave or to disregard the instruction. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Johnson v. State, 995 So.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding officer’s direction to car passenger to “sit tight” was detention). Additionally, Officer Hilton illegally detained Mr. Neeley after he returned to the van by instructing him to step out of the vehicle. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); Shaw v. State, 778 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Allen v. State, 703 So.2d 1162, 1162-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Mr. Neeley’s “consent” was tainted and involuntary. Therefore, we reverse Mr. Neeley’s conviction.1
Reversed.
VILLANTI and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
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Aguilar v. State, 259 So. 3d 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…see also Connor, 803 So. 2d at 609 ("[W]hen consent is obtained after illegal police activity such as an illegal search or arrest, the unlawful police action presumptively taints and renders involuntary any consent to search."); Neeley v. State, 112 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Because the consent is presumptively involuntary, the "consent will be held voluntary only if there is clear and convincing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of pri…
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State v. Jones, 138 So. 3d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…ed. We hold that the trial court erred in partially denying Jones’ motion to suppress because the statements were made and the physical evidence was gathered after an illegal detention that occurred at the beginning of the stop. See Neeley v. State, 112 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Johnson v. State, 995 So. 2d 1011, 1013-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Leroy v. State, 982 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when, under the circumstances…
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State v. Willis (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)…officer constituted a stop. Where an officer makes a show of authority, such as a “request” for the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets, such show of authority may convert the consensual encounter into a stop. See, e.g., Neeley v. State, 112 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“Officer Hilton’s instruction to Mr. Neeley to ‘stand by’ was a detention because a reasonable person under the circumstances would not feel free to leave or to disregard the instruction.”); Gentles v. State, 50 So. 3d 1192,…
Authorities Cited
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980)
- State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012)
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)
- Butler v. State, 697 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Allen v. State, 703 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Johnson v. State, 995 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- Martinez v. State, 995 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- Shaw v. State, 778 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)