DOUGLAS M. WYCKOFF, PETITIONER,
v.
MELISSA K. CAVANAUGH F/K/A MELISSA K. WYCKOFF, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2015-05-15
No. 1D15-1646
LEWIS, C.J., WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., concur.
164 So. 3d 165 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A former husband sought a writ of prohibition to challenge a trial judge's denial of his motion to disqualify based on the judge's alleged refusal to allow him to cross-examine his former wife during an evidentiary hearing on a timesharing suspension motion. The appellate court granted the petition, finding that the denial of cross-examination rights constitutes a sufficient basis for disqualification and ordered assignment of a new trial judge.


Holding

The court held that the alleged refusal to permit cross-examination constitutes a legally sufficient basis for a motion to disqualify and that the motion should have been granted. The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition and remanded for assignment of a new trial judge.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to disqualify a judge is legally sufficient when it alleges that the judge refused to allow a party to cross-examine another party during an evidentiary hearing.

[2] The outright denial of the fundamental right of cross-examination can give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias.

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Key Quotes

“the judge's refusal to allow a mother in a timesharing proceeding to conduct cross-examination "denied the Mother a most basic right of due process and reasonably caused her to fear that she would not receive a fair and impartial hearing"”

Establishes that denial of cross-examination violates due process and creates reasonable fear of bias

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Facts & Procedural History

In a post-dissolution family law proceeding, the former wife filed an emergency motion to temporarily suspend the former husband's timesharing and vis…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, the former husband in this post-dissolution proceeding, filed a petition for writ of prohibition to review the trial court’s order denying his verified motion to disqualify the trial judge. The motion alleged that the judge refused to allow Petitioner to cross-examine Respondent, the former wife, during an evidentiary hearing on the former wife’s emergency motion to temporarily suspend the former husband’s timesharing and visitation. We agree with the former husband that, based on this allegation,1 the motion to disqualify was legally sufficient and should have been granted. See Wade v. Wade, 123 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and explaining that the judge’s refusal • to allow a mother in a timesharing proceeding to con*166duct cross-examination “denied the Mother a most basic right of due process and reasonably caused her to fear that she would not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and rejecting argument that the judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim was merely a complaint about an adverse ruling because “the outright denial of the basic and fundamental right of cross-examination ... would give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand for the assignment of a new trial judge.2

PETITION GRANTED.

LEWIS, C.J., WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Bielling v. Bielling, 188 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    …uld be disqualified from presiding over further proceedings in this matter because the abrupt entry of a final order without allowing Appellant to finish presenting evidence and argument demonstrated bias against Appellant. See Wyckoff v. Cavanaugh, 164 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing cases holding that denial of due process is valid basis for disqualification of trial judge). Appellant did not file a motion to disqualify the trial judge below in compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration…

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