CLEVELAND
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A trial court cannot impose a habitual felony offender sentence unless the State introduces record evidence proving the defendant's prior felony convictions and the dates required by section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The sentence must be reversed and remanded for resentencing when such evidence is absent, even if the defendant stipulated to prior convictions.
[1] To impose a habitual felony offender sentence under section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the trial court must find based on record evidence the dates of the defendant…
[2] A defendant's stipulation to prior felony convictions at trial does not constitute record evidence of the temporal requirements necessary for a habitual felony offender s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before the trial court may impose a habitual felony offender sentence, it must find, based on record evidence, that the defendant has been previously convicted of any combination of two or more felonies and that the current felony occurred either (a) while the defendant was serving a prison sentence or lawfully imposed supervision as a result of a prior felony conviction; or (b) within five years from the date of conviction for the defendant's last prior felony or within five years from the date of the defendant's release from prison or supervision for a prior felony offense.”
This establishes the statutory requirements the State must prove through record evidence to impose a habitual felony offender sentence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCleveland was convicted of battery on a correctional officer and the trial court imposed a habitual felony offender sentence. Cleveland stipulated at …
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
BO WILLIAMS CLEVELAND,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D2023-2373
April4, 2025
Appeal from the Circuit Court for DeSoto County; Don T. Hall, Judge.
Dane K. Chase of Chase Law Florida, P.A., Saint Petersburg, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marena S. Ramirez, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
ATKINSON, Judge.
Bo Williams Cleveland appeals his judgment and sentence for battery on a correctional officer. Mr. Cleveland's conviction is affirmed without further discussion. However, Mr. Cleveland's sentence must be reversed because the State failed to introduce evidence proving that he qualified as a habitual felony offender for purposes of an enhanced sentence under section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2022).
LUCAS, J., Concurs. SMITH, J., Concurs separately.
I concur with the majority's opinion. I write separately because I would dispose of Mr. Cleveland's argument that a jury is required to make the necessary factual findings to support his habitual felony offender status pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 107–08 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). On this point, our court and other district courts have held that neither Alleyne nor Apprendi require the jury to determine whether a defendant can be sentenced as a habitual felony offender. See Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("[B]ecause Lopez's date of release from prison is a part of his prior record, that fact determination did not need to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the trial court's determination of a defendant's date of release after serving a prison sentence on a prior conviction, for purposes of enhanced sentencing under the habitual offender statute, did not violate Apprendi because the trial court's finding—that the instant offense was committed within five years of the date of the defendant's last felony conviction or the date of release from prison—was "directly derivative of a prior conviction and therefore does not implicate Sixth Amendment protections"); Hunter v. State, 174 So. 3d 1011, 1016–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that the State was not required to prove enhancement factors to jury prior to trial court's imposition of habitual violent felony offender enhancement); McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a jury did not need to determine whether defendant had the requisite predicate convictions for habitual felony sentence); see also Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423, 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("Alleyne leaves intact the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (U.S. 2013)
- Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2001)
- McBRIDE v. State, 884 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
- Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Calvin's Heavy Equip., Inc. v. Kirkland, 699 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Sanders v. State, 765 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Mitchell v. State, 780 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- The Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. State of Fla. & Joseph P. Smith, 924 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)