FRANK ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court correctly denied the appellant's motion to vacate his sentence.
The appellant sought to vacate his sentence, alleging illegal arrest, relentless interrogation, undue delay in appearing before a magistrate, denial o…
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The appellant, by this appeal, seeks review of an order of the trial court denying his motion, filed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix.
The appellant alleged in his petition that his confinement was illegal, in that he was denied due process of law on the following grounds: (1) His arrest was illegal. (2) He was subjected to relentless interrogation. (3) He was not taken before the magistrate without undue delay. (4) He was denied right of bail. (S) The aforementioned matters were for the express purpose of procuring damaging statements and evidence against the appellant.
Having considered the record on appeal,, we find the allegations of the appellant’s, motion to vacate are without merit, as it appears that he had counsel of his own-, choosing at the time he originally pleaded:’ to the charges before the trial court and that he had counsel when he switched his-pleas to guilty. Therefore, the record refuting the mere conclusions of the petition,, the trial court was correct in denying relief thereunder, pursuant to the following authorities: Milton v. Cochran, Fla.1962, 147 So.2d 137; Dykes v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 162 So.2d 675; United States v. Maher, N.D. Maine 1950, 89 F.Supp. 289; United States v. Jenkins, 3 Cir. 1960, 281 F.2d 193; United States v. Shields, 6 Cir. 1961, 291 F.2d 798; Roddy v. United States, 10 Cir. 1961, 296 F.2d 9; United States v. Koptik, 7 Cir. 1962, 300 F.2d 19.
Affirmed.
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Bridges v. State, 169 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Anderson v. State of Florida, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So. 2d 887.…
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Williams v. State, 167 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…nally pleaded not guilty and subsequently, when represented by counsel of his own choosing, changed this plea to guilty. Therefore, he was entitled to no relief. See: Sardinia v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 328; Anderson v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So. 2d 887. The other two grounds of the petition are not sufficient for a collateral attack under Criminal Procedure Rule #1. See: Milton v. Cochran, Fla.1962, 147 So. 2d 137; Wooten v. State, Fla.App.1964, 163 So. 2d 305; Simpson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164…
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Rodriguez v. State, 176 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)….” Our inspection of the record leads us to the conclusion that the trial judge did not commit error in ruling that the allegations of the petition were insufficient. See Brown v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So. 2d 34; Anderson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So. 2d 887. The action taken by the defendant-at trial was with advice of counsel. The three co-defendants, all of whom had advice of the same attorney, also changed their pleas from not guilty to guilty at the time of trial. Neither the record nor the Rule 1…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1962)
- Dykes v. State, 162 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th Cir. 1961)
- United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1962)
- United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1961)
- United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1960)