SIMON E. RUBIN ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
HENRY MAJOR, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-04-23
No. 67-515
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
209 So. 2d 691 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Holding

The court held that the special act provided jurisdiction for the circuit court to award attorney's fees, and the appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion regarding the amount awarded.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellee was discharged as a fireman, and an appeal to the City Personnel Board was unsuccessful. The circuit court granted certiorari, reinstated the…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal by the Personnel Board of the City of Miami Beach is from the circuit court’s order awarding an attorney’s fee to counsel for the appellee. The appel-lee was discharged as a fireman of the City of Miami Beach. An appeal from the discharge was filed to the City Personnel Board. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari was filed in the circuit court seeking to review the adverse decision of the Personnel Board. The court granted the petition and after a hearing on the merits reinstated the appellee and restored all retirement and corollary benefits, including some back pay. The court also awarded an attorney’s fee.

In this court appellee’s counsel cited one provision in a special act1 of the Florida Legislature as authority for the award. We agree that the special act gave the circuit court jurisdiction to award a reasonable attorney’s fee.2 Rule 3.16(e) F.A.R. (1965).

The only question on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney’s fee the circuit court awarded. The appellant urges that the fee is so grossly excessive as to constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. The appellant has failed to carry the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. See Pross v. Pross, Fla. 1954, 72 So.2d 671; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App. 1961, 127 So.2d 137, 26 A.L.R.3d 592; and Williams v. Williams, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 865.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Rubin v. Sanford, 218 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
    …orders here under review be and the [*180] same are hereby reversed, with directions to the trial judge to dismiss the petitions for attorneys’ fees. Reversed and remanded with directions. . See, also, related case of Rubin v. Major, Fla.App.1968, 209 So. 2d 691. . Deficiencies in titles of Acts generally cannot be raised if there is an intervening [*179] Session of the Legislature, between the time of the passage of the Act and the time the question is raised, which renacts as a revision all general acts.…
  • Wooten v. Wooten, 213 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
    …s examination succeeded in minimizing the weight of expert testimony in support of the award of an attorney’s fee, but we are unable to say that the evidentiary basis for the fee was insufficient as a matter of law. See Rubin v. Major, Fla.App.1968, 209 So. 2d 691. Affirmed.…
  • Rubin v. Major, 221 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968)
    …Certiorari denied without opinion. 209 So. 2d 691.…

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