WILLIAM FARR, APPELLANT,
v.
RHODA FARR (LANDIS), APPELLEE
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William Farr appeals a post-final decree order determining property rights, child support, and appointing a special master in a divorce case. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly retained jurisdiction to determine property rights by consent of the parties and had discretion to continue child support due to the child's physical disability.
The trial court had jurisdiction to reserve determination of property rights until after entry of the final divorce decree when both parties consented, especially where the wife claimed a special equity that had never been determined. The court properly required the father to continue child support payments beyond the child's majority due to the child's known physical disability. The appointment of a special master and order for the accountant to testify were proper.
[1] A trial court has jurisdiction to reserve the determination of property rights subsequent to the entry of a final divorce decree when counsel for all parties consent to s…
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction to determine a spouse's special equity in property after a divorce judgment when the special equity has not been previously determined.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was at the urging of counsel for the apppellant that jurisdiction to determine property rights was reserved; it was consented to by counsel for the appellee; it was acted upon by the court; and we find that in this case the chancellor had the power to reserve this determination until a time subsequent to his resolving the issue of divorce.”
Establishes the court's holding that trial court could reserve jurisdiction over property rights when both parties consented to the reservation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam and Rhoda Farr were parties to a divorce proceeding. At the final hearing, counsel for the appellant (William) consented to the chancellor res…
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By this interlocutory appeal, review is sought of a post-final decree order entered by a chancellor, wherein he made certain adjudications relative to determining the property rights of the parties, support for a child of the parties, appointment of a special master, and directions to a certified public accountant.
The primary contention by the appellant is that the trial court was without jurisdiction to go into the property rights of the parties, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the final hearing counsel for the appellant consented to the chancellor reserving jurisdiction to determine property rights subsequent to the entry of the final decree of divorce. We find this position not to be well taken.
It was at the urging of counsel for the apppellant that jurisdiction to determine property rights was reserved; it was consented to by counsel for the appellee; it was acted upon by the court; and we find that in this case the chancellor had the power to reserve this determination until a time subsequent to his resolving the issue of divorce.
Counsel for the appellant relies for reversal on several authorities, particularly Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 53. All of his authorities, with the exception of Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, supra, we find distinguishable upon the fact that no consent to reservation of jurisdiction was made prior to the entry of the final judgment. We find the above cited opinion distinguishable on the facts, and if it is not so distinguishable then this opinion will be in conflict therewith.
In the case of Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, supra, the chancellor found that the parties held certain property as an estate by the entireties at the time of the entry of the final judgment of divorce. Upon the dissolution of the marriage, by operation of law, they became tenants in common of this property. Valentine v. Valentine, Fla. 1950, 45 So.2d 885; Lubarr v. Lubarr, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 123; Schoenrock v. Schoenrock, Fla.App. 1967, 202 So.2d 571; § 689.15, Fla.Stat, F.S.A. No question of a special equity was involved, and this opinion held that after a dissolution of the marriage [notwithstanding the supposed reservation of jurisdiction to determine property rights] a chancellor would be without the power to consider a special equity of the wife subsequent to a judgment of divorce. In the instant case, the wife has always claimed a special equity in certain property of the husband. At no time has there been a determination of property rights, either by operation of law or by an act of the chancellor. And, we hold that under these facts the trial judge had the jurisdiction to continue the cause to determine a special equity, if any, possessed by the wife.
It is apparent that the child of the parties, although h'aving passed his majority, is suffering a physical disability which was known to the chancellor, and we find no error in his requiring the father to continue the support payments subsequent to the child reaching his majority until such a time as he could have a full hearing on the matter; this is clearly within his discretion. Perla v. Perla, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 689; Fincham v. Levin, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 883.
No objection was made by the appellant to the appointment of a special master and, in fact, it appears that he consented to same. Therefore, no error has been demonstrated in this regard. Marx v. Withers, 119 Fla. 692, 160 So. 662; Moore v. Hendry, 126 Fla. 411, 171 So. 228; Marsh v. Sarasota County, Fla.App. 1957, 97 So.2d 312; Karl v. David Ritter, Sportservice, Inc., Fla.App. 1964, 164 So.2d 23.
Lastly, the certified public accountant was the accountant for both parties and there was no error in the order requiring him to appear and testify regarding the financial affairs of the parties.
*763Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…of the court. See Annotation: “Necessity of notice of application or intention to correct error in judgment entry” at 14 A.L.R.2d 224. . See Annotation “Collateral attack on domestic nunc pro tunc judgment” at 70 A.L.R.2d 1131. . See Farr v. Farr, 249 So. 2d 761 (3 D.C.A. Fla.1971). . See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Young, 162 So. 2d 303 (3 D.C.A.Fla.1964).…
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Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (1948); McEachin v. McEachin, 154 So. 2d 894 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1963); and Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (4th D. C.A.Fla.1970). The appellee/wife asserts the reservation of jurisdiction was valid and relies on Farr v. Farr, 249 So. 2d 761 (3d DL.C.A.Fla.1971). The question is whether a Trial Court may enter a judgment dissolving a marriage but within said judgment reserve jurisdiction to determine later the property rights between the parties. It is uncontested that a court may rese…
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Norwood K. Walton v. Walton, 290 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…ourt to make such a decision in his counterclaim, should not now be heard to complain that the trial court committed error in undertaking to do what the appellant requested. Dorman v. Dorman, 125 Fla. 280, 169 So. 2d 867; Farr v. Farr, Fla.App.1971, 249 So. 2d 761. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, we affirm the action of the trial judge in dividing the jointly held property at the request of the appellant, and find no abuse of discretion in the manner of division as ordered. Affirmed. . We have not…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1952)
- Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1950)
- Marsh v. Sarasota Cnty., 97 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957)
- Thaddeus J. Grezik v. Grezik, 155 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Frieda Karl and John Karl v. Ritter, 164 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Lubarr v. Lubarr, 199 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Schoenrock v. Alvina N. Schoenrock, 202 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Marx v. Withers, 119 Fla. 692 (Fla. 1935)
- Moore v. Hendry, 126 Fla. 411 (Fla. 1936)