SHELBY PRESTON LANGSTON, APPELLANT,
v.
MARTHA HENDERSON LANGSTON, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1972-02-08
Nos. 71-637, 71-800
Before SWANN, C. J„ and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
257 So. 2d 625 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1972) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's award of $183,750 in lump sum alimony to his wife over nine years and eleven months, as well as the court's reservation of jurisdiction to consider periodic alimony in the future and the award of attorneys' fees. The appellate court affirms, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's decisions on all issues, finding no clear abuse of discretion. The trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony, properly reserved jurisdiction to consider periodic alimony in the future, and properly awarded attorneys' fees to the wife.


Headnotes

[1] An appellate court will disturb a lump sum alimony award only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.

[2] A trial court may reserve jurisdiction to consider future periodic alimony awards based on a party's future needs and ability to pay.

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Key Quotes

“In order to disturb an allowance of lump sum alimony, the appellant is required, on appeal, to clearly show the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of the award.”

Establishes the standard of review for alimony awards on appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

The wife was awarded lump sum alimony of $183,750, payable over a period of nine years and eleven months. The trial court also reserved jurisdiction t…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal by the husband from certain provisions in a final decree of divorce for the wife.

The wife was awarded lump sum alimony of $183,750, payable over a period of nine years and eleven months. On appeal the husband argues error was made in the determination of his total assets resulting in an excessive award of lump sum alimony to the wife. The wife argues the husband failed to provide this court with all the evidence relating to the husband’s assets which were before the trial judge.

In order to disturb an allowance of lump sum alimony, the appellant is required, on appeal, to clearly show the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of the award. No abuse of such discretion has been clearly shown in this appeal. Ortiz v. Ortiz, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 243; and Pollak v. Pollak, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 771.

The husband argues next that the trial court had “no power to regain jurisdiction after nine years and eleven months have passed.” This is an improper statement as the final decree reserved jurisdiction for several purposes and there is no valid point concerning the trial court regaining jurisdiction. We note that counsel who prepared this point was not counsel who argued the case on appeal. The husband challenges only the reservation of jurisdiction by the trial court for the purpose of:

“Considering after the expiration of nine years and eleven months from June 1, 1971, the need of the Plaintiff, MARTHA HENDERSON LANGSTON, if any, and of the Defendant’s SHELBY PRESTON LANGSTON’S ability to pay alimony to the plaintiff, in periodic installments.”

The husband concedes the trial judge has legal authority to grant both lump sum and periodic alimony to a wife. See Fla. Stat. § 61.08, F.S.A., Barfield v. Barfield, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 132; Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 734. His position is the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding lump sum alimony and in reserving jurisdiction to possibly award periodic alimony at a future date.

We considered a fact situation somewhat similar in Zohlman v. Zohlman, Fla.App.1970, 235 So.2d 532. There, we found no abuse of discretion in the present lump sum award of alimony in the sum of $80,000 to the wife, with periodic alimony payments of $1,250 per month. In the case, sub judice, there may never be any award of periodic alimony under the terms of this final decree. The reservation of jurisdiction to determine the wife’s needs, in the future, was not an abuse of discretion under the facts herein presented to the trial judge. If the trial judge should abuse his discretion in making an award, or in *627the amount of the award, of periodic alimony in the future, it may be reviewed at that time.

The husband also challenges the award and the amount of attorneys’ fees which the trial court required him to pay to the attorneys for the wife. We find no error in either of these points. See Zohlman, supra; Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 592; and Turney v. Turney, Fla.App.1963, 149 So.2d 83.

The provisions of the final decree which are challenged by this appeal are

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
    …ee to such a provision in a property settlement agreement. Further,- jurisdiction may be retained to enter periodic alimony if found necessary after such termination of lump sum alimony installment payments. See Hyatt v. Hyatt; Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). Permanent Periodic Alimony Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties. The two primary elements to be consi…
  • Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1976)
    …in Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla.1974) (reh. den. 1975); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1972); Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138 (Fla.App.3d 1974); Schultz v. Schultz, [*1130] 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla.App.2d 1974); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla.App.3d 1972); Zohlman v. Zohlman, 235 So. 2d 532 (Fla.App.3d 1970) and Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla.App.3d 1966). We grant certiorari and quash the decision below, with directions that the judgment of the trial court be reinstated.…
    1 / 2
  • Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
    …. Lump sum alimony awards have long been upheld in Florida courts. Yandell v. Yandell, supra; Pross v. Pross, supra; Zohlman v. Zohlman, 235 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Fishman v. Fishman, 245 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). By definition, an award of lump sum alimony vests in the recipient at the time of the final decree, and is not subject to defeasance or modification. Latta v. Latta, 135 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Keller v. Belcher, 256…

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