MARGUARITE MARSHALL, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL MARSHALL, APPELLEE
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Wife appealed a final judgment in a divorce case, challenging the denial of permanent alimony, denial of a continuance motion, and the trial court's failure to retain jurisdiction over future alimony claims. The appellate court affirmed the denial of permanent alimony but reversed and remanded to require the trial court to retain jurisdiction over future alimony and to order the husband to transfer the marital home and furnishings to the wife.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance or denying permanent alimony given the parties' relative needs and abilities. However, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future and in failing to order transfer of the marital home and furnishings to the wife when both parties were in agreement.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for continuance of a final hearing in a dissolution of marriage action when the record supports such denia…
[2] A trial court does not err in denying a present award of alimony based on the relative needs and abilities of the parties.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Chancellor, based on the record, did abuse his discretion in failing to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future if such be applied for and properly allowable under § 61.14, Fla.Stat.”
Establishes that trial courts must retain jurisdiction over alimony matters even when denying present awards
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee-husband initiated a dissolution of marriage action against the appellant-wife. The trial court denied the wife's motion for continuance o…
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The original opinion in this cause filed by this Court on December 19, 1972, is hereby withdrawn prior to issuance of the mandate and this opinion is substituted therefor.
Appellant wife seeks review of a final judgment in an action for dissolution of marriage brought by the appellee-husband and attacks the denial of permanent alimo*108ny, denial of her motion for continuance of the final hearing- and the failure of the trial judge to retain jurisdiction over the. parties as to alimony in the event the needs of the wife or ability of the husband changes in the future.
Upon consideration of the record on appeal, the briefs and the argument of counsel, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance requested by the appellant. In addition, we cannot say that the Chancellor erred in denying the appellant alimony in light of the relative needs and abilities of the parties. Accordingly, we will not disturb so much of the final judgment which denies a present award of alimony.
However, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor, based on the record, did abuse his discretion in failing to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future if such be applied for and properly allowable under § 61.14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Poe v. Poe, Fla.App.1972, 263 So.2d 644; Melton v. Melton, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 705; Reed v. Reed, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 449; Arthur v. Arthur, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 8; Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 734. We also note that this error was noted by the Chancellor at the hearing on appellant’s motion for a new trial. However, the late Judge John J. Kehoe was prevented from modifying his final order, as he had intended, by his untimely death. We, therefore, order such a modification at this time.
In addition, we note that the appellant prayed that title to the marital household and furnishings be given to her and that the appellee was agreeable to allowing the wife to keep the house. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor should have ordered the appellee to transfer title to the house and its furnishings to the appellant wife and retained jurisdiction over the parties in order to enforce such order.
Therefore, we affirm that part of the final judgment that grants the dissolution of marriage and denies the appellant permanent alimony but reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to amend the final judgment so as to retain jurisdiction over the parties as to future alimony and to enter and enforce an order directing the appellee to transfer title of the marital home and furnishings to the appellant wife.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Wood v. Wood, 359 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…to award same at such future date as appel-lee could demonstrate a material change in the circumstances of the parties as would warrant such an award. A reservation of jurisdiction for such a purpose is, of course, permissible. Marshall v. Marshall, 273 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). At such time when appellee does, in fact, petition the court for an award of permanent alimony, appellant will then be given the opportunity to present evidence in opposition to such…
Authorities Cited
- O'Dell v. Carlton B. O'Dell, 204 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- POE v. POE, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Melton v. Melton, 251 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Thomas v. State, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Lindholm, 243 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Arthur v. Arthur, 243 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)