JOHN HARGROVE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the defendant was not taken into custody on the Pasco County charges in June, and therefore the speedy trial rule was not triggered at that time.
[1] A defendant is not "taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to" charges when arrested on unrelated charges in a different county and…
[2] The lodging of a formal detainer on a charge, indicating that disposition of all other charges will not result in the prisoner's release, starts the speedy trial period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was arrested in Pinellas County on unrelated Polk County charges and identified in a lineup for the Pasco County charges. No hold was pl…
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Hargrove claims to have been “taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to” these charges on June 16, 1972. CrPR 3.-191(a)(1), 33 F.S.A. On that date he was arrested in Pinellas County on Polk County charges unrelated to this case, and, while in the Pinellas jail, was placed in a line-up, where a witness to the crime charged in the instant case identified him. No hold was placed upon him on this Pas-co County matter, and he was not formally charged until August 14. He was then on bond, in fact, and was arrested September 1 in Pinellas County. We think his argument that he was taken into custody on these charges in June is without merit, dispense with the requested oral argument (F.A.R. 3.10(e), 32 F.S.A., and affirm.
State v. Sutton, Fla.App.2d 1972, 269 So.2d 712, is a different matter. There the defendant was held on a detain-er, as well as on extraneous charges, and we held that the lodging of a formal de-tainer on a charge, meaning that the disposition of all other charges will not result in the prisoner’s release, starts the meter running under the speedy trial rule. We held there that the State cannot enlarge the time by withholding formal service of process. The important thing is whether the prisoner is held in custody on the charge in question. If he is, then the State must bring him to trial within the time allowed.
At the other end of the scale, there may be times when deliberate delay without taking the accused into custody may raise a constitutional question, but this case falls far short of that. See United States v. Marion, 1971, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; Barker v. Wingo, 1972, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.
There may be valid reasons why these Pasco County charges were not filed until *392August. Certainly such reasons are presumed to exist, no prejudice has been shown, and we find no reason to reverse the trial judge’s denial of discharge.
Affirmed.
LILES and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977)…ld that a de-tainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the running of the speedy trial time. To the extent that Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), and State v. Sutton, supra, are inconsistent herewith, they are overruled. The decision of the District Court under review is quashed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. O…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Floyd Glenn Williams v. The Honorable E. L. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…We hold that under F.R.Cr.P. 3.-191(a)(1) the 180-day time period in which the state had to bring relator to trial commenced to run when he was formally arrested on the Putnam County charges. We are aware that our sister court in Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (2 Fla.App.1973), and State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (2 Fla.App.1973), has taken the position that the time period commences to run when a detainer is issued. As a detainer does not operate to place the person against whom it is issued in custody a…
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State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…st, November 7, 1973. The record reflects, however, that they were arrested and charged with different offenses on that date and that they were not charged nor were “holds” placed against them for the offense here charged. Compare Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Further, they were arrested by officers of a different police department and charged in a different court. Finally, they are charged here with an offense on a different date in a different county. In any event, this argument does…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1971)
- State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)