ROBERT LEE HOLTON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A pretrial bail bond premium is not a taxable cost when criminal charges are dismissed.
[1] A pretrial bail bond premium is not a taxable cost when criminal charges against a defendant are dismissed.
[2] Statutory authority and judicial discretion govern the determination of taxable costs in criminal proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant's criminal charges were dismissed due to speedy trial violations. He sought to tax the $1,000 pretrial bail bond premium as a cost. The tria…
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PER CURIAM.
The sole issue in this case is whether a pretrial bail bond premium is a taxable cost where criminal charges against the defendant have been dismissed. On April 16, 1974, the trial court dismissed the criminal charges against the defendant, Robert Lee Holton, because the speedy trial period had run. On July 5, 1974, Holton filed a motion to tax costs listing inter alia $1,000 as the premium on his $10,000 pretrial surety bond. The trial court denied such motion as to the bond premium whereupon Holton appealed.
There is authorization under both Art. I, Sec. 19, of the Florida Constitution, and § 939.06, Fla.Stat., for reimbursement of costs to a defendant who has been acquitted or discharged. It is left to the courts to determine costs to be taxed.
Holton argues by analogy that the case of Lillibridge v. City of Miami, Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 40, holding that the premium on a supersedeas bond posted by the defendant pending appeal was taxable upon the reversal of his conviction, is applicable. However, we distinguish Lilli-bridge on its facts, since the ruling was based on the fact that on an appeal from a municipal court, the posting of a bond was a condition to the filing of the appeal. We agree with the holding in Doran v. State, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 86, 87, wherein it is stated that,
“There are many expenses which one may incur because he is charged with a crime. Yet, only those items reasonably within the scope of statutory authority are taxable. Absent more specific legislative mandate, we are reluctant to read into the law a necessity for the imposition upon the public of the staggering expense which would follow if reimbursement were required for all bail bond premiums of persons ultimately acquitted or discharged of the crime for which they were charged.”
See also Wood v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.App.1971, 248 So. 2d 176, wherein trial court’s failure to assess the pre-trial bail bond premium as a taxable cost was upheld on appeal.
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied taxing the bail bond premium and the order is affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Benitez v. State, 350 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…as used in Section 939.06, Florida Statutes (1975) means all reasonable and necessary costs.3 Such an interpretation would be contrary to the holding of the courts of this state. See Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). See also 20 C.J.S. Costs § 457b (1940). While there is force to the argument that an innocent defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged should be left as whole financially as a land owner whose property is taken by th…
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Mrs. Stanley (Joyce) Goldberg v. Cnty. OF Dade, 378 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…he forensic psychologist who assisted in the selection of the jury, we note that Florida Statute 939.06 (1977) refers to “taxablé costs” which have been defined as only those items reasonably within the scope of statutory authority. Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Considering this definition in conjunction with Florida Statute 939.15 (1977) which provides that the county shall pay those costs allowed by law, we find no authority to tax such costs. We find thát the trial court correctly de…
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Short v. State of Fla. & Pasco Cnty., 579 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…ming that this issue is properly before this court, we find no abuse of discretion concerning any of these decisions. See Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Goldberg v. Dade County, 378 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). On November 21, 1990, this court announced decisions in Sawyer v. State, 570 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and Clark v. State, 570 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In those cases, we adopted a procedure for certification of costs…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wood v. City OF Jacksonville, 248 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Geri Lillibridge v. City OF Miami, 276 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1973)