RUBEN MONZON, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA S. MONZON, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital residence and rehabilitative alimony, nor in awarding attorney's fees despite the initial lack of a specific prayer for them.
[1] Courts have broad discretion to award any combination of rehabilitative alimony, lump sum alimony, and periodic permanent alimony.
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony and property when competent substantial evidence supports the awards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant appealed provisions of a dissolution judgment awarding the marital residence and rehabilitative alimony to his ex-wife, and a subsequent ord…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Ruben Monzon, respondent in the trial court, appeals those provisions of a dissolution of marriage judgment awarding his ex-wife, Linda, the jointly owned marital residence as partial lump sum alimony and rehabilitative alimony of $500 per month for 18 months. Appellant also appeals a subsequent order determining that Linda’s attorney is entitled to a $5,000 fee and directing appellant to pay $3,500 thereof.
With respect to appellant’s first point on appeal, contending error in the awards of the marital residence and rehabilitative alimony, it is now well established that the courts have broad discretion to utilize and award any combination of reha bilitative alimony, lump sum alimony, periodic permanent alimony, etc. Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). The record reflects that Linda provided the bulk of the down payment for the marital residence and that she quit her job at appellant’s request. There being competent substantial evidence to support the above awards, we cannot say the chancellor abused his discretion and it is not the function of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence. See Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976).
Appellant secondly argues that the chancellor erred in assuming jurisdiction over and awarding attorney’s fees when Linda’s petition failed to demand such fees so that she was not legally entitled to recover them. We cannot agree.
Although Linda’s petition for dissolution contained no such prayer, counsel for the respective parties agreed prior to the final hearing that the chancellor should reserve ruling on attorney’s fees on behalf of Linda and the final judgment expressly reserved ruling on attorney’s fees. We, therefore, find that the chancellor had jurisdiction to enter an order awarding reasonable attorney’s fees subsequent to the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. See Section 61.-16, Florida Statutes (1975) and Cf. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla.3d DCA 1976).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Kratzer v. Reimiller, 552 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…f marital residence upheld pending outcome of case); Robinson v. Robinson, 340 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (judgment on ownership of marital residence upheld where tried without objection, although not raised in the pleadings.); Monzon v. Monzon, 349 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (attorney fee award upheld although request for attorney fee was omitted from petition, where parties agreed pri- or to trial hearing that the court could reserve jurisdiction to award them subsequently.) Failure to plead or amen…
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Patience Duttenhofer v. Duttenhofer, 474 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…the voluntary surrender of a remunerative job for a less remunerative one or none at all is recognized as an equitable factor which may be considered in awarding alimony, see, e.g., Urban v. Urban, 424 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Monzon v. Monzon, 349 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Brook v. Brook, 289 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 300 So. 2d 895 (Fla.1974), is not inconsistent with our view that a forfeiture which occurs upon marriage cannot be so considered.3 Where the partners to a marriage, whe…
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Donovan v. Environs Palm Beach, 372 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…dgment after it becomes final, but it does not retain the power, unless provided by statute or rule, to amend, modify or alter the provisions of a final judgment.” See also Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); cf. Monzon v. Monzon, 349 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). The trial court having failed to retain jurisdiction, it therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter a subsequent order awarding attorney fees. The order appealed is AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. LETTS, J., concurring specially…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Melvyn B. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- James W. Church v. Josephine Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)