STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. GLENWOOD BROOKS COBB, SR., RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE W. L. BAILEY, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from hearing a contempt motion after the judge had recused himself from the underlying dissolution case. The court held that the recusal divested the judge of authority to proceed with the contempt hearing.
No, the circuit judge's recusal from the dissolution case divested him of the authority to preside over the contempt proceedings. The contempt order was improperly issued by the recused judge.
[1] A judge who recuses himself from a case generally loses the authority to preside over subsequent proceedings in that case, even if the recusal is based on an informal sug…
[2] A trial court's order temporarily fixing parties' obligations pending a final hearing may remain valid even after a judge's recusal from the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We consider that the respondent judge’s recusal order effectively deprived that judge of authority to preside in the contempt proceedings.”
Establishes the core legal conclusion of the court regarding the effect of the recusal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA circuit judge recused himself from a marital dissolution case due to an appearance of impropriety. While reserving jurisdiction for temporary suppor…
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SMITH, Judge.
We issued a rule nisi in prohibition on relator’s showing that the respondent circuit judge, having recused himself from consideration of the dissolution issues in this case of marital strife, improperly proceeded to hear and determine the wife’s motion for contempt process against relator. Respondent has filed a return to the rule and we have considered the case on briefs and a transcript of the circuit court’s proceedings. The respondent circuit judge, sensitive to an appearance of impropriety in his consideration of emotional issues between parties with whom the judge had social and business relations for “quite a long time,” invited an oral suggestion for recusal, which relator made, and recused himself from consideration of the case. The court reserved power, however, to act immediately on imminent questions of temporary alimony and child support and temporary use and possession of an automobile and household items. While relator acquiesced in the court’s retention of limited jurisdiction, relator affirmatively objected when, nearly four weeks later, .the respondent judge undertook disposition of the wife’s petition that relator be held in contempt for disobedience to the court’s order temporarily regulating the parties’ property affairs pending a full hearing before another judge.
We consider that the respondent judge’s recusal order effectively deprived that judge of authority to preside in the contempt proceedings. In these circumstances, the trial court’s order temporarily fixing the parties’ obligations pending final hearing may stand, but the wife’s petition for contempt proceedings should have been and must now be referred to another circuit judge. A recusal entered on informal motion in lieu of formal disqualification proceedings ends the judge’s power to take part in the disposition of the case. Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The contempt order is vacated and a writ of prohibition will issue.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ter final judgments on issues already tried, Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 378 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1980), or to continue where limited jurisdiction has been retained. State ex rel. Cobb v. Bailey, 349 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). These latter propositions state the rule applicable in this case. Appellant’s remaining points assert that the trial court acted arbitrarily in adjudicating the husband’s monetary claims against appellee. We find no abuse of di…
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Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil OIL Corp., 378 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…jurisdiction to rule on those matters previously tried. Section 38.10, Fla.Stats. (1977) was not intended to be used in the manner urged by Coastal. The trial court had the authority to enter the Final Judgment. Compare State ex rel. Cobb v. Bailey, 349 So. 2d 849 (Fla.App. 1st DCA 1977). Appellant has failed to demonstrate reversible error. The judgment is AFFIRMED. McCORD and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.…
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Richard Plaza v. Marie Plaza, 21 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…So. 2d 1255, 1255 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and quashing the order under review; finding that because the order was entered after the trial judge had been disqualified, it was void); State ex rel. Cobb v. Bailey, 349 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (holding that the judge’s recu-sal order effectively deprived that judge of authority to preside over the contempt proceedings). While disqualification of the judge generally requires that the judge take no further action i…
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- Gilmer v. Shell OIL Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)