STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. PHILIP VAN EEGHEN, APPELLANT,
v.
H. T. WILLIAMS, AS SHERIFF OF BREVARD COUNTY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of bail for Van Eeghen, who was charged with first-degree murder in a capital case. The court held that the evidence presented was insufficient to meet the constitutional standard of 'proof evident or presumption great' required to deny bail in capital offenses.
The evidence was insufficient to deny bail. The court held that the constitutional standard requires proof that guilt is 'evident' or the 'presumption great'—a degree of proof higher than proof beyond a reasonable doubt—and the evidence in this case failed to meet that threshold.
“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences where the proof is evident or the presumption great.”
States the constitutional standard governing bail in capital cases from the Florida Constitution, Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVan Eeghen was indicted for first-degree murder and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his detention without bail. After a hearing on…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Bail cases and more on FLexlaw
THORNAL, Justice.
Appellant Van Eeghen seeks reversal of an order of the Circuit Judge dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding him to the custody of appellee Sheriff without bail.
The only question before us is whether the evidence presented to the trial judge was sufficient to justify the denial of bail in a capital case.
Appellant Van Eeghen was indicted by a Grand Jury and charged with first degree murder. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to test his right to bail. The writ was issued and made returnable before the Circuit Judge. After hearing all of the testimony, the Circuit Judge entered a final judgment dismissing the writ and remanding the petitioner-appellant to the custody of the Sheriff wtihout bail but granting to the petitioner the right to take an appeal to this Court from said judgment. Hence, this appeal.
The record before us has been carefully and thoroughly examined. In considering the right of accused to bail, we must apply the provisions of Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which reads:
“Sec. 9. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences where the proof is evident or the presumption great.”
We have consistently followed the constitutional prescription which permits the denial of bail in capital offenses only where the proof is evident or the presumption great. It is not sufficient to justify a denial of bail in such cases that the evidence establish merely a probability of guilt. See Ex parte Nathan, Fla., 50 So. 38.
In Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27, this Court held that the degree of proof sufficient to deny an accused the right to bail in a capital case under our Constitution, to-wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. See State ex rel. Freeman v. Kelly, Fla. 1956, 86 So. 2d 166; State ex rel. Hernandez v. Culbreath, 152 Fla. 356, 11 So. 2d 569; State ex rel. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844, 36 So. 2d 828.
We pretermit any discussion of the details of the evidence in the case before us for the reason that we do not desire tO' indicate in any fashion this Court’s opinion on the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence at a subsequent trial. It is sufficient to hold, and we do hold, that the evidence in this record is not adequate to justify the denial of bail within the-framework of the requirements of our Constitution. In other words, the evidence presented to the trial judge fails to supply proof that guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great.
The accused is, therefore, entitled to bail. The judgment appealed from is reversed' and it is the judgment of this Court that the appellant Philip Van Eeghen be released from custody on good and sufficient appearance bail bond in the sum of $10,000, h> be approved by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brevard County.
It is so ordered.
DREW, C. J., and TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Columbus Fletcher Primm v. State, 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…to the proof of guilt being evident or the presumption thereof great is the hearsay testimony of the two investigating officers. The degree of proof necessary to deny bail in capital offenses was set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45: “In Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27, this Court held that the degree of proof sufficient to deny an accused the right to bail in a capital case under our Constitution, to-wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is gre…
-
State v. Perry, 605 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…tion, to wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt,” State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla.1956) (following Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27 (1916) and its progeny); and (2) where the state’s evidence, although not insuffi [*97] cient to convict for a capital or life offense, is arguably impeached in substantial respects…1 / 2
-
Preston v. Sheriff David GEE, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…nding than proof to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. This had been the law for sixty-four years, Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27 (1916), and it remained unaltered at the time Arthur was decided. See State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1956); Deeb v. Gandy, 110 Fla. 283, 148 So. 540 (1933); State ex rel. Gobel v. Chase, 91 Fla. 10, 107 So. 921 (1926). The Arthur court did not indicate that it intended to change this entrenched rule or explain the court’s reason for doing so,…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236 (Fla. 1916)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Mary Freeman v. Kelly, 86 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1956)
- State of Fla. Ex rel. Cecil H. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844 (Fla. 1948)
- State v. Honorable Arthur Gomez, 152 Fla. 355 (Fla. 1943)
- In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 152 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1943)
- State Upon the Relation of Mario Hernandez v. Culbreath, 152 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1943)