STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. MARY FREEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS J. KELLY, AS SHERIFF OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1956-03-16
DREW, C. J., and HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
86 So. 2d 166 Florida Supreme Court (1956) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant was arrested and indicted for first-degree murder but posted bond. After voluntarily surrendering to the sheriff, she petitioned for habeas corpus to regain her bond, arguing the proof of guilt was not evident or the presumption great as required by the Florida Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of habeas corpus and ordered bail be granted.


Holding

The trial court erred in quashing the writ. Because the proof of guilt was not evident or the presumption great, appellant was entitled to bail under the Florida Constitution, Section 9, Declaration of Rights. The trial court's decision is reversed with directions to grant bail.


Key Quotes

“Appellant is charged with a capital offense but if proof of guilt is not "evident or the presumption great", she is entitled to bail.”

Establishes the constitutional standard for bail in capital cases under Florida law.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was arrested on a murder charge, bound over at a preliminary hearing, and posted $10,000 bond. She was subsequently indicted for first-degre…

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, Justice.

TERRELL, Justice.

Appellant was arrested on a warrant charging murder in the first degree. At a preliminary hearing she was bound over for appearance before the Circuit Court on condition that she post bond in the sum of $10,000, which she promptly did. Soon thereafter she was indicted for murder in the first degree. She voluntarily surrendered to the sheriff and promptly petitioned the appropriate court for writ of habeas corpus to allow her bond on the ground that proof of guilt was not “evident or the presumption great.” The writ was issued, return thereto was entered and counsel stipulated that in lieu of calling witnesses, the charge be considered on the transcript of testimony taken at the preliminary hearing. On consideration the court quashed the writ and remanded appellant to custody. Appeal was granted and the cause was accelerated under 30 F.S.A. Rule 43 of the Rules of this court.

The sole point for determination is whether or not the trial court committed error in quashing the writ of habeas corpus and remanding the appellant to custody of the sheriff without bail.

Appellant is charged with a capital offense but if proof of guilt is not “evident or the presumption great”, she is entitled to bail. Section 9, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. We have examined the evidence and we do not think there is a clear showing that appellant was guilty of the degree of homicide for which she was charged. State ex rel. Young v. Kelly, Fla., 66 So. 2d 252; State ex rel. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844, 36 So. 2d 828; Deeb v. Gandy, 110 Fla. 283, 148 So. 540; Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27; Mayo v. State, Fla., 71 So. 2d 899.

The last cited case is apposite because we there held that defendant’s version of the homicide can not be ignored where there is absence of other evidence legally sufficient to contradict his explanation. Appellant and deceased were the only witnesses to the homicide and the tenor of appellant’s evidence is that she shot in self-defense.

We think appellant was entitled to the relief prayed for so the cause is reversed with directions to grant bail.

Reversed with directions.

DREW, C. J., and HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980)
    …lable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great.” This provision guaranteed all accused persons not covered by the exception an entitlement to bail. E. g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Kelly, 86 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1956); Ex parte Hatcher, 86 Fla. 330, 98 So. 72 (1923). . State v. Garrett, 16 Ariz.App. 427, 493 P. 2d 1232 (1972); People v. District Court, 187 Colo. 164, 529 P. 2d 1335 (1974). . State v. Hartzell, 13 N.D. 356, 100 N.W. 745 (1904); Ex par…
  • …does the rule prevent a court from examining the evidence to determine whether the guilt is evident or presumption great as bearing on the right of an accused to bail where he is charged with a capital offense. State ex rel. Freeman v. Kelly, Fla., 86 So. 2d 166; Section 9, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of State of Florida, F.S.A. In the cases before us the circuit court having first concluded that the contract was [*176] a part of the information, next came to the conclusion that “The nub of this wh…
  • …-wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. See State ex rel. Freeman v. Kelly, Fla. 1956, 86 So. 2d 166; State ex rel. Hernandez v. Culbreath, 152 Fla. 356, 11 So. 2d 569; State ex rel. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844, 36 So. 2d 828. We pretermit any discussion of the details of the evidence in the case before us for the reason that we do not desire…

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