HOLLEY CURTIS TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Holley Curtis Taylor appealed his jury convictions for unlawful possession of heroin and marijuana, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when the state presented testimony that he was a prison inmate on a work release program. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that disclosure of his custody status was proper to justify the warrantless search and was harmless error given the direct evidence of guilt.
The court held that disclosure of the defendant's prison inmate status was not grounds for mistrial because: (1) it was proper and necessary to justify the warrantless search by prison officials; (2) defendant's own counsel elicited evidence of the custody status on cross-examination; and (3) any error was harmless given the direct and uncontradicted evidence of guilt.
[1] A prison official may search an inmate in extended custody without a warrant when the inmate is subject to a work release program and has allegedly violated its terms.
[2] Disclosure of a defendant's status as an inmate in a prison camp is permissible when necessary to justify an arrest and search conducted without a warrant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The circumstances of the case were such, as in a prosecution for escape, that it was proper, if not essential in order to justify the arrest and search of the defendant without a warrant, to reveal the facts as to his status which permitted the search by the prison official.”
Establishes that disclosure of custody status was necessary and proper to justify the warrantless search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor was convicted of a prior offense and confined at Big Pine Road Prison. At the time of arrest for the current charges, he was in extended custod…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant was informed against, tried by a jury and convicted on separate counts of unlawful possession of heroin and unlawful possession of marijuana. He was adjudged guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two and one half years on the first count, and one and a half years 'on the second count, with provision for the sentences to be served concurrently.
Appealing therefrom the appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, made when the state presented testimony that he was an inmate of a state prison camp. We find no error, and affirm.
For conviction of a prior offense the defendant had been confined at Big Pine Road Prison, on Big Pine Key in Monroe County. At the time of his arrest for the offenses involved in this case he was in the status of extended custody, residing apart from the prison camp under a work release program agreement.
Having become advised of certain actions of the defendant which were considered to be in violation of the work release agreement and for which the defendant was entitled to be taken into custody and returned to the prison, the officer in charge thereof, with two Monroe County officers, went to the apartment occupied by the defendant for the purpose of taking him into custody and returning him to the camp. The defendant invited them in. The prison officer searched him, and found on his person a substance which the defendant then stated was “grass.” The officer then delivered the substance (marijuana) to a Monroe County officer who arrested the defendant for possession thereof. A subsequent search of the apartment with benefit of a warrant disclosed further contraband, with possession of which the defendant was charged.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, contending it was obtained on an illegal search and seizure. The trial court correctly denied the motion, on the ground that the defendant was in a status of extended custody in which the official of the prison camp was entitled to search him without a warrant. Cf. Echols v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 201 So. 2d 89, 93-94; Lavazzoli v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 281 So. 2d 519.
At the trial the prison captain testified to the above facts, as the basis for the search, namely that the defendant was an inmate of the prison camp on extended custody under a work release agreement, the terms of which were understood by the captain to have been violated.
The appellant argues that disclosure of the fact that he was an inmate of the prison camp supplied information to the jury that he had previously committed some crime, and that such disclosure constituted ground for mistrial, the denial of which, appellant argues, was reversible error. We do not agree. The circumstances of the case were such, as in a prosecution for escape, that it was proper, if not essential in order to justify the arrest and search of the defendant without a warrant, to reveal the facts as to his status which permitted the search by the prison official. Secondly, defendant’s counsel on cross-examination brought out evidence of the custody status of the defendant and with reference to his work release agreement. See Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. 834, 837; United States v. Truitt, 5 Cir. 1971, 440 F. 2d 1070.
Moreover, the direct and uncontradicted evidence of guilt of the offense of possession of the drugs was such that the disclosure in evidence of the status of the defendant as an inmate of the prison camp, was harmless error, not basis for reversal. See Garcia v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 278 So. 2d 678 and cases cited there.
No reversible error having been shown, the judgment is affirmed.
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Adan v. State, 453 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…al judge.” Cobbett, 82 So. 2d at 872. See also Perez v. State, 452 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In fact, the defendant’s counsel himself elicited testimony of the burglary charge during the direct examination of the defendant. See Taylor v. State, 289 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). See also Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. 834, 837 (1925). Accordingly, no reversible error is present.…
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Lowman v. State, 353 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…h their credibility. This combination of failure to raise timely objections and exploitation for impeachment value is sufficient of itself to vitiate defendant’s argument. See Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. 834 (1925); Taylor v. State, 289 So. 2d 421 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). But the record also reveals that the actual instructions given the jury defined the law in a manner sufficient to encompass the substance of the requested charge. Refusal to give a requested charge when it is covered by charges gi…
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Fields v. State, 379 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…cumulative and constituted harmless error. § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1977). With this revelation by the defendant, his guilt became evident rendering evidence of other crimes harmless. Hamilton v. State, 356 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Taylor v. State, 289 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. . In practice, the problem is compounded by the question as to whether the analyst’s or other expert’s testimony is privileged. See §§ 90.242, 827.07(11), Fla.S…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299 (Fla. 1925)
- United States v. Alben Wm. Barkley Truitt, 440 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1971)
- Echols v. State, 201 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- In re Est. of Rosella M. Sager, 201 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- City OF Miami v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 278 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Arsenio Garcia v. State, 278 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Lavazzoli v. State, 281 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)