PARKER CHARLES PEAK, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Parker Charles Peak, Jr. appeals his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for twenty-five years. The Third District Court of Appeal affirms the conviction and sentence, finding no merit in Peak's arguments regarding the constitutionality of the sentencing statute, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and prosecutorial comments.
The court affirmed Peak's conviction and sentence, finding no constitutional defect in the sentencing statute, no error in giving the modified Allen charge, no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings, and no prejudicial prosecutorial comments sufficient to upset the conviction.
[1] A statute mandating life imprisonment without parole eligibility for twenty-five years for first-degree murder is constitutional.
[2] A modified Allen charge given to a jury after ten hours of deliberation is permissible.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Florida Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of this statute.”
Establishes that the sentencing statute under which Peak was sentenced has been constitutionally validated by Florida's highest court.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParker Charles Peak, Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. He was sentenced to l…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
HUBBART, Judge.
The defendant Parker Charles Peak, Jr. appeals a conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of life imprisonment with no eligibility of parole for twenty-five years entered in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. He urges numerous alleged errors committed by the trial court as a basis for upsetting his conviction and sentence herein. We find no merit in these contentions and affirm.
First, the defendant attacks the constitutionality of the statute [§ 775.082(1), Fla.Stat. (1975)] under which he was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of this statute. McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla.1977); Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla.1976); Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1975).
Second, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving a modified Allen charge [Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) 2.21] to the jury after approximately ten hours of jury deliberations. The Florida Supreme Court has upheld a similar verdict — urging jury instruction under circumstances parallel to the instant case. State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1974); Nelson v. State, 148 Fla. 338, 4 So. 2d 375 (1941).
See also Bryan v. Wainwright, 511 F. 2d 644 (5th Cir. 1975).
As a corollary to this argument, the defendant further argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction similar to the modified Allen charge given by the trial court but with a slightly different emphasis. Once the modified Allen charge was given, however, there was clearly no need, in our view, for the trial court to give the defendant’s requested charge.
Third, the defendant contends that the court made certain erroneous evidentiary rulings. He complains that the court excluded certain evidence touching upon his claim of self defense. In our view, the defense of self defense was never sufficiently raised at trial by the defendant or any other witness and accordingly the evidence in question was properly excluded. Bailey v. State, 155 Fla. 597, 21 So. 2d 217 (1945); Williams v. State, 238 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
See also State v. Coles, 91 So. 2d 200 (Fla.1956).
The defendant further complains that evidence obliquely tending to show that he had a prior criminal record was presented before the jury thereby necessitating a mistrial in this cause. As the defendant himself admitted on cross-examination at trial that he did in fact have a prior criminal record, we regard the inadvertent reference to the defendant’s prior conviction as harmless. See Houston v. State, 337 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Cunningham v. State, 239 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
The defendant also complains that a police photograph of the defendant was improperly admitted in evidence. We cannot agree. United States v. Davis, 487 F. 2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973).
The defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to certain alleged prejudicial comments made by the prosecuting attorney in final argument to the jury and in denying his motion for mistrial based thereon. In our view, these remarks were insufficient to upset the conviction herein. Whitney v. State, 132 So. 2d 599 (Fla.1951); Gray v. State, 296 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Ricks v. State, 242 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2001)…(where appellant claims the court erred in denying a motion for mistrial when oblique references were made to his prior criminal history, such error is completely harmless since appellant testified and admitted various criminal acts); Peak v. State, 363 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978) (“As the defendant himself admitted on cross-examination at trial that he did in fact have a prior criminal record, we regard the inadvertent reference to the defendant’s prior conviction as harmless.”). On direct examinati…
-
Warren v. State, 498 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)….1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1883, 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1983); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Gardner v. State, 405 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Peak v. State, 363 So. 2d 1166 [*476] (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 460 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 642, 62 L.Ed.2d 384 (1979). As previously indicated, however, this standard charge has since been modified and now reads: “I know that all of you…
-
Colebrook v. State, 429 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Peak v. State, 363 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 462, 62 L.Ed.2d 384 (1979); Chariott v. State, 226 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (16 total)
- Nadean O. McARTHUR v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977)
- United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973)
- State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974)
- State v. Ola Coles, 91 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1956)
- Howard Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1976)
- Nelson v. State, 148 Fla. 338 (Fla. 1941)
- Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975)
- Ricks v. State, 242 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Whitney v. State, 132 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1961)