Notable Florida Decisions

The Florida Supreme Court held that executing a 77-year-old defendant experiencing cognitive decline does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the United States Supreme Court has recognized only one age-based exemption from execution—the prohibition against executing juveniles—and the conformity clause in the Florida Constitution binds Florida courts to the federal floor. The Court held that the compressed warrant period does not violate due process because the defendant received notice and opportunity to be heard, had adequate access to counsel, and failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Co

A trial court lacks authority to commit an incompetent criminal defendant for restoration treatment when the evidence does not establish by clear and convincing proof that there is a substantial probability the defendant will regain competency in the reasonably foreseeable future.

A party seeking to dissolve an injunction must demonstrate a change in circumstances such that continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose, and incarceration alone does not satisfy this burden when the injunction's prohibitions on indirect contact remain enforceable.

A traffic stop is lawful when an officer observes traffic infractions in the presence of other vehicles and has a well-founded suspicion of impairment based on erratic driving patterns, even if the infractions alone might be minor.

A sentence imposing both life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years violates section 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Florida Statutes, and when the sentencing record clearly establishes the court intended to impose life imprisonment, the proper remedy is ministerial removal of the unauthorized mandatory minimum rather than de novo resentencing.

A towing operator's lien is purely statutory and requires strict compliance with section 713.78, Florida Statutes. Failure to provide timely notice to the vehicle owner within five business days of storage precludes enforcement of the lien and any storage charges.

A stalking injunction requires evidence that the defendant's conduct caused substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person in the victim's position, applying an objective standard. Mere insulting comments, name-calling, and staring, though rude and unpleasant, are insufficient to meet this statutory threshold.

A trial court is without procedural jurisdiction to entertain an amended complaint filed months after final judgment has been entered and the time for appeal has expired, absent a Rule 1.540 motion for relief from judgment.

A forum-selection clause that identifies a forum without language of exclusivity is permissive and does not require dismissal of an action filed in another forum. The provision stating disputes are "Subject to Taiwanese Law and Jurisdiction" lacked the mandatory language necessary to exclude jurisdiction elsewhere.

A trial court abuses its discretion in setting bail when it bases its decision entirely on the nature of the alleged offenses without considering statutory factors including the defendant's financial resources, family ties, employment, community ties, and flight risk. A statutory presumption in favor of release on nonmonetary conditions applies to offenses not designated as dangerous.

A prosecution for first-degree misdemeanor must be commenced within two years of the offense, and when the defendant has not been arrested or served with a summons, prosecution is commenced only when a capias warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. The State must present competent, substantial evidence of diligent search and investigation of obvious sources of information to justify delay in executing the capias warrant.

A trial court must apply the common law standard for new trials under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 when considering a motion for new trial on punitive damages, not the remittitur statute standard. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motion under the correct legal standard.

The State failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Smith willfully and substantially violated his probation curfew condition because the evidence—consisting of a single knock on the front door and window, phone calls, and calling his name—was insufficient to establish that he was not at his approved residence. A probation violation must be both substantial and willful to justify revocation, and the State bears the burden of proving the violation by the greater weight of the evidence. Evidence of a probationer's failure to respond to knocking and phone calls is not legally suf

An arbitration clause covering disputes "arising out of the transaction, sale, contract, or closing" encompasses both a claim for declaratory relief challenging the validity of a corrective deed describing an easement and a claim for fraudulent concealment regarding the location of a drain field, as both have a direct relationship to the underlying real property transaction and the contractual duties created by the purchase agreement. A general reference to "the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association" without specification of which practice area rules apply does not constitu

Future medical expenses are recoverable only when they are reasonably certain to be incurred, not merely possible or speculative. An expert's testimony that future medical treatments are included "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty" is not dispositive when the underlying basis for those opinions relies on conditional language such as "may," "could," and "if." The trial court erred by denying the directed verdict motion as to future medical expenses beyond medication costs, as no evidentiary basis supported the jury's award for speculative treatments.

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for reconsideration of the trial court's order admitting limited ballistics evidence from a prior murder, for failing to hire a ballistics expert to rebut the State's expert, or for making reasonable strategic decisions regarding other evidentiary objections and penalty-phase mitigation evidence. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that Riley murder evidence was inadmissible because any such error would have been harmless given the strength of the evidence supporting Smiley's conviction.

A party's demand for modified contract terms or statement of a preferred course of action does not constitute an unequivocal repudiation of the contract unless it amounts to a clear statement of intention not to perform except on conditions beyond the original contract.

Non-economic damages are not available under the Florida Public Whistleblower Act because the statute does not clearly and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity for such damages. Statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, and the Act's enumerated remedies do not expressly include pain and suffering or other non-economic damages.

A motion to disqualify a judge based on allegations that are contrary to the record, frivolous arguments, and AI-generated gibberish is legally insufficient and properly denied. An attorney filing documents with her signature represents that she has read the document, that there are good grounds to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, and must exercise independent professional judgment rather than relying on AI-generated content without meaningful review. Emergency writ petitions seeking review of multiple unrelated rulings in a single proceeding, citing unpublished orders with

A trial court abuses its discretion when it adopts substantial portions of a party's closing argument verbatim without demonstrating independent analysis, particularly when the order incorporates both parties' distinct citation styles and contains findings unsupported by the record. An attorney's fees award must be supported by competent substantial evidence, and a trial court cannot reduce fees based on hours that appear nowhere in the record and were testified to by no witness. A trial court may disallow fees for duplicative work only when the opponent identifies with specificity the hours t

A plaintiff adequately alleges material misrepresentation under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act when he alleges that a defendant represented the company would acquire an asset while knowing the defendant intended to acquire it personally, even if offering materials disclosed the acquisition was prospective and might not occur. Cautionary language does not render such misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law when the claim concerns the defendant's present intent rather than merely the future failure of a contemplated transaction.

A defendant establishes good cause to withdraw a plea before sentencing when counsel fails to advise of a viable motion to suppress incriminating statements, and the trial court must focus on whether the defendant acted in ignorance or misapprehension, not the likelihood of success of the suppression motion.

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of an expired Florida Building Code provision as mandatory public statutory law, failing to provide procedural notice and opportunity to be heard, and admitting the provision without determining whether it applied to the case. The judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

A conviction for felon in possession of a firearm under section 790.23(1) may rest on constructive possession, but the three-year mandatory minimum enhancement under section 775.087(2)(a)(1) requires proof of actual possession as defined in section 775.087(4)—either carrying the firearm on one's person or having it within immediate physical reach with ready access and intent to use it.

The court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of most ineffective-assistance claims but reversed the summary denial of a subclaim in ground four alleging counsel's failure to obtain evidence about a telephone call, requiring remand for amendment because the claim was legally insufficient as pleaded and the motion was timely filed with other sufficient claims.

When a defendant challenges prior convictions on a scoresheet via a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, the State bears the burden of producing competent evidence that the prior convictions were correctly included. The trial court erred in including convictions from more than ten years before the primary offense without the State meeting its burden of proof, and the error was not harmless because the court imposed the lowest permissible sentence.

Summary judgment was improper on the issue of whether a tenancy by the entireties was created in the right to receive rents from a ground lease, as disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether George intended to convey survivorship rights to Grace and whether all six unities necessary to create such a tenancy were present.

Although the trial court erred in permitting testimony about the nature of the defendant's five prior convictions, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to both the felon-in-possession and first-degree murder convictions because the defendant's guilt was clearly established through his own admissions and corroborating testimony regarding premeditation and knowledge of the firearm prohibition.

Although evidence of a prior shooting into the defendant's residence was properly excluded as reverse Williams rule evidence, the trial court erred by failing to separately consider whether the same evidence was independently admissible to explain the defendant's flight from the scene and support his defense theory of innocence.

A trial court abuses its discretion by excluding expert testimony or a party's testimony based solely on bias or financial interest, which go to credibility rather than admissibility. A personal representative is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on compensation petitions and cannot be denied compensation without evidence and findings on the statutory factors in § 733.617.