Notable Florida Decisions

Evidence is sufficient to support a jury's finding that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, when the defendant was released from a state correctional facility within three years of committing the qualifying offense.

Evidence is sufficient to support a jury's finding that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender under Florida Statutes § 775.082(9) when the defendant was released from a state correctional facility within three years of committing the qualifying offense.

Section 607.1436(1), Florida Statutes, empowers a trial court to set aside or modify a buyout election on equitable grounds regardless of whether the electing party or the petitioning shareholder raises the matter. The statute's plain language—that an election is "irrevocable unless the court determines that it is equitable to set aside or modify the election"—does not limit equitable considerations to only the electing party's request to opt out. The trial court erred in concluding it lacked power to entertain a petitioning shareholder's motion to set aside an election on equitable grounds.

A court may apply an amended rule of procedure to documents filed before the amendment's effective date when the amendment merely clarifies pre-existing requirements and does not impose new legal consequences. Pro se litigants and attorneys have a duty to ensure that legal authorities cited in court filings exist and are accurately cited, and courts have inherent authority to sanction violations.

A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over a conflicting written judgment; where the oral pronouncement is legal, it is affirmed, but the written judgment must be corrected to remove designations that violate the prohibition on multiple recidivist enhancements under section 775.084.

A settlement agreement does not constitute a "judgment obtained" under section 627.7152(10)(a), Florida Statutes, and therefore does not entitle an assignee to recover attorney's fees. Settlement dollars are merely a contractual estimate of the settling party's liability, not damages recovered.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting collateral crime evidence of Roberts' prior threats and acts of violence against the victim to complete the narrative of their relationship and establish his state of mind. The trial court properly rejected the statutory mitigating factor of Roberts' capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, as the expert testimony did not conclusively establish this factor by the greater weight of the evidence. The trial court's nunc pro tunc competency determination satisfied due process requirements because the hearing included test

The Court amended forty-one Florida Probate Rules to update references to Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516, 2.525, and 2.420 to reflect their current titles, and made conforming grammatical changes throughout the rules. The amendments updated rule references from "Service of Pleadings and Documents" to "Service," from "Electronic Filing" to "Filing," and added "and protection of" to the title of Rule 2.420. The amendments became effective October 1, 2026, and a motion for rehearing would not alter the effective date.

Evidence obtained during a search executed pursuant to a valid warrant need not be suppressed to remedy a violation of Florida's statutory knock-and-announce requirement under section 933.09. The exclusionary rule is not required or authorized by section 933.09, and the Legislature has prescribed criminal penalties under section 933.17 as the applicable remedy for violations. The Court receded from State v. Cable, which had held that suppression was the proper remedy for knock-and-announce violations.

The statutory definition of "mental injury" in Florida Statute § 827.03(1)(d), which requires proof "supported by expert testimony," applies to all child abuse prosecutions under § 827.03, including those under subsection (1)(b)2 involving acts that could reasonably be expected to result in mental injury. Because the State failed to present expert testimony regarding mental injury, Mojica's conviction for child abuse under § 827.03(1)(b)2 must be reversed. The supremacy-of-text principle requires courts to apply the Legislature's explicit statutory definitions uniformly throughout a statute.

A property owner cannot rely on the independent contractor defense to avoid liability when the owner has constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition that it negligently created or approved, particularly where the dangerous condition is concealed and not inherent to the work the contractor was hired to perform. Constructive knowledge may be inferred when a dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that the property owner, exercising reasonable care, should have known of it and taken action to remedy it. The test for whether a danger is open and obvious is not whether the object

A condominium resident cannot rely on Florida's transient-substance doctrine to establish premises liability for a slip-and-fall in her own unit without presenting evidence that the dangerous condition was caused by the Association's negligence in maintaining common-area pipes rather than the resident's own plumbing. Summary judgment is proper when the resident fails to produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the wastewater backup was more likely caused by a defect in the Association's sanitary stack pipes.

A default judgment is void when substitute service is made upon a person who does not reside at the defendant's usual place of abode, as required by Florida Statute § 48.031(1)(a). The judgment may be vacated at any time because it was entered without valid service of process.

Evidence that a defendant shot the victim at close range, failed to render aid, and made statements suggesting malice is sufficient to support a second-degree murder conviction requiring proof of ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent.

A trial court must grant a brief recess when a party requests time to prepare a written motion to disqualify the judge based on conduct occurring during the hearing.

The Court amended Florida Probate Rules 5.025, 5.122, 5.200, 5.320, and 5.470 as proposed by the Probate Rules Committee, with minor revisions, to clarify curator powers, update statutory references, and correct grammatical language.

Section 111.065 imposes mandatory, time-bound conditions precedent for law enforcement officer reimbursement claims, and an officer who fails to submit a statutorily compliant application to the employing agency within 30 days of termination of the criminal action, and who fails to file a court application within 30 days of the agency's rejection, is not entitled to reimbursement.

A judgment debtor may file and maintain an action challenging a domesticated foreign judgment without satisfying the statutory conditions for staying enforcement under section 55.509 of the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The conditions for obtaining a stay are separate from the conditions for commencing or maintaining a challenge to the judgment's validity.

A judgment debtor may file and maintain an action challenging a domesticated foreign judgment without satisfying the statutory conditions for staying enforcement under section 55.509 of the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The conditions for obtaining a stay are separate from the conditions for commencing or maintaining a challenge to the judgment's validity.

A trial court abuses its discretion and errs in calculating prejudgment interest when it relies on testimony that lacks a foundation in personal knowledge and is based on documents that were properly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Prejudgment interest awards must be supported by competent, substantial evidence, and the movant bears the burden of proving the underlying amounts.

When a defendant challenges a foreclosure plaintiff's standing, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case including an unbroken chain of assignments; summary judgment is improper where genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the chain of title to a lost note.

Bridge-the-gap alimony was improper because the trial court failed to identify a legitimate, identifiable short-term need supported by competent substantial evidence; instead, durational alimony was appropriate for this moderate-length marriage. The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the husband's child support income based solely on his 2023 financial affidavit without explanation, when his historical earnings from 2019-2022 and his 2023 tax return provided substantial evidence of higher income. The trial court erred in summarily denying the wife's attorney's fees request withou

The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on the forcible felony exception to self-defense under section 776.041(1) because Cordell was charged only with third-degree murder and attempted felony murder—the very crimes for which he asserted self-defense—and not with any independent forcible felony, making the instruction circular and confusing. The trial court properly denied Cordell's motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial because sufficient evidence supported the verdict, including testimony that Cordell remained at a distance from the victims and fired conti

A defendant seeking summary judgment who does not bear the burden of proof at trial must either affirmatively present evidence disproving the nonmovant's claim or show the nonmovant has no evidence to prove it; here, the public defender failed to meet this burden by addressing a theory of liability the plaintiff never asserted, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on a different ground without shifting the burden back to the plaintiff.

A final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case is legally insufficient and must be reversed and remanded when it fails to attach a parenting plan and contains internal inconsistencies regarding parental responsibility and timesharing that fail to adequately comply with section 61.13(2)(a)–(b), Florida Statutes.

A capital defendant's method-of-execution claim based on a medical condition discovered years before the death warrant is untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1) unless the defendant demonstrates that the facts were unknown or could not have been ascertained by due diligence, and such a claim fails on the merits if it does not establish a substantial and imminent risk of needless suffering under the Baze-Glossip test and does not identify a known and available alternative method of execution that significantly reduces the risk of pain. A categorical exemption from execution based on advanced age is no

A postconviction court may summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion without an evidentiary hearing when the motion, files, and records conclusively show the movant is entitled to no relief. Professional resolutions, consensus opinions, and new expert reports reviewing existing trial records do not constitute newly discovered evidence under Florida law. Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred in successive motions and cannot be revived through cumulative error arguments based on evidence deemed not newly discovered.

A death row inmate's second successive postconviction motion raising Giglio and Brady claims based on newly discovered evidence from a jailhouse informant's federal deposition testimony was properly denied as untimely and procedurally barred. Previously known evidence does not become newly discovered merely because additional details emerge or the witness testifies again in a different proceeding.

District courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review a trial court's final order denying a downward departure sentence. The Legislature has not clearly limited appellate review of such denials, and sentencing orders are final orders appealable as a matter of right under the Florida Constitution.

Two former officials (Cabrera and Bermudez) who were still serving when the retirement ordinance was enacted acquired vested rights in their pensions because the pension became part of their compensation earned during active service and did not violate Florida Statutes § 215.425, and the City's subsequent repeal impaired those vested rights in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution. Two other former officials (Ruiz and DiPietro) who had already retired before the ordinance was enacted did not acquire vested rights because their pensions constituted extra compensation fo