STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY JEROME EVANS A/K/A ANTHONY JEROME GREEN, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of burglary charges against Evans, who was a motel guest and claimed he mistakenly entered a storeroom thinking it was a bathroom. The appellate court reversed, holding that intent is a question of fact for a jury, not a matter to be decided on a motion to dismiss.
Intent is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. A trial court may not determine factual issues, weigh conflicting evidence, or assess witness credibility in a summary dismissal proceeding.
[1] Intent is an essential element of the crime of burglary and is typically inferred from the acts of the parties and surrounding circumstances.
[2] Intent, being a state of mind, is generally a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The intent of the accused is an essential element of the offense charged. It is not usually the subject of direct proof. It is inferred from the acts of the parties and from the surrounding circumstances.”
Establishes that intent is an essential element of burglary and is typically inferred from circumstances, not direct proof.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvans, a guest at the Town and Country Motel, entered a patio bar storeroom located about eight feet from the bar. He claimed he thought it was a bath…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
The information for burglary charges that appellee unlawfully entered the patio bar storeroom of the Town and Country Motel with the intent to commit a theft. Appellee filed a sworn motion to dismiss, stating, inter alia, that he was a guest of the motel; that shortly prior to his arrest he and another guest went to the patio bar for a drink; that the closest restrooms cannot be seen from the bar; that he entered the storeroom located about eight feet from the bar; that he was in the storeroom a very short time before being discovered by the barmaid; that there are no signs on the storage room door, indicating that it is a storeroom or that patrons are to keep out; that he has consistently maintained he thought the storeroom was a bathroom; that the light was not on in the storeroom and that he was looking for the light switch. To this sworn motion the state demurred, alleging that all of the foregoing was irrelevant, immaterial or not sufficient in law to constitute grounds for dismissal. The trial court granted the sworn motion. We reverse.
Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1979), provides:
“Burglary” means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. (Emphasis added).
In State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), we reversed a trial court order of dismissal following a charge for posses sion of a false, forged or counterfeit note, and said:
A reading of this statute reveals that the act prohibited must be accomplished with intent. The intent of the accused is an essential element of the offense charged. It is not usually the subject of direct proof. It is inferred from the acts of the parties and from the surrounding circumstances. Williams v. State, Fla. App.1970, 239 So. 2d 127; Edwards v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 274; Groneau v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So. 2d 599; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 285; Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So. 2d 625.
Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the witnesses. From that observation, the trier of fact may determine the believability of that witness and the weight to be given his testimony. The demeanor of the witness, his frankness, or lack of frankness, his intelligence, his interest in the outcome of the case, and the reasonableness of the testimony presented, in the light of all the evidence in the case, are but a few of those factors which may play a part in making that determination.
Id. at 458.
More recently, the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. J. T. S., 373 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cited our decision in State v. West, supra, and said:
Intent is not an issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(cX4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, since intent is usually inferred from the acts of the parties and the surrounding circumstances; being a state of mind, intent is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, who has the opportunity to observe all of the witnesses. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
A proceeding under Rule 3.190(c)(4) is the equivalent of a civil summary judgment proceeding, and as stated in State v. West, supra at 458: The trial court may not try or determine factual issues in a summary judgment proceeding; nor consider either the weight of the conflicting evidence or the credibility of the witnesses in determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material facts; nor substitute itself for the trier of the fact and determine controverted issues of fact. (Emphasis added).
See also State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
Sub judice, we hold that appellee’s intent was an issue for the triers of fact; consequently, the sworn motion to dismiss should have been denied. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DOWNEY and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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State v. Demetrios Sokos, 426 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…law, Smith v. State, 320 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), Spencer v. State, 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), intent or state of mind (i.e. predisposition) is not an issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4). State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), Cummings v. State, 378 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); State v. J.T.S. and G.R.W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Finall…
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State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 608 (Fla.1976), but where, as here, a defendant’s intent or state of mind (i.e., predisposition) is an issue, that issue should not be decided on a motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4). State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); Cummings v. State, 378 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1980); State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 4…
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In the Interest of S.T.N. v. State, 474 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…knowledge are not proper issues to be decided on a motion to dismiss. State v. Alexander, 406 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Stewart, 404 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Alford, 395 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. McCray, 387 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d [*886]…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Esaw Jones v. State, 192 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Williams v. State, 239 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Scott v. State, 137 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Edwards v. State, 213 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)