RAMON PEREZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Conviction for attempted robbery reversed because evidence of merely driving the perpetrator away from the scene is insufficient to prove the prior intent to participate in the crime required for aiding and abetting liability.
Merely driving the perpetrator from the scene of an aborted robbery is insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite prior intent to participate in the crime necessary for aiding and abetting conviction.
[1] Aiding and abetting liability for robbery requires proof of prior intent to participate in the crime, which cannot be inferred solely from the defendant's act of driving…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePerez was convicted of attempted robbery at a non-jury trial based solely on evidence that he pulled the actual robber (Lara) into a moving car and dr…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
At a non-jury trial, Perez was convicted of attempted robbery, obviously on the theory that he had aided and abetted the commission of the crime. The only evidence against him was that he assisted the actual robber, one Lara, to escape from his pursuers by pulling him into a moving car and driving from the vicinity of an aborted purse-snatch. There was no direct proof that Perez had been waiting for Lara, much less that he had a prior intention to participate in the offense itself, as is indispensable to conviction. Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4, 150 So. 132 (1933); Williams v. State, 206 So. 2d 446 (Fla.4th DCA 1968).
Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.2d DCA 1980); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); and Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla.3d DCA 1968), establish that merely driving the perpetrator from the scene is insufficient circumstantial evidence of this requisite intent-even, though, unlike this case, it is also shown that the defendant had driven him to the area or was present while the crime was taking place. A fortio-ri, these decisions require that Perez be discharged. Accord, e. g., J. O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1980).
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…acts must be drawn from the evidence and then pyramided to prove the offense charged, the evidence lacks the conclusive nature to support the conviction. Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923); Chaudoin at 402; G.C. at 640. Perez v. State, 390 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Stuckey v. State, 414 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). In the case sub judice, four inferences had to be made from the circumstances and evidence presented, namely that (1) the car appellant was driving was in fact the car that dr…
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J. L. B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…s not on a public sidewalk) before it was committed, and that, unlike J.H., the respondent here did not immediately cease his flight and inform the person who apprehended him that he had done nothing wrong. . Compare the holdings in Perez v. State, 390 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), and Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), where the defendants actually assisted the perpetrator by driving h…
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T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…oof over it, together with the curtilage thereof. The "curtilage” has been defined as the area surrounding any building. Sealey v. State, 379 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Greer v. State, 354 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). . E.g., Perez v. State, 390 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); J.H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1980); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 65…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnnell Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Ira Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4 (Fla. 1933)
- Williams v. State, 206 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- J. O. and R. G. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)