STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
WILLIAM CONDON, JR., RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida sought to reinstate criminal mischief charges against Condon after the state nolle prossed and refiled the information due to victim unavailability. The court held that Condon's prior waiver of speedy trial rights carried over to the refiled information, and the state did not violate Condon's constitutional speedy trial right, reversing the trial court's order granting discharge.
A defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights obtained through continuances carries over and remains effective when an information is nolle prossed and subsequently refiled. The speedy trial rule is brought back into play only by denial of a motion for discharge or the defendant's demand for speedy trial. Under the constitutional speedy trial right, which has no predetermined time periods, Condon was not denied his right because he had not asserted a demand for speedy trial, the delays prior to nolle prosequi were mostly attributable to the defendant, the subsequent delays were reasonable, and there was no showing of prejudice.
[1] A defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, carries over to a refiled information after the original information is…
[2] The speedy trial rule is subsequently brought back into play only by the denial of a defendant's motion for discharge or by the defendant's demand for speedy trial.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant has by obtaining a continuance waived his speedy trial rights under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the information is nolle prossed, the waiver carries over and is effective under the refiled information”
Establishes the core holding that speedy trial waivers survive nolle prosequi and apply to refiled charges
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCondon was charged with criminal mischief by information filed September 20, 1980. After one state continuance and four defense continuances, trial wa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Assertion Of Speedy Trial Right cases and more on FLexlaw
[*74] GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
After one state continuance, four defense continuances and a notice of defendant/respondent William Condon, Jr.’s hospitalization, his trial on an information filed September 20, 1980, charging criminal mischief was set for December 29, 1981. On that date the state issued a nolle prosequi because the alleged victim was unavailable to testify. Condon’s motion to dismiss was denied. The information was refiled January 22, 1982 and Condon was arraigned a month later.
On April 19, 1982 the county court heard and granted Condon's motion to discharge. It appears from the transcript the county court held the state’s delay in refiling the information violated Condon’s constitutional speedy trial right. The state’s unsuccessful appeal to the circuit court was followed by this petition for writ of certiorari, which we find to be meritorious.
As this court has stated before, when a defendant has by obtaining a continuance waived his speedy trial rights under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the information is nolle prossed, the waiver carries over and is effective under the refiled information. State v. Trimel, 387 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Accord Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The speedy trial rule is subsequently brought back into play only by denial of defendant’s motion for discharge or by defendant’s demand for speedy trial. State v. Kerper, 393 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (citing Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971); State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)).
In the instant case, neither of these had occurred. Nor can the state have violated rule 3.191(h) by nolle pross-ing, when the speedy trial rule was already waived.
Unlike the speedy trial rule, the constitutional speedy trial right knows no predetermined time periods. The operative question is merely whether the defendant is brought to trial within a reasonable time, and the criteria to be considered are “the length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Trimel, 387 So. 2d 528, 528-529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)).
In the instant case defendant/respondent had not asserted his demand for speedy trial, and the ink on his motion for discharge was still wet. The extended delays prior to the nolle prosequi were mostly attributable to the defendant; the delays thereafter were not unreasonable, and there was no showing of prejudice to defendant’s case. In sum, Condon was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The county court’s discharge of defendant finds support in no applicable theory of law and thus represents a departure from the essential requirements of law. Certio-rari is granted, the orders of the circuit court and the county court are quashed, and the cause is remanded to the county court for further proceedings.
BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986)…. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Wright v. State, 387 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The state could not have violated rule 3.191(h)(2) by nol pross-ing the information when the defendant had already waived his rights under the rule. State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Kerper, 393 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Further, we reject Stewart’s argument that the speedy trial period in the instant case expired on day ninety. At the time Stewart requested the continuance, he stood charged w…
-
State v. Hutley, 474 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…aw; however, we think a more intensive analysis requires reversal. The continuance of January 9, 1984, is attributable to the defendant; the effect of this continuance carries across the hiatus created by the nol-pross-ing in March, State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); thus the speedy trial period was no longer rigidly the 180 days from arrest stated in the rule, but a reasonable time. Defendant’s discharge was therefore inappropriate, however negligent or inept the assistant state attorney ma…
-
State v. Albanez, 448 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…ly and, therefore, unless reactivated by a demand or denied motion for discharge, carries over to a refiled information. This principle was recognized by this court in State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See also State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Cocalis, 443 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Conner v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State v. Brown, 394 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). For the foregoing reasons, we find that appellee’s waiver of speedy t…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Udell Shirley Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- State v. Kerper, 393 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Trimel, 387 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)