W.B., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for aiding and abetting in the theft of an automobile based solely on his presence at the scene. The appellate court reversed, holding that presence, knowledge of the crime, and flight from police are insufficient to establish the criminal intent necessary for aiding and abetting liability.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency. There was no evidence that the juvenile intended the crime to be committed or performed any act to assist in perpetrating it. Presence at the scene, knowledge that a crime would be committed, and flight from police do not override the reasonable hypothesis that the accused did not intend to participate in the criminal activity.
[1] A person cannot be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another without evidence of intent that the crime be committed or an act to assist in its per…
[2] Circumstantial evidence used to show criminal intent must preclude every reasonable inference that the accused did not intend to participate in the criminal activity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no evidence appellant intended that the crime be committed or that he did some act to assist in the perpetration of the crime, therefore, he cannot be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another.”
Establishes the legal standard for aiding and abetting liability—requiring either intent that the crime be committed or an act assisting in its perpetration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceW.B., a juvenile, was riding in his adult brother's car when his brother and another adult discussed stealing a car. The brother drove to the location…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency based on a finding that appellant aided and abetted in the theft of an automobile. We reverse.
The evidence in this case, taken in a light most favorable to the State reveals that appellant, W.B., while riding in his adult brother’s car, heard his brother and another adult male discuss stealing a car. Appellant’s brother drove to the location of the car to be stolen and appellant was present when the car was stolen. Appellant stood between the stolen car and his brother’s car, although at no time did he touch the stolen car. During the time the car was being broken into, appellant hid from a passing car and appeared nervous. Once the stolen car was started, appellant reentered his brother’s car and rode away with him. After a car chase and an accident, appellant ran away from the police officers giving chase but was apprehended.
There is no evidence appellant intended that the crime be committed or that he did some act to assist in the perpetration of the crime, therefore, he cannot be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another. See Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla.1988); T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); G.C. v. State, 407 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Further, since there is no direct evidence of criminal intent, circumstantial evidence was relied upon to show such an intent. However, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not preclude every reasonable inference that appellant did not intend to participate in the criminal activity. See A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d at 1159; K.W.U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1979).
Finally, this court has held that knowledge a crime is going to be committed, presence at the scene, or flight from the scene will not override the reasonable hypothesis that an accused did not intend to participate in the criminal activity. J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); G.C. v. State, 407 So. 2d at 640; J.L.B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); J.H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1980); J.O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Therefore, we find that the evidence adduced below does not rise to the level necessary to override the hypothesis that appellant did not intend to participate in the theft of the automobile. Reversed and remanded with instructions to discharge the juvenile.
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Morse v. State, 604 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…432 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (facts must eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, not merely create a strong probability of, and be consistent with, guilt); Rager v. State, 587 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); W.B. v. State, 554 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Even if the shoeprints leading from the restaurant to Room 11 could be said to show appellant was at the scene of the burglary, that fact, along with his later running from Officer Gay, is insufficient to exclude a reasonable hyp…
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West v. State, 585 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…site intent himself or that he knew the principal had that intent. While the evidence of intent may be circumstantial, it must exclude every reasonable inference that the defendant did not intend to participate in criminal activities. W.B. v. State, 554 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Shockey v. State, 338 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In Stuckey v. State, 414 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the court addressed factual circumstances similar to those involved herein. The court concluded that the…
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E.B. v. State, 568 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…e victim. See T.H. v. State, 554 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The circumstantial evidence of intent — E. B.’s presence in the car — does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence, namely, that he merely witnessed the crime. W.B. v. State, 554 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Valdez v. State, 504 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); C.P.P. v. State, 479 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); J.W. v. State; A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); see S…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1988)
- J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- G. C. v. State, 407 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- J. L. B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- A. Y. G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- J. O. and R. G. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- K. W. U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)