JOHN M. SHORT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA AND PASCO COUNTY, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1991-04-10
No. 90-02071
HALL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
579 So. 2d 163 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

John M. Short appeals an order denying certification of certain costs as taxable costs in his criminal case, in which he was acquitted. The court affirmed, holding that attorneys' fees cannot be taxable costs and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify other challenged expenses.


Holding

Attorneys' fees cannot be taxable costs as a matter of law and need not be certified regardless of how they are characterized. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the newspaper clipping service, expert jury selection, and private investigator expenses, and in certifying only $2,500 of the forensic economist costs.


Headnotes

[1] Attorneys' fees incurred by a defendant in a criminal prosecution are not taxable costs as a matter of law.

[2] A trial court has no obligation to certify a payment to a county as a taxable cost if the expense cannot be a taxable cost under any circumstance.

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Key Quotes

“The fact that the defendant requested reimbursement of his attorneys' fees as 'taxable costs' does not transform fees into costs.”

Establishes that attorneys' fees cannot become taxable costs merely by characterizing them as such

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Facts & Procedural History

Short was acquitted in a criminal prosecution. After acquittal, he sought certification of various expenses as taxable costs to be charged to Pasco Co…

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Opinion of the Court
ALTENBERND, Judge.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

The defendant, John M. Short, appeals an order which certifies certain costs and declines to certify other costs to Pasco County as taxable costs incurred by him during a criminal prosecution in which he was acquitted. The circuit court entered the order on June 14, 1990, after a hearing at which both the state and Pasco County were represented. We affirm.

At the hearing, the circuit court made five rulings which are the subject of this appeal. First, it ruled that the attorneys’ fees incurred by the defendant are not taxable costs as a matter of law and need not be certified as such pursuant to section 939.06, Florida Statutes (1989). This ruling is correct. Hillsborough County v. Martinez, 483 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The fact that the defendant requested reimbursement of his attorneys’ fees as “taxable costs” does not transform fees into costs. Although the certification of taxable costs is now regarded as a ministerial function, a judge has no obligation to certify a payment to a county if the expenses cannot be a taxable cost under any circumstance.

The defendant also asked the circuit court to certify the following expenses as taxable costs: 1) $420 for a newspaper clipping service, 2) $8,000 for an expert in jury selection, 3) $18,000 for a private investigator, and 4) $12,000 for a forensic economist. The circuit court declined to certify the first three items and certified only $2,500 as a taxable cost concerning the forensic economist. Because such expenses could be taxable costs that a county might agree to pay, in whole or in part, a trial court cannot refuse to certify them unless it is extended discretion to do so. Thus, these items require an analysis which differs from the analysis of the attorneys’ fees.

The defendant served his initial brief to this court on November 8, 1990. That brief argues only that the circuit court “abused its discretion” in failing to certify these costs. The County’s answer brief maintains that the court did not abuse its discretion. Assuming that this issue is properly before this court, we find no abuse of discretion concerning any of these decisions. See Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Goldberg v. Dade County, 378 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

On November 21, 1990, this court announced decisions in Sawyer v. State, 570 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and Clark v. State, 570 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In those cases, we adopted a procedure for certification of costs which is further described in Pfeifer v. Powell, 498 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). There is no question that the circuit court did not follow this new ministerial procedure in this case. Instead, it exercised its discretion at this stage in the criminal proceeding rather than at a later time in a civil proceeding after the County had declined to refund these costs. All of the parties agreed to this approach and thus have not preserved this issue for review. Because they requested the court to use this streamlined approach, we affirm the order denying in part the defendant’s request to certify taxable costs.

Affirmed.

HALL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …v. Martinez, 483 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). In Martinez, the court determined that chapter 939, Florida Statutes, makes no provision for an award of fees for a private attorney retained by a defendant in a criminal case. See also Short v. State, 579 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (fact that the acquitted defendant requested reimbursement of attorney’s fees as “taxable costs” does not transform fees into costs). Carrying the mutuality doctrine to its logical conclusion, since an acquitted defendant is not e…
  • Volusia Cnty. v. Carrin, 666 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …939.06-.08, Florida Statutes (1993), see Pfeifer v. Powell, 498 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); nevertheless, since the County has been ordered to make payment, we conclude the County is entitled to appellate review of the order. See Short v. State, 579 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The appealed order in this case is thus unlike Orange County v. Davis, 414 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), in which the order followed the statutory scheme. . See, for example, §§ 939.15 and 951.04, Fla. Stat. (1993). . See Pow…
  • State of Fla. & Palm Beach Cnty. v. Ball, 689 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …have always been responsible for their own attorney’s fees, even though by statute, acquitted defendants are reimbursed for taxable “costs.” Fla. Stat. § 939.06 (1993). See Goldberg v. Dade County, 378 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Short v. State, 579 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Hillsborough County v. Martinez, 483 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243, 94 S.Ct. 1179, 1181, 39 L.Ed.2d 297 (1974); Glenn v. Unit…

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