LENNAR CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
MIRIAM MUSKAT, APPELLEE
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Lennar Corporation appealed a trial court's denial of its motion for sanctions under Florida's offer-of-settlement statute after the jury entered judgment in Lennar's favor. The appellate court reversed, holding that section 45.061 applies when judgment is entered for the defendant and that Muskat's rejection of Lennar's $2,000 settlement offer (on a $163,000 claim) created an unrebutted presumption of unreasonable rejection, warranting sanctions.
Section 45.061 is constitutional and applies when judgment is entered for the defendant. Muskat's rejection of the $2,000 settlement offer created a presumption of unreasonable rejection that was not rebutted as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in denying Lennar's motion for sanctions.
[1] A defendant is entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees incurred after a plaintiff unreasonably rejected a settlement offer, even if the plaintiff obtained no judgme…
[2] The statute governing offers of settlement does not require a plaintiff to obtain a judgment for a defendant to be awarded sanctions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the offer rejected”
Establishes the statutory presumption of unreasonable rejection triggered when judgment favors defendant by more than 25% over rejected offer
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLennar made a settlement offer of $2,000 to Muskat, who had claimed a $163,000 brokerage commission that Lennar believed was fraudulent. Muskat reject…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
After the appellants-defendants Lennar Corporation and Lennar Homes, Inc. made, and the plaintiff-appellee, Miriam Muskat, rejected an offer of settlement pursuant to section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), the jury returned a verdict for Lennar and Muskat’s appeal from the adverse judgment was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Muskat v. Lennar, 582 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (table). Supported by a sworn motion concerning the manner in which the amount of the settlement offer was determined,1 Lennar moved for sanctions under sections 45.061(2), (3). Although Muskat made no evidentiary showing to rebut the presumption of unreasonable rejection created by section 45.-061(2)(b),2 the trial judge denied the motion without explanation.3 We reverse.
As we have today in Collection Chevrolet, Inc. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 595 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), we hold both that section 45.061 is constitutional, Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1992), and that it applies when judgment is entered for the defendant. On the latter issue, we again certify conflict with Timmons v. Combs, 579 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review granted, 587 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1991) and Westover v. Allstate Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). See Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d at 14 (issue noted but not resolved).
On the merits, we conclude that the presumption of unreasonable rejection created under these circumstances was not rebutted as a matter of law, see Gross v. Albertson’s, Inc., 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and that the trial judge therefore erred in failing to grant the motion for sanctions. The cause is remanded solely for the purpose of determining the amount to be assessed under section 45.061(3).
Reversed.
. The underlying claim was for a $163,000 brokerage commission which Lennar knew — and the jury obviously agreed (as do we) — was totally fraudulent. The offer of $2,000 represented an amount which Lennar appropriately considered would permit Muskat to recover her costs and reasonable expenses, without the necessity of incurring further ones and avoiding the subsequent imposition of costs against her. In our judgment, unlike the honestly disputed claim which was involved in Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Elbert, 590 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), Lennar’s offer in these circumstances, at least prima facie, was a reasonable one within the meaning of section 45.061(2).
. 45.061 Offers of settlement—
**
(b) An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected. For the purposes of this section, the amount of the judgment shall be the total amount of money damages awarded plus the amount of costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer for which recovery is provided by operation of other provisions of Florida law.
. The trial court also denied Lennar’s concomitant motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the appellants’ very substantial contention that this ruling was also erroneous.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Weinstein, 747 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…also City of Neptune Beach v. Smith, 740 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. Acme Gas Corp., 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992). In respectively holding and arguing otherwise, the trial court and the appellee, relying mostly on language in Eagleman, that a “good faith” offer must be based on an objective assessme…
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Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
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Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 641 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…d a joint offer invalid per se, while numerous cases have recognized, without comment, the validity of joint offers. See Schmidt; Goodpaster v. Evans, 570 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.1991); Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), rev. denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Gross v. Albertson’s, Inc., 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). We decline to hold a joint offer invalid per se. The nature of any offer and its validity and enforceability may be factors…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992)
- Bowers v. State, 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Elbert, 590 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Timmons v. Combs, 579 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Westover v. Allstate Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Collection Chevrolet, Inc. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 595 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)