JAMES HARPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Harper appeals his adjudication as a habitual felony offender and his 4.5-year sentence, arguing the trial court failed to make the requisite statutory findings on the record. The court holds that specific findings regarding habitual offender status must be made on the record, either written or transcribed, to allow meaningful appellate review and satisfy statutory requirements.
The trial court erred by adjudicating Harper as a habitual felony offender without making specific findings of fact on the record. Habitual offender findings must be made in a reported judicial proceeding, either written or transcribed, to provide meaningful appellate review, and a negotiated plea agreement does not waive the requirement for the fact-finding process itself.
[1] A trial court must make specific findings of fact on the record to support an adjudication of habitual felony offender status.
[2] The failure to make specific findings of fact on the record for habitual offender status requires reversal of the adjudication and vacation of the sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Habitual offender findings need not be in writing as long as they are made in a reported judicial proceeding.”
Establishes the standard that findings must either be written or transcribed in a reported proceeding, not merely inferred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarper pleaded nolo contendere to battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to a plea bargain in which the prosecutor recommended and the judge ag…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
Harper appeals his adjudication as a habitual felony offender and 4V2 year sentence received pursuant to that classification. Harper initially tendered and the trial court accepted a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to battery on a law enforcement officer. As a term of the plea bargain, the prosecutor recommended and the judge agreed to a 5 year sentencing cap as a habitual offender. At sentencing, the trial judge was presented with Harper’s prior judgments and sentences starting from 1973. The trial judge orally adjudicated Harper as a habitual felony offender. Harper argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not making the requisite statutory findings concerning his habitual offender status on the record. See generally, § 775.084(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
In Powell v. State, 596 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), as in the present case, the trial court adjudicated the defendant to be a habitual felony offender but did not make any specific findings of fact on record to support the classification. The state argued that despite the lack of specific formal findings, the imposition of the habitual felony offender sentence was supported by the PSI relied on by the trial court. This court held that the PSI record did not meet the statutory requirement of specific findings, and reversed the habitual offender adjudication and vacated the sentence. See also Power v. State, 568 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (Habitual Offender Act as amended in 1988 still requires findings of fact).
In the present case, there was no discussion at sentencing as to Harper’s prior felony convictions with the exception of a 1981 conviction that was initially disputed. Furthermore, there was no discussion as to whether the present offense was committed within five years from Harper’s release from prison on a felony or from the conviction date of the last prior felony. See § 775.084(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991).
Habitual offender findings need not be in writing as long as they are made in a reported judicial proceeding. See Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989). In the present case, the record is devoid^? of any findings, written or transcribed. The error is compounded because the certified copies of the prior judgments and sentences were not filed and made part of the record.
Although Harper accepted the prosecutor’s recommendation for habitual offender sentencing as a term of the plea agreement, he did not expressly waive his right under the habitual offender statute to findings of fact, nor stipulate to his status as a habitual offender. Cf. Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). A negotiated plea agreement to be sentenced as a habitual offender may be considered a waiver of the statutory notice requirement, but not a waiver of the fact-finding process. See Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
The state argues that it may be inferred from the sentencing transcript that the trial judge reviewed the documentary evidence presented by the prosecutor and made the necessary factual findings before adjudicating Harper as a habitual offender. This argument runs contrary to supreme court decisions which have held that specific findings regarding habitual offender status must be made on the record to provide meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989); Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985).
We reverse the habitual offender adjudication and vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing. The trial court may again determine whether Harper is eligible for sentencing as a habitual offender. SENTENCE VACATED and REMANDED.
GOSHORN, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hope v. State, 766 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…ware that such a sentence would be imposed. This determination would have been helpful because entering a plea as an habitual offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement may be considered a waiver of the notice requirement. See Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); see also Lee v. State, 731 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). . The court in Maddox further distinguished illegal sentences from fundamental sentencing errors when it noted: However, clearly the class of errors that constitute an "…
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State v. Will, 645 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…being so, no useful purpose would be served by holding the habitual offender hearing, or obtaining an on-the-record waiver of the habitual offender hearing.3 See Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310, 310-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). But see Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).4 Assuming arguendo that it was necessary to obtain an on-the-record waiver, or to conduct a habitual offender hearing, defendant would still be entitled to no relief. In order to obtain postconviction relief, defendant mus…
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Suarez v. State, 616 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…the habitual offender statute. Chalk v. State, 600 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Anstead, J. concurring specially); Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); cf., Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Any error in failing to make the requisite findings was harmless error. State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1993). Prior to appellant’s plea, the State filed a notice to enhance appellant’s sentence pursuant to section 775.084…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bennie Lee Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1985)
- Timmie Lewis Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1989)
- Power v. State, 568 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Haines v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Powell v. State, 596 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)