JOEY WASHINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joey Washington appealed a resentencing on habitual felony offender charges. The trial court imposed an identical sentence before the appellate mandate had been formally issued, depriving it of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and remanded, directing reinstatement of the original sentence.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence on December 21, 1992, because jurisdiction vests in the appellate court upon filing of a timely notice of appeal and does not return to the trial court until issuance of the mandate, which occurred on January 19, 1993.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to impose sentence after a notice of appeal has been filed and the appellate court's mandate has not yet issued.
[2] An appellate court's judgment becomes final upon the issuance of its mandate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon the filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days of rendition of the judgment, the jurisdiction of the cause vests absolutely in the appellate court until such appeal has been finally disposed of.”
Establishes the rule that appellate jurisdiction vests immediately upon timely filing of notice of appeal and continues until appeal is final.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWashington was convicted of four drug offenses and sentenced to concurrent 30-year habitual felony offender terms. After his initial appeal, this cour…
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WENTWORTH, Senior Judge.
Joey Washington has appealed from an habitual felony offender sentence imposed on remand in Washington v. State, 610 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We reverse, and remand for reinstatement of the original judgment and sentence.
Washington appealed his conviction of four drug offenses and the resulting concurrent 30-year habitual felony offender terms. This court affirmed the convictions, but reversed and remanded for resentencing citing the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that Washington met each of the criteria of section 775.084(l)(a), Florida Statutes. Washington v. State, 610 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (Washington I).
The opinion in Washington I issued on November 19, 1992. However, a timely motion for clarification and certification delayed issuance of the mandate until disposition of the motion. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.340(b). An opinion granting the motion issued on December 31, 1992, and the mandate as to both opinions issued on January 19, 1993. The Supreme Court thereafter quashed Washington I in State v. Washington, 620 So. 2d 1231 (Fla.1993) (Washington II), and remanded to this court for further proceedings. We thereafter affirmed the original habitual felony offender sentences. Washington v. State, 625 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (Washington III).
The trial court resentenced Washington pursuant to Washington I on December 21, 1992, prior to either a ruling on the motion for clarification or issuance of the mandate. The trial court imposed identical concurrent 30-year habitual offender terms, and Washington appealed. His counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) averring that he can make no good faith argument for reversal. The state argues that the jurisdictional authority for re-sentencing, i.e., Washington I, was quashed and superseded by Washington II and III. Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to resentenee Washington. The state seeks vacation of the sentence appealed herein, and reimposition of the original sentence.
Upon the filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days of rendition of the judgment, the jurisdiction of the cause vests absolutely in the appellate court until such appeal has been finally disposed of. See Pruitt v. Brock, 437 So. 2d 768, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The judgment of an appellate court becomes final upon issuance of a mandate. See Thibodeau v. Sarasota Memorial Hospital, 449 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Thus, Washington’s timely appeal of the original judgment and sentence vested jurisdiction in this court until its issuance of a mandate. Although the court issued an opinion in Washington I prior to the December 21, 1992 resentencing herein, the mandate did not issue until January 19, 1993. Therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to impose sentence on December 21, 1992, and we vacate that sentence.
With regard to the sentence now to be imposed, this court has previously mandated that the judgment and sentence appealed in Washington I be affirmed. Washington III, 625 So. 2d at 1234. We therefore direct on remand that, upon vacation of the judgment and sentence imposed on December 21, 1992, the trial court reinstate the original judgment and sentence.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
ZEHMER, C.J., and SMITH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Mathis v. State, 963 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…t lacked jurisdiction to resentence Brooks); State v. Miyasato, 805 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (mandate functions to end the jurisdiction of the appellate court and to return full jurisdiction of the case to the trial court); Washington v. State, 637 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (the judgment of an appellate court becomes final upon the issuance of a mandate). Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court’s May 16, 2007, order denying petitioner’s motions to reduce s…
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Jackson v. State, 653 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…PER CURIAM. The trial court was without jurisdiction to resentence appellant prior to issuance of this court’s mandate in Case No. 93-1995 on September 27, 1994. Washington v. State, 637 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with this court’s opinion in Jackson v. State, 641 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.…
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Schneider v. State, 825 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…Schneider had already been resen-tenced in that case prior to the issuance of our mandate. Schneider argues and we agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Schneider prior to the issuance of our mandate. See Washington v. State, 637 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for Schneider to be resentenced on counts I and III of case number 90-998 in accordance with the mandate issued in Schneider I. Reversed and remanded for resent…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Pruitt v. Brock, 437 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Thibodeau v. Sarasota Mem'l Hosp. & All Risk Corp. of Fla., 449 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- State v. Trujillo-Pentate, 620 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Washington, 620 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1993)
- Washington v. State, 610 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Pleasant v. State, 625 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Washington v. State, 625 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)