T.C., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLEE
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A father whose parental rights were terminated appeals, arguing the trial court failed to address all statutory factors in its termination order. The appellate court affirms, holding that while the statute requires only that the court briefly state the facts supporting termination, any deficiency would be harmless given the overwhelming evidence of sexual abuse.
The trial court was required only to briefly state the facts upon which its decision to terminate parental rights was made under section 39.469(3), not to address each and every factor listed in section 39.4612. Any deficiency in the order would be harmless error given the overwhelming evidence supporting termination.
[1] A written order of disposition terminating parental rights must briefly state the facts upon which the decision is made.
[2] A trial court's order terminating parental rights will be affirmed if competent substantial evidence supports the decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the court terminates parental rights, the court shall enter a written order of disposition briefly stating the facts upon which its decision to terminate the parental rights is made.”
Establishes the statutory requirement for termination orders under section 39.469(3), which requires only brief statement of facts, not exhaustive discussion of all statutory factors
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe father sexually molested his daughter between ages six and ten, which he stipulated to at trial. He attempted to justify his conduct by claiming t…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant’s parental rights were terminated by order of the court in which it recited facts and reached conclusions of law. The termination was based in part on appellant’s stipulation that he had sexually molested Ms young daughter. Testimony at the trial, recited in the order, revealed that the father attempted to excuse Ms conduct by stating that the daughter, between the ages of six and ten during the period of molestation, imtiated the encounters. He did not think that what he had done amounted to abuse or harm to her. The father is serving a long prison term as a result of his conduct.
He claims that we should reverse the order of termination because the trial court failed to address in its order each of the factors enumerated in section 39.4612, Florida Statutes (1995). While the statute says that the trial court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including those listed therem, section 39.469(3), Florida Statutes (1995), states: “If the court terminates parental rights, the court shall enter a written order of disposition briefly stating the facts upon which its decision to terminate the parental rights is made.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The trial court has complied with this directive, and in review of its order, competent substantial evidence exists to support it.1 In fact, we find that the evidence supporting termination was overwhelming, and thus any deficiency in the order would be excused m any event. See A.T. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 490 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We therefore affirm.
WARNER, PARIENTE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . Appellant points to cases which appear to require an order of termination of parental rights to address each and every factor listed in section 39.4612 and to, be reversible if the order fails to do so. See In re C.K., 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); In re C.M.P., 608 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); I.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 668 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). To Me extent that these cases require that the order recite and discuss each and every factor, we disagree with their interpretation of the relevant statutes. However, we deem this to be a case where there is overwhelming evidence to support termination. Thus, our disagreement is not dispositive, and we do not certify conflict with these decisions.
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Narciso Alberto v. Dep't OF Child. & Families, 707 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See In Interest of T.M., 641 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1994); T.C. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 681 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), review denied, 689 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.1997); In Interest of R.W.P., 634 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).…
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State v. J.A., 701 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…reaching that determination. § 39.4612, Fla. Stat. (1997). Those cases that have discussed this statutory requirement have done so only in the context of orders that terminated rights. See, e.g., T.C. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 681 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 689 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.1997); I.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 668 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); In re C.K., 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); In re C.M.P., 608 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).…
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D.F. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 877 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…State, 599 So. 2d 978, 984 (Fla.1992); C.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 756 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); see also F.A.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 804 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); T.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 681 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). As I see it, a retrial of this ease is an exercise in futility and only prolongs and/or frustrates the appellee’s ability to secure adequate permanent placement for the minor children at issue in this case. . Thus, contrary to…
Authorities Cited
- IN the Interest of C.K. v. State, 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- State v. Honorable J. Rogers Padgett, 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- I.M. v. State, 668 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- In the Interest of C.M.P., 608 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)