SUSANA A. ARLEO, F/K/A SUSANA A. GARCIA, PETITIONER,
v.
CARLOS E. GARCIA, RESPONDENT
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The court granted a petition for writ of prohibition, holding that a trial court loses jurisdiction once it enters an order on a first motion for rehearing and therefore cannot entertain a second motion for rehearing or proceed further in the case.
A trial court loses jurisdiction upon entering an order on a first motion for rehearing and has no authority to entertain a second motion for rehearing. The 'without prejudice' clause does not authorize a second motion for rehearing. Rule 1.540 does not provide jurisdiction because the pension matter does not involve a clerical error, and the trial court made a final adjudication on the pension issue without reserving jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on a second motion for rehearing after entering an order on the first motion for rehearing.
[2] A "without prejudice" clause in an order denying a motion for rehearing does not permit the filing of a subsequent, unauthorized motion for rehearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon entering the order on respondent's first motion for rehearing, the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on the second motion for rehearing and to consider the merits of the case.”
Establishes the core holding that trial court jurisdiction is lost once an order is entered on the first motion for rehearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA trial court entered an order denying respondent's first motion for rehearing, which included a 'without prejudice' clause. The respondent then filed…
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PER CURIAM.
We grant the petition for writ of prohibition. Upon entering the order on respondent’s first motion for rehearing, the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on the second motion for rehearing and to consider the merits of the case. See Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970). The “without prejudice” clause in the order denying the first motion for rehearing does not allow for the filing of a second motion for rehearing; trial courts have no authority to permit the filing of any further motion for rehearing beyond the one authorized by rule 1.530. Capital Bank v. Knuck, 537 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Rule 1.540 does not provide the trial court with jurisdiction since the pension matter at issue does not rest on a clerical error, and the fact-specific case of DePadro v. Moore, 215 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1969), urged by respondent as controlling, is distinguishable. Finally, the trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction over the pension issue because the court made an adjudication on the pension issue — i.e., that the pension is a non-marital asset — and did not reserve jurisdiction over that issue. See Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla.1976).
All orders entered by the trial court after its denial of respondent’s first motion for rehearing are hereby vacated. We assume it will be unnecessary to issue a formal writ of prohibition, and that the trial judge will dismiss respondent’s second motion for rehearing as an unauthorized motion, and will not proceed further with the case.
PROHIBITION GRANTED.
WARNER, FARMER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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The Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…tions for rehearing filed pursuant to rule 1.530. See Wilson, 949 So. 2d at 1152 (“[T]rial courts have no authority to permit the filing of any further motion for rehearing [*1153] beyond the one authorized by rule 1.530.”) (quoting Arleo v. Garcia, 695 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)); Capital Bank, 537 So. 2d at 698 (“[T]he lower court could do nothing after the appropriate disposition of the single authorized post-trial motion”). Ms. Grimaldi urges us to treat her second motion, the motion to vacate, as a…
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Bellino v. W & W Lumber & Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 902 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…er Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(2). The trial court would have had the ability to adjust the amount determined to be owing in the final judgment only if it had granted the motion for rehearing and reopened the case. See Arleo v. Garcia, 695 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Thus we agree with Bellino that the trial judge should have granted the motion for rehearing. On the cross-appeal, W & W Lumber argues that the trial court erred when it declined to award prejudgment interest for the cost of th…
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Trueblood v. State, 782 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Arleo v. Garcia, 695 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (upon entry of order on first motion for rehearing, trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on second motion for rehearing). ERVIN, MINER and BROWNING, JJ„ concur.…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. OF Shelby v. Tillman Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970)
- Cap. Bank v. The Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 537 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Lenora Jackson v. State, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- DePADRO v. Moore, 215 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- Bassham v. State, 222 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1969)
- Pepin & Campbell Ins. Co. v. Johns, 222 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1969)