JOHN J. MORTON, APPELLANT,
v.
ELMO STAPLES, FRANK CRAWFORD, AND GULF COAST STEEL BUILDINGS, INC., APPELLEES
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The court reversed an order granting a new trial because the trial judge failed to specify the grounds for the new trial as required by Florida statute and court rules. The court held that such procedural defects are fatal to the validity of the order and reinstated the plaintiff's original judgment.
An order granting a new trial that fails to specify the particular grounds upon which the motion was granted is invalid and must be reversed. Florida statute and court rules make it mandatory that trial judges indicate in such orders the specific grounds for granting the motion.
“In every case in which the trial court shall enter an order granting a motion for a new trial, the trial judge shall indicate in the order granting said motion the particular ground or grounds upon which said motion was granted”
Statutory requirement establishing the mandatory nature of specifying grounds for new trial orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Morton won a judgment in a common law action tried before the circuit judge without a jury. The defendant filed a timely motion for new tria…
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Appeal, by plaintiff below, from the circuit judge’s order granting a new trial.
Plaintiff was awarded judgment in a common law action tried on the merits before the circuit judge sitting without a jury. On motion timely filed by defendant, the trial judge granted a new trial. The order granting a new trial failed to state the ground or grounds therefor.
The sole point presented is the validity of an order granting a new trial when it fails to contain the ground or grounds for so granting. The law is well settled that such an order is not valid.
F.S. § 59.07(4), F.S.A., provides:
“In every case in which the trial court shall enter an order granting a motion for a new trial, the trial judge shall indicate in the order granting said motion the particular ground or grounds upon which said motion was granted, and upon appeal from any such order, if taken under the statutes providing for appeal from orders granting new trials, no other grounds than those specified by the trial judge, as a basis for the order granting the new *807trial, shall be considered as arguable upon said appeal.”
Rule 2.6(d) F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A., provides:
“In every case in which the trial court shall enter an order granting a motion for a new trial, the trial judge shall indicate in the order granting said motion the particular ground or grounds upon which said motion was granted.”
Cases construing the above statute and rule clearly hold that such an order must be set aside. In Means v. Douglas 1 it is stated:
“Further, the order granting the new trial upon the issue of damages must be set aside because the order fails to indicate the particular ground or grounds upon which the motion was granted, as required by § 59.07(4) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., and Rules 2.6(d) and 2.8(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., Fla. 1951, 53 So.2d 912; Ebersole v. Tepperman, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 564; cf. Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789, 193 So. 821.”
Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron Inc.2 involved a common law jury trial wherein the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants. Thereafter, on motion of the plaintiffs, a new trial was granted. The order granting a new trial failed to state the grounds therefor. Some two and a half months subsequent to directing the verdict and during appeal, the trial court entered an order, the stated purpose of which was to clarify and amend the order granting a new trial. In setting aside the order granting a new trial and reinstating the verdict, the court stated:
“The direction in § 59.07(4), Fla. Stat., F.S.A., and rule 2.6(d), F.R.C.P., that 'the trial judge shall indicate in the order granting said motion [for new trial] the particular ground or grounds upon which said motion was granted’ is mandatory, and while there may be exceptions to the requirement for strict observance of this rule (Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., supra), the record in this case furnishes no basis to excuse non-compliance.”
For additional authority see Gaskill v. Montague, 128 So.2d 420 (Fla.App.3rd, 1961), and Ponte v. Lattin, 135 So.2d 260 (Fla.App.3rd, 1961).
The order granting a new trial is reversed with directions to reinstate the judgment.
WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and STUR-GIS J., concur.
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Citator
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Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965)…n an order granting new trial has been repeatedly held to be basis for reversing such orders. Means v. Douglas, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 88; Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 122 So. 2d 240; Morton v. Staples, et al., Fla.App.1962, 141 So. 2d 806; Hammett v. Lyte Line, Inc., Fla. 1963, 150 So. 2d 235. Certainly, if the omission of the required ground for new trial was only a clerical error subject to correction under Rule 1.38(a) some mention of and resort to it would have been made in our c…
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Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., 150 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1963)….R. C.P., was amended by deleting paragraph (d) which is now paragraph (f) of Rule 2.8, F.R.C.P., amended. See, In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1962). . Ebersole v. Tepperman, 65 So. 2d 564 (Fla.1953); Morton v. Staples, 141 So. 2d 806 (Fla.App.1962); Webb City, Inc. v. Lugerner, 138 So. 2d 531 (Fla.App.1962); Gaskill v. Montague, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla.App.1961); Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., 122 So. 2d 240 (Fla. App.1960); Means v. Douglas, 110 So. 2d 88 (Fla.App.1959).…
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Pensacola Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Costa, 195 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)…2d 402, 404. . 23 Fla.Jur. 374^-New Trial, § 2. . 6A Moore’s Federal Practice 3707, § 59.-02 (2d Ed.) . 6A Moore’s Federal Practice 3768, § 59.-07 (2d Ed.) . 6A Moore’s Federal Practice 3772, § 59.07 (2d Ed.) . Morton v. Staples, (Fla.App.1962) 141 So. 2d 806. . Hall v. American Distributing Corp., (Fla.App.1966) 181 So. 2d 711.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., 122 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Gaskill v. Montague, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Simpson, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789 (Fla. 1940)
- State ex rel. Peterman v. Adams, 65 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1953)
- Ponte v. Lattin, 135 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)