RANDAL ALLEN ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
LAWRENCE SUMMERS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A plaintiff filed a personal injury action in Dade County arising from an automobile accident that occurred in St. Lucie County. The defendants, residents of Seminole and Orange Counties, moved to transfer venue to a county where the cause of action accrued or where they were resident. The court reversed the denial of the transfer motion, holding that defendants were entitled to transfer unless the foreign insurance company defendants had agents in the proper counties.
The court held that the individual defendants and the corporate defendant Florida Convoy, Inc. were entitled to transfer venue under Florida statute to the county where the cause of action accrued (St. Lucie County) or where they were resident (Seminole or Orange County), unless the foreign insurance company defendants had agents in one of those proper counties.
[1] A plaintiff may not establish venue in a county solely by joining foreign insurance companies as defendants if the cause of action accrued in another county and the other…
[2] A defendant may move to transfer a cause of action to the county where the cause of action accrued or where the defendant resides.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By their motion for transfer the individual defendants (under § 47.011 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) and the corporate defendant Florida Convoy, Inc. (under § 47.051 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) objecting to venue in Dade County availed themselves of the privilege to require that the action be brought or maintained in the county in which the cause of action accrued or in which they or one of them was resident.”
Establishes the statutory basis for defendants' venue rights and the privilege they invoked by their motion
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn automobile accident occurred in St. Lucie County. The plaintiff filed suit in Dade County circuit court against multiple defendants: Randal Allen (…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Personal Injury Damages cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellee Lawrence Summers filed an action in the circuit court of Dade County for damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident alleged to have occurred in St. Lucie County. The places of residence of the defendants were not stated in the complaint.
The defendants moved the court to transfer the cause to another county. The motion and supporting affidavits showed that the accident occurred in St. Lucie County; that the two insurance company defendants were foreign corporations; that the defendant Florida Convoy, Inc. was a Florida corporation having its principal office and place of business in Orange County; that the defendant Randal Allen was a resident of Seminole County; and that defendant G. D. Mattox was a resident of Orange County.
The two foreign insurance companies, who were liability insurers of other named defendants, were made defendants in the cause under the authority of Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla.1969, 223 So.2d 713. Thus, with the accident having occurred in St. Lucie County, and the defendants other than the two insurance companies being residents of Seminole County or Orange County, the basis relied on by the plaintiff for filing the action in Dade County was because the foreign insurance companies maintained an office or agent in Dade County. The defendants’ motion to transfer was denied, and the defendants filed this interlocutory appeal from that order relating to venue, as authorized by Rule 4.2(a) FAR, 32 F.S.A.
We hold the appeal has merit. By their motion for transfer the individual defendants (under § 47.011 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) and the corporate defendant Florida Convoy, Inc. (under § 47.051 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) objecting to venue in Dade County availed themselves of the privilege to require that the action be brought or maintained in the county in which the cause of action accrued or in which they or one of them was resident. Upon so doing they were entitled to be granted relief on their motion to transfer, unless it should be made to appear that the foreign corporations joined as liability *15insurers of said defendants did not have an agent in one of the counties in which the other defendants were resident or the cause of action accrued, that is, Seminole County, Orange County or St. Lucie County. See Enfinger v. Baxley, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 538; King v. King, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 857; Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Mercer, Fla.App.1964, 226 So,2d 270; Sage v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Hartford, Fla.App.1970, 239 So.2d 831.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gaboury v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…d in that forum which will cause the least amount of inconvenience and expense to those parties required to answer and defend the action. Polar Ice Cream and Creamery Company v. Andrews, 146 So. 2d 609 (1st DCA Fla.1962). See also, Allen v. Summers, 273 So. 2d 13 (3rd DCA Fla.1973); England v. Cook, 256 So. 2d 403 (3rd DCA Fla.1972); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Mann, 285 So. 2d 681 (3rd DCA Fla.1973), rev’d. 300 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1974). The granting or refusal of the application for change of venue is…
-
Walt Disney World Co. & Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Leff, 323 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…tuation here and that the action should have been filed in Polk County within the purview of § 47.011, F.S.A. The trial court’s denial of the plea of privilege was therefore error.” (footnote omitted). The rule was also applied in Allen v. Summers, 273 So. 2d 13 (3rd DCAFla.1973); Maloney v. Fleishaker, 238 So. 2d 496 (2nd DCAFla.1970); King v. King, 188 So. 2d 857 (4th DCAFla.1966), and was recognized by this court, but not applied because the facts did not so warrant, in Sage v. Travelers Indemnity Compan…
-
Barry S. Mankowitz, M.D. v. Staub, 553 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…Red Cross resides in both Dade and Monroe Counties, it may not use section 47.021 to defeat defendant Mankowitz’s right to be sued in Monroe County, the site of his sole residence. Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla.1957); Allen v. Summers, 273 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer, 226 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Consequently, the first order under review entered in this case, denying appellant’s motion for change of venue, is reversed. Similarly, the second order un…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Miller v. Miller, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1957)
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Levada Mercer, 226 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Amos Jackson v. State, 188 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Fowler v. State of N.J. State Parole Bd., 239 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Sage v. Travelers Indem. Co. OF Hartford, 239 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)