FLORA SHACRAHA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenged a restitution order and certain conditions of community control imposed as part of her probation sentence for DWI and leaving the scene of an accident. The court reversed on both grounds: the restitution amount was unaffordable without a payment schedule, and non-standard conditions of community control were not orally pronounced at sentencing as required by law.
The court reversed the restitution order because under Florida law, restitution must be paid immediately if no payment schedule is set, and the evidence did not support the defendant's ability to pay immediately. The court also reversed the two non-standard community control conditions because all special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing; only standard conditions listed in section 948.03(1) may be included in written orders without oral pronouncement.
[1] If a trial court does not set a payment schedule for restitution, payment is immediately due.
[2] A restitution order must be consistent with a defendant's ability to pay.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If no schedule of payments is ordered by the trial court, then payment of restitution must be made immediately.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that restitution without a payment schedule is due immediately under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced her to thirty days in jail and t…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges a restitution order entered as a condition of her probation, contending that the trial court erred in entering it because of her inability to pay the amount set by the trial court. Appellant also contends that the written order of community control does not conform to the oral pronouncement. We agree as to both issues.
The trial court sentenced appellant, who had pled guilty to charges of driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident, to thirty days in jail and two years community control. After a hearing on appellant’s ability to pay, it ordered her to pay $1,395 in restitution. The court did not set any payment schedule for the restitution, even though the state had asked only that some amount be paid each month.
If no schedule of payments is ordered by the trial court, then payment of restitution must be made immediately. § 775.089(3)(c), Fla.Stat. The evidence in this case, even in the light most favorable to the state, does not show that the defendant had the ability to make immediate payment of the restitution amount, although the .evidence shows an ability to pay had the trial court ordered payments be made within a required time or in specified installments. See Boss v. State, 613 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). We therefore reverse and remand the order of restitution to the trial court for establishment of a later specified payment date or an installment payment schedule consistent with appellant’s ability to pay.
Second, appellant complains that two conditions of community control, (requiring appellant to maintain an hourly accounting of her activities on a daily log which shall be submitted to the community control officer as well as the requirement that she participate in self-improvement programs) were not orally pronounced at the time of sentence and were not standard conditions of community control/probation. § 948.03, Fla.Stat. (1991). We agree that these conditions must be stricken for failure to orally pronounce them at sentencing. These same conditions of community control have been stricken in Vincent v. State, 600 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) and Evans v. State, 605 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). By the state’s argument, we perceive that it (and perhaps the trial court) misconstrues what must be orally pronounced at sentencing. All special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Cumbie v. State, 597 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Only those “standard conditions” of community control/probation which are those listed in section 948.03(1) may be included in the written order even if not pronounced orally at sentencing. The conditions mentioned above are not within the standard conditions of section 948.03(1) and therefore were required to be pronounced orally at sentencing. See Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We reverse and remand with directions that these conditions be stricken from the order of community control.
WARNER, POLEN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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Vasquez v. State, 663 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…on of this condition which prohibits defendant, a convicted felón, from owning or possessing a firearm, should be affirmed and does not require that we strike it. See Hart; Shaddix v. State, 599 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Shacraha v. State, 635 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), we stated that only those standard conditions of probation which are listed in section 948.03 may be included in the written order without being orally pronounced. The issue before us in Shac-raha, however, did not require…
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Royals v. State, 673 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used. We reverse conditions twelve and thirteen which were not orally pronounced and are not standard conditions of community control or probation. Shacraha v. State, 635 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions to eliminate conditions twelve and thirteen from the order of community control. GUNTHER, C.J., and WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.…
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Duby v. State, 651 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…tter. In considering the statutory factors, the trial court should take into account the above-noted circumstances and any other appropriate evidence relating to the issues of present and future financial needs and ability to pay. Shacraha v. State, 635 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (reversing to establish future payment date or installment schedule, where defendant had no ability to make immediate payment of restitution amount, but there was evidence of future ability to pay); Medina v. State, 591 So. 2d 10…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cumbie v. State, 597 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Boss v. State, 613 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Vincent v. State, 600 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Pepper v. First Union Nat'l Bank OF Fla., 605 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Evans v. State, 605 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)