UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

COLEY QUINN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

HARRIS, Senior District Judge: Appellant Coley Quinn was charged with conspiring to possess cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine) with the intent to distribute it, and that it was a further purpose of the conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possessing cocaine hydrochloride with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Two codefendants, John Ruff, Jr., II, and John Ruff, Jr., Ill, [sic] also were charged in all counts.

Quinn and his codefendants pled guilty.

Quinn thereafter was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, proceeded to trial, and was found guilty as charged.

Prior to sentencing, Quinn filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the enhanced penalties for crack cocaine and asserting that he had been selectively prosecuted because of his race.

The district judge consolidated the motion with respect to the crack cocaine penalties with a similar motion filed in another of his cases, Hickman, No. 93-14021-CR-KLR, and, after a joint hearing, denied the motion to deem the penalties unconstitutional and denied a request for discovery in connection with the selective prosecution claim.

The district court sentenced Quinn to concurrent 235-month terms of incarceration on Counts One and Two, a consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment on Count Three, and five years of supervised release. I.

Background Coley Quinn and his two codefendants, John Ruff, Jr., II, and John Ruff, Jr., Ill, were arrested on April 14,1993. A confidential informant had told Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents that he had information about a drug ring that was distributing crack cocaine.

At the direction of the agents, the informant telephoned the younger Ruff to arrange the sale of two kilograms of cocaine to the group for $35,000.

Quinn answered the phone and said that they wanted to do the deal immediately.

Later in the day, the informant called the younger Ruff and agreed to meet with Quinn in a shopping center parking lot.

Quinn arrived at the scene of the transaction, left his car, and walked a distance of approximately 50 to 60 feet to the informant’s vehicle.

The informant taped their conversation.

Quinn said that everything was ready and that he had seen the money, but that the Ruffs wanted to check the “shit” by “cook[ing] some.”

Quinn and the informant arranged for the Ruffs to buy the cocaine conditionally and to “cook” some before giving final approval; Quinn described one of the Ruffs as “the greatest guy cooking wise.”

The informant told Quinn that each of them would receive $1,500 for arranging the deal, and Quinn again said that he wanted to close the deal promptly.

The Ruffs arrived thereafter, asked if “Coley” had explained the transaction, displayed the purchase money to the informant, and confirmed the procedure for the deal.

The informant called Officer Patrick Flannery of the City of West Palm Beach Police Department, who was posing as the drug courier. Flannery arrived in a Toyota Camry; Quinn and the younger Ruff got into the car and exchanged the money for the cocaine.

They were .arrested.

The police also arrested a juvenile who was sitting in Quinn’s car and apprehended him with a loaded gun.

Quinn and the Ruffs were transported to a DEA office.

Quinn was advised of his Miranda rights and gave a statement.

According to the agents, Quinn said that he had introduced the informant to the Ruffs after learning that the informant had access to cocaine, that the elder Ruff, in Quinn’s presence, had told the informant that he was in the business of making crack and needed high quality cocaine for that purpose, and that Quinn had seen the informant several times during the next year and they had discussed working together in the future, eventually leading to the transaction at issue here.

Quinn also stated that he had brought the gun for “self-protection,” that he had pulled off 1-95 on the way to the drug deal to check the weapon, and that he had placed the gun between the two front seats of his car and had covered it with a towel.

Quinn also offered to become an informant.

He said that he had worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in the past and gave the name of FBI Special Agent Larry Doss to support this.

Quinn also stated that he was not working for Doss at the time of the arrest and that he had gotten involved in the transaction for the money.

Quinn moved to suppress his post-arrest statement as involuntary, contending that it had been coerced by a false statement that he was facing 40 years in prison.

The motion was denied.

Prior to trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3, Quinn filed a notice of his intent to assert as a defense his belief that he was acting in accordance with public authority.

The ease proceeded to trial, and the government called several law enforcement officers to testify about both the transaction and Quinn’s confession.

On the second day of trial, the government announced its intent to call a previously undisclosed witness, DEA Agent Robert Mangiamele, to testify about an alleged second post-arrest statement made by Quinn that he was involved in the instant transaction for profit and not as an informant.

Quinn objected, and the trial judge restricted Mangiamele’s testimony to rebuttal.

Quinn testified that he had met the informant through his employer and had introduced him to the Ruffs, who wished to do a drug deal.

He began to feel that he was involved in the deal too deeply, called the FBI, and was referred to Agent Doss.

The two met; Quinn provided some information on suspected drug figures, and asked for money.

Doss told Quinn to keep him informed and to make sure his drug contacts were not connected with the DEA. Quinn contacted Doss again in December 1992, and Doss again told Quinn to keep him informed.

Doss previously had told Quinn that he did not want to do any deals for less than five kilograms of cocaine, and Quinn allegedly said that doing so would require a number of preliminary transactions in order to gain the drug dealers’ confidence.

Doss told Quinn to contact him when he reached the five-kilogram level.

Quinn further testified that he contacted Doss again in March 1993 to tell him about a one-kilogram deal involving the younger Ruff, but that he did not have the address for the house where Ruff had picked up the cocaine.

Doss told Quinn that he could not get a search warrant without an address, and Quinn said that he would have to do another drug deal to get it.

On April 12, 1993, the informant contacted Quinn about the instant deal; Quinn did not discuss the April transaction with Doss because they had already discussed Quinn’s building up to a five-kilogram deal.

Quinn also testified that, at about the time he initiated his contact with Doss, he had told two other people that he was contacting the FBI and hoped to work for that agency.

First, in a conversation at a Costco store, he spoke with his longtime acquaintance, John Flint of the Palm Beach Sheriffs Department, and told him that he planned to work for the FBI and asked for advice on how to approach Doss.

Second, Quinn spoke with an HRS caseworker to seek assistance in paying his rent, and he mentioned that he hoped to work as an informant for the FBI.

Quinn wanted to call Flint as a witness, but the government objected and the trial court did not allow Flint to testify.

The HRS case worker did testify for the defense.

At the conclusion of the government’s case, Quinn moved for a judgment of acquittal on the § 924(c) count on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that his gun was used to facilitate a drug trafficking crime.

The trial judge denied the motion, stating: “They don’t have to use the gun in the transaction.

If it is available, could have been used, that’s all that’s required.”

On rebuttal, Agent Doss testified that Quinn had never told him about the Ruffs or a one-kilogram deal in Miami, and that he had not encouraged Quinn to get involved in drug deals and then tell Doss about them later. DEA Special Agent Nicholas Kent and West Palm Beach Police Officer John Kelly testified that Quinn stated that he had participated in the drug deal for the money, and not as an FBI informant.

DEA Special Agent Mangiamele testified that both Doss and Quinn had told him that Quinn had not been working for the FBI at the time of the arrest, and that Quinn had said that he had arranged the deal for the money.

II.

Analysis A The Exclusion of John Flint’s Testimony Quinn contends that the district court incorrectly excluded Flint’s proffered testimony.

Flint, of the Palm Beach Sheriffs Department, was Quinn’s long-time acquaintance and had had a discussion with Quinn in a Costco store.

Quinn testified about this conversation.

The government objected to Flint’s testimony on the ground that it would be hearsay, and the court excluded it.

The parties disagree initially about the applicable standard of review.

The government contends that a plain error standard applies because appellant did not preserve his objection by making an offer of proof to the district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2); appellant urges us to apply an abuse of discretion standard.

Rule 103(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... (2) .... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.”

Rule 103(a)(2) does not require that a formal offer of proof be made to preserve an objection.

Sweiss, 814 F. 2d 1208, 1211 (7th Cir.1986).

Where the substance of the evidence is apparent to the court from its context, an appellant is entitled to ordinary appellate review of a ruling excluding evidence.

Here, that burden was satisfied because the prosecutor was informed in advance of Quinn’s intent to call Flint, objected immediately when Flint’s testimony was proffered, and explained to the court that Flint was going to testify to a certain conversation and that the government believed it to be hearsay.

Moreover, Quinn discussed this conversation during his own testimony.

Accordingly, we conclude that an abuse of discretion standard applies.

See Sheffield, 992 F. 2d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir.1993) (“[B]ecause the trial court and prosecutor were well aware of the substance of the evidence, and the record reflects the substance of the evidence, we find that the defense counsel made an adequate proffer”).

Flint was expected to testify about a conversation he had with Quinn in which Quinn asked Flint about becoming an informant for the FBI.

Quinn contends that Flint’s testimony would have corroborated his defense that he believed he was acting under public authority when he made the drug deal, and therefore lacked the requisite criminal intent.

Quinn contends here, as he did before the district court, that (1) the statements are not hearsay, and (2) even if they are hearsay, they should have been admitted under either the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), or under the “catch-all” provision in Rule 803(24).

We conclude that the district court was incorrect in determining that the statements were hearsay.

Rule 801(c) defines “hearsay” as “a statement ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

Here, the statements were not offered for their truth, i.e., that Quinn was then working or was going to work for the FBI.

See Harris, 733 F. 2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir.1984).

Because we conclude that the offered statements were not proscribed “hearsay,” we need not address the parties’ arguments about exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The exclusion of this testimony, however, did not affect a substantial right of appellant.

See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) and Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).

Flint’s testimony, as discussed above, was offered to establish that Quinn intended to contact Doss about becoming an informant.

There was, however, no dispute that Quinn had this intention and acted upon it.

Moreover, the testimony would have been merely cumulative; Agent Doss and Quinn already had testified about their conversations, and the HRS caseworker testified that Quinn had told him that he intended to work as an FBI informant.

Accordingly, we conclude that the exclusion of Flint’s testimony was harmless error. B.

The Brady/Giglio Issue Quinn filed a pretrial motion requesting that the trial court order the government to disclose the personnel files of the testifying officers for impeachment purposes.

The court granted the motion “within the scope of the Standing Discovery Order.”

Quinn then filed a motion for clarification, asking the court to “rule definitively as to ... whether the Government must review personnel records of law enforcement officers.”

The district judge referred the motion for clarification to a United States Magistrate Judge, who issued an order denying the motion and stating that the government was obliged to furnish counsel with Brady and Giglio material.

Failure to comply with this obligation could result in the imposition of severe sanctions.

This Court declines to instruct the Government on the manner in which to discharge its obligations under the Standing Discovery Order. The district judge read the magistrate judge’s order aloud at an April 7,1994, hearing on Quinn’s two suppression motions.

He then stated: As far as personal [sic] records go, the government has to see if they’re ...

Brady or Giglio ....

Everybody knows that....

And I’m not going to tell the government what it has to do.

One thing to clarify my position is that the government should be reviewing those records to determine whether this is Brady material at sight, not just to necessarily hand them over. The prosecutor stated that she understood the court.

Quinn contends that the district court failed to ensure that the government adequately complied with its order with respect to the personnel records of testifying law enforcement officers.

We review this issue de novo.

See Mejia, 82 F. 3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 188, 136 L.Ed.2d 126 (1996); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F. 2d 285, 298 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 929, 110 S.Ct. 2628, 110 L.Ed.2d 648 (1990).

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the failure of the prosecution to turn over evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt violates due process.

Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97.

Included among the evidence that Brady obligates the prosecution to disclose is “evidence affecting credibility.”

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Brady rule is not an evidentiary rule that grants broad discovery powers to a defendant and that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977).

Here, the district judge required the government to comply with Brady and Giglio, and stated that the government was required to review the personnel files to determine whether they contained Brady or Giglio material.

Quinn, however, contends that “Bra dy and Giglio are not sufficient to insure that a defendant will be able to ascertain whether material exists in the personnel records of federal law enforcement officers that should cast legitimate doubt as to their credibility.”

Quinn thus urges us to follow Henthorn, 931 F. 2d 29 (9th Cir.1991), which holds that when a defendant requests the personnel files of testifying officers, the government must examine them and disclose material information that is favorable to the defense, and that if the government is uncertain about the materiality of the information, it may submit the information to the trial court for in camera review.

Id. at 30-31.

The Henthom court further held that a defendant need not make an initial showing of materiality; the government’s obligation to examine the files arises by virtue of a defendant’s demand for their production, Id. at 31.

We decline to follow Henthorn.

Quinn has offered no support for his contention that the personnel files might contain information of significance to his case; nevertheless, he argues that the government should have been required to disclose the contents of the files or produce the files for the district court’s inspection.

In Pitt, 717 F. 2d 1334 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1421, 79 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), however, this court rejected that argument and held that because a defendant had failed to demonstrate that the contents of an FBI agent’s file contained material evidence, the district court did not err in refusing to order the prosecution to turn over the file.

Id. at 1338-39.

Other circuits also have rejected this argument.

In Andrus, 775 F. 2d 825 (7th Cir.1985), the Seventh Circuit held: “ Mere speculation that a government file may contain Brady material is not sufficient to require a remand for in camera inspection, much less reversal for a new trial. A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the district court.”

Id. at 843 (quoting Navarro, 737 F. 2d 625, 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 438, 83 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984)).

The Sixth Circuit also has rejected the argument, citing Andrus and Pitt.

See Driscoll, 970 F. 2d 1472, 1482 (6th Cir.1992) (upholding government’s refusal to disclose testifying officers’ personnel files based only on defendant’s speculation that files contained material useful to impeach officers' credibility), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1083, 113 S.Ct. 1056, 122 L.Ed.2d 362 (1993).

Quinn’s speculative claim falls into the same category as the claims rejected in Pitt, Andrus, and Driscoll, and we conclude that the district court did not err by not providing further relief. C.

The Admission of Agent Mangiamele’s Testimony At the beginning of the second day of the three-day trial, the AUSA notified the court that she and the case agent, Kent, had learned the previous evening of a post-arrest statement Quinn had made to Agent Mangiamele, in which Quinn stated that he was not working for Agent Doss at the time of the arrest and that he participated in the drug transaction for money. (This statement was made at a different time than the similar statement made in the presence of Agent Kent and Officer Kelly.) Defense counsel objected to the admission of this testimony on the ground that Mangia-mele’s name and the substance of his testimony had not been disclosed to Quinn prior to trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12.3(a)(2) and 16(a)(1)(A), and the Standing Discovery Order. The district court permitted the testimony as rebuttal on the ground that it was merely corroborative.

Quinn argues that his defense was prejudiced by the admission of this testimony, which with more time he might have been able to have excluded.

Rule 12.3(a) requires the government to give notice of any witness who may contradict a public authority defense.

Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires the government to disclose any oral statement made by the defendant to a government agent that the government intends to offer as evidence at trial.

Both rules require the government to make prompt disclosure, before or during trial, of information of which it learns after giving the initial notice.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.3(b) & 16(c). “[A] discovery violation does not automatically preclude the government’s use of the evidence at trial.”

Accetturo, 966 F. 2d 631, 636 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1082, 113 S.Ct. 1053, 122 L.Ed.2d 360 (1993).

Moreover, we will reverse a conviction based on the government’s violation of a discovery order only if the defendant has demonstrated that the violation “prejudiced his substantial rights.”

Rivera, 944 F. 2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir.1991).

Here, Mangiamele’s testimony was cumulative of the testimony presented by Kent and Kelly, who testified that Quinn had told them that he had not been working for the FBI prior to his arrest, but instead had participated in the drug deal for the money.

We therefore readily conclude that Mangia-mele’s testimony did not prejudice Quinn’s substantial rights.

See id. at 1566-67. D.

The Proposed Entrapment Instruction Quinn contends that the district court erred by denying his request for an entrapment instruction.

He asserts that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense theory with some basis in the evidence and legal support, citing Hedges, 912 F. 2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir.1990) (regarding jury instruction on entrapment by estoppel), and contends that his testimony demonstrated that Agent Doss induced him to participate in the drug transaction.

Entrapment is an affirmative defense, evidence of which must be presented before the issue is considered to be properly raised.

Gates, 967 F. 2d 497, 499 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 632, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992).

The defendant has the “initial burden of producing evidence, or of pointing to substantial evidence” showing government involvement or inducement.

Parr, 716 F. 2d 796, 802 (11th Cir.1983).

To satisfy this burden, [t]he defendant must demonstrate not merely inducement or suggestion on the part of the government but “an element of persuasion or mild coercion.”...

The defendant may make such a showing by demonstrating that he had not favorably received the government plan, and the government had had to “push it” on him, ..., or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one occasion he had directly refused to participate ....

Ventura, 936 F. 2d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted in text), quoting Andrews, 765 F. 2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 815, 88 L.Ed.2d 789 (1986).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused.

Gates, 967 F. 2d at 499; Parr, 716 F. 2d at 802.

Applying the law to the facts presented here, Quinn indicated no reluctance to get involved in the drug deal.

Nor is there any evidence that Agent Doss persuaded or coerced him in any way.

Evidence that the agent merely did not discourage Quinn from participating in the venture is insufficient to entitle Quinn to an entrapment instruction.

Because Quinn failed to come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue of entrapment, we conclude that the district court correctly refused to instruct on entrapment. E.

Quinn’s Motion To Suppress His Post-Arrest Statements Quinn filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statements to Agent Kent on the grounds that Kent made improper inducements and threats to him and discouraged his obtaining an attorney.

At the hearing, Quinn testified that he had been told that he was facing a 40-year sentence but might receive a more favorable sentence if he cooperated.

He testified that he also had been told that it would be difficult to cooperate once an attorney had been appointed.

He also suggested that he had not properly been advised of his Miranda rights; he stated that although his rights were read to him orally, the written waiver form that he signed had been obscured.

Agent Kent testified that the issue of the potential sentence arose only after Quinn asked Kent about it, and that he made a accurate estimate of Quinn’s potential sentence: he predicted 25 years, and Quinn ultimately was sentenced to a 295-month term of incarceration. “[DJiscussions of realistic penalties ... are normally insufficient to preclude free choice.”

Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F. 2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 436, 121 L.Ed.2d 356 (1992).

Regarding Kent’s discussion of Quinn’s choice to obtain counsel, the government contends that Kent “simply advised Quinn of the consequences that could flow from delaying any attempt at cooperation.”

We observe, in any event, that Quinn made no inculpatory statements after Kent’s statement about obtaining counsel.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and review its application of law to facts de novo.

Blackman, 66 F. 3d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1365, 134 L.Ed.2d 531, and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 393, 136 L.Ed.2d 309 (1996).

The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, who concluded that Quinn’s statement was voluntarily made, and, to the extent that Quinn’s testimony conflicted with the finding that Agent Kent had made no threats to Quinn, it was not credible.

The court also concluded that Quinn had been advised of his Miranda rights.

The admissibility of confessions is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States ... a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).

We agree with the district court that Quinn’s statement was made knowingly and voluntarily.

We also conclude that Quinn’s suggestion that the statement should have been suppressed because he was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights is without merit.

Quinn-himself testified that an agent read him his rights.

The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. F.

Sentencing Guideline Issues Quinn further argues that the district court erred in determining that his offenses involved crack cocaine, that the court erred by rejecting his request for a downward departure, that the penalties for crack cocaine offenses are cruel and unusual as applied to Quinn, that the penalties for crack cocaine offenses lack a rational basis, and that the court erred by denying his request for discovery on-his selective prosecution claim.

All of these claims lack merit, and we address them briefly. 1.

Quinn first contends that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level according to the guideline for 1.6 kilograms of crack rather than at the level which would be applicable to two kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride.

He argues that there was insufficient evidence to justify sentencing him to the higher penalty for crack cocaine.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Lewis, 115 F. 3d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir.1997).

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Id.

Here, because the jury’s verdict did not specify the object of Quinn’s conspiracy, i.e., possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride or crack cocaine, Quinn could be sentenced under the guideline for crack cocaine only if “the court, were it sitting as a trier of fact, would convict the defendant of conspiring to commit that offense.”

McKinley, 995 F. 2d 1020, 1025-26 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d) comment 5), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1021, 114 S.Ct. 1405, 128 L.Ed.2d 77, and cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1036, 114 S.Ct. 1552, 128 L.Ed.2d 201 (1994).

During the sentencing hearing, in response to Quinn’s objection to the pre-sentence report, the district judge stated: It’s clear to me that if I were hearing this as the trier of fact, that I wouldn’t have any trouble at all in finding that he was— the object of the conspiracy was to cook crack, so on that basis I would find that the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the conspiracy was to cook crack with it.

The district court’s explicit finding is amply supported by the record.

The conversion of powder cocaine into crack not only was foreseeable bj[ Quinn, but was plainly within the scope of the criminal activity that he undertook.

There was evidence that Quinn had discussed “cooking” the cocaine with the informant, and that the elder Ruff, in Quinn’s presence, had told the informant that he was in the business of making crack and needed high quality cocaine for that job.

Cf.

Chisholm, 73 F. 3d 304, 308 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that it was neither reasonably foreseeable to defendant nor an object of the conspiracy that powder cocaine would be converted to crack where defendant merely assisted with the procurement of powder cocaine, had no contact with the crack dealer, and where the record contained no evidence that defendant had knowledge of, or agreement to, the planned conversion).

Accordingly, we reject this argument.